nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2013‒05‒11
six papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Platform Competition and Access Regulation on the Internet By Sue Mialon; Samiran Banerjee
  2. Utilizarea componentelor Social Media in mediul de afaceri – perspectiva IMM-urilor By Robu, Maximilian
  3. On pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games By Riascos Villegas, Alvaro; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
  4. Why Rent When You Can Buy? A Theory of Repurchase Agreements By Borghan Nezami Narajabad; Cyril Monnet
  5. Sales Mechanisms in Online Markets: What Happened to Internet Auctions? By Liran Einav; Chiara Farronato; Jonathan D. Levin; Neel Sundaresan
  6. Regional Food Hubs: Improving Market Access for Local Producers By Barham, James; Tropp, Debra; Dimitri, Carolyn

  1. By: Sue Mialon; Samiran Banerjee
    Abstract: We provide a new model of platform competition on the Internet and analyze the effect of last-mile access charges on market outcomes. Consumers subscribe to two vertically related platforms, an Internet service provider (ISP) and a content network platform (CNP), to reach content providers (CPs). CPs interact with consumers via CNPs. Local ISPs provide an essential input: the internet connection for consumers and the last-mile access for the CNPs. The effects of access regulation that lowers the ISPs' last-mile access charges depend on (i) how much consumers value the network services, (ii) how much an increase in the Internet price lowers CNPs' fees from CPs, and (iii) the elasticities of consumer demand for the Internet with respect to price and network externality. When consumers' valuation of the network services is very high, the market for Internet connection is fully covered and access regulation unambiguously improves welfare since it lowers the fees for CPs without affecting consumer demand. When consumers' valuation is very low, access regulation does not have any impact because ISPs optimally set the access charge at zero. When consumers' valuation is moderate and the CNPs' fee reduction in response to a higher Internet price is large, access regulation lowers not only the fees from CPs but also consumer Internet prices. Hence, the "seasaw principle" between consumer Internet price and access charge breaks down in this case, and access regulation unambiguously improves welfare for consumers and CPs. On the other hand, if CNPs' fee adjustment is minimal, access regulation induces a higher consumer internet price and the welfare implication of access regulation is ambiguous. Access regulation improves welfare in this case if consumer demand responds more to the change in network externality than the change in price.
    Date: 2012–01
  2. By: Robu, Maximilian
    Abstract: SMEs have a major contribution to economic growth and job creation. In a dynamic world, marked by very rapid technological and economic changes, they must adapt and seek new ways to improve business. Social Media seems to provide tools to improve the work, especially on the sales and marketing. This paper is to capture how social media components are used in SMEs, also highlighting some of the advantages of them.
    Keywords: social media, sales, marketing,SMEs
    JEL: D80 L82 L86
    Date: 2013–03–31
  3. By: Riascos Villegas, Alvaro; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
    Abstract: We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions are continuous and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. When atomic players have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave objective functions, a pure strategy Nash equilibria always exists.
    Keywords: Generalized games; Non-convexities; Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
    JEL: C72 C62
    Date: 2013–03
  4. By: Borghan Nezami Narajabad (Rice University); Cyril Monnet (Universitat Bern)
    Abstract: In a model with matching frictions, we provide conditions under which repurchase agreements (or repos) co-exist with asset sales. In a repo, the seller agrees to repurchase the asset at a later date at the agreed price. Absent bilateral trading frictions, repos have no role despite uncertainty about future valuations. Introducing pairwise meetings, we show that agents prefer to sell (or buy) assets whenever they face little uncertainty regarding the future use of the asset. As agents become more uncertain of the value of holding the asset, repos become more prevalent. We show that while the total volume of repos is always increasing with the uncertainty, the total sales volume is hump-shaped. In other words, pairwise matching alone is sufficient to explain why repo markets exist and there is no need to introduce random matching, search frictions, information asymmetries or other market frictions.
    Date: 2012
  5. By: Liran Einav; Chiara Farronato; Jonathan D. Levin; Neel Sundaresan
    Abstract: Consumer auctions were very popular in the early days of internet commerce, but today online sellers mostly use posted prices. Data from eBay shows that compositional shifts in the items being sold, or the sellers offering these items, cannot account for this evolution. Instead, the returns to sellers using auctions have diminished. We develop a model to distinguish two hypotheses: a shift in buyer demand away from auctions, and general narrowing of seller margins that favors posted prices. Our estimates suggest that the former is more important. We also provide evidence on where auctions still are used, and on why some sellers may continue to use both auctions and posted prices.
    JEL: D02 D43 D44 D82 L13 L86
    Date: 2013–05
  6. By: Barham, James; Tropp, Debra; Dimitri, Carolyn
    Abstract: This is a PDF of a Powerpoint presentation.
    Keywords: food hub, local food, Agribusiness, Marketing,
    Date: 2012–09

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