nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2012‒04‒17
seven papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Can we curb retail sales volatility through marketing mix actions? By Mercedes Esteban Bravo; Gökhan Yildirim; Jose Vidal-Sanz
  2. Persuasive Silence By Toru Suzuki
  3. Consumer Behavioural Biases in Competition: A Survey By Steffen Huck; Jidong Zhou
  4. Price Competition with Consumer Confusion By Ioanna Chioveanu; Jidong Zhou
  5. L'effetto country of origin sull'intenzione d'acquisto del consumatore: una literature review By Vianelli, Donata; Marzano, Fabio Claudio
  6. Competitive Targeted Marketing By Hang-Hyun Jo; Jeoung-Yoo Kim
  7. Informative Advertising in Directed Search By Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro; Julien, Benoit; Chengsi, Wang

  1. By: Mercedes Esteban Bravo; Gökhan Yildirim; Jose Vidal-Sanz
    Abstract: Sales uncertainty is a central problem for marketing management. Marketers tend to focus on expected sales, rather than short-term time-varying oscillations. With long supply-chain streams, the Bullwhip effect can turn retail sales volatility into a major problem for upstream companies. While it has been recognized that conditional expected sales change through time (for a review see Dekimpe and Hanssens, 2000), marketers have not yet started to modeling explicitly time variation of sales' conditional variances. In this paper we focus on this issue, modeling and forecasting time-varying retail sales and marketing mix volatility and their crossed effects within brand, and between competitive brands. We analyze up to 6 product categories sold by Dominick's Finer Foods, finding volatility and co-volatilities in all of them. We discuss managerial implications for brand management and competitive strategy
    Keywords: Sales, Volatility, Bullwhip effect, Marketing mix
    Date: 2011–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb112407&r=mkt
  2. By: Toru Suzuki (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)
    Abstract: In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the eective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an eective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can "backfire" and when it can be eective.
    Keywords: Signaling game, Consideration set, Counter signaling, Limited attention, Marketing, Advertising
    JEL: D03 D82 D83 L15
    Date: 2012–04–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-014&r=mkt
  3. By: Steffen Huck; Jidong Zhou
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-16&r=mkt
  4. By: Ioanna Chioveanu; Jidong Zhou
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-19&r=mkt
  5. By: Vianelli, Donata; Marzano, Fabio Claudio
    Abstract: The aim of this study is to provide a literature review on the influence of the country of origin effect (COO) on consumer behavior. Despite the high number of studies carried out on COO since the Sixties, many issues are still discussed in the literature and several research questions should be clarified. Hence it becomes relevant to investigate more on this topic that is considered to be increasingly relevant in the international marketing strategy of the company. The main contributes have been analyzed following a chronological / conceptual approach, giving more relevance to the researches that had been able to add a significant value to the research literature. Suggestions for future researches pointed out by different Authors have been organized and structured, in order to create a stimulus for new studies and in-depth analysis on the country of origin effect.
    Keywords: Country of origin, Brand image, Country image, Consumer behavior
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tre:wpaper:7&r=mkt
  6. By: Hang-Hyun Jo; Jeoung-Yoo Kim
    Abstract: In this paper, we consider two firms diffusing incompatible technologies and their decision of consumer targeting. The technology adoption is made in two steps. First, once the firms sell their products to their respective targeted consumer, the technology is diffused successively by word-of-mouth communication from the initial consumer to other consumers linked along the network. Then, in the second step, each consumer imitates the technology distribution keeps evolving until it reaches the long-run steady state. We demonstrate that the early entrant chooses the minmax location when firms are myopic in the sense that they do not take the imitation possibility into account. If firms consider the possibility of imitation, the best target will tend towards a hub, although the minmax principle in general keeps valid in the sense that it should be the minmax location after considering imitation.
    Date: 2012–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0834&r=mkt
  7. By: Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro; Julien, Benoit; Chengsi, Wang
    Abstract: We consider a directed search environment where capacity constrained sellers reach uncoordinated buyers through costly advertising while buyers observed all prices probabilistically. We show that: (i) the equilibrium advertising intensity has an inverted U-shape in market tightness, (ii) the equilibrium advertising intensity is higher under an auction mechanism than under posted pricing, and (iii) the equilibrium price and measure of informed buyers may {be positively correlated} even in large markets.
    Keywords: costly advertising; directed search; imperfect observability; sales mechanism
    JEL: M37 J64 D83
    Date: 2012–04–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38057&r=mkt

This nep-mkt issue is ©2012 by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.