nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2011‒09‒22
six papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Customer driven marketing strategy of LIC international in Bahrain: a product specific study By Pillai, Rajasekharan; Rao, M S; Thampy, Jaik; Peter, Jerrin
  2. Accounting for Taste: Consumer Valuations for Food-Safety Technologies By David M. Bruner; William L. Huth; David M. McEvoy; O. Ashton Morgan
  3. Strategic loyalty reward in dynamic price Discrimination By Bernard Caillaud; Romain De Nijs
  4. The dynamics of a differentiated duopoly with quantity competition By Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
  5. Influences on Sponsorship Deals in NASCAR: Indirect Evidence from Time on Camera By Kurt W. Rotthoff; Craig A. Depken, II; Peter A. Groothuis
  6. A Simplified Mixed Logit Demand Model with an Application to the Simulation of Entry By Sergio Aquino de Souza

  1. By: Pillai, Rajasekharan; Rao, M S; Thampy, Jaik; Peter, Jerrin
    Abstract: Abstract Marketing of service product requires a slightly different strategy owing to the idiosyncratic nature of service items. The present study explores the customer oriented marketing strategy of LIC International in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The approach of the study was exploratory and personal interview was conducted to contribute major input source to the research. The company has been following a different marketing strategy in the study area different from the conventional approach in the home country. The customer focused marketing strategy was reviewed in seven Ps frame work.
    Keywords: Service marketing; LIC international; insurance marketing; Seven Ps
    JEL: M31 G22
    Date: 2011
  2. By: David M. Bruner; William L. Huth; David M. McEvoy; O. Ashton Morgan
    Abstract: Consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for post-harvest processed (PHP) raw oysters – oysters without health risks – is studied in experimental nth-price auction markets. The experimental design decomposes the effects of taste, objective risk information, and information on four PHP technologies on consumers’ valuations. Results show that relatively uninformed consumers are willing to pay equivalent amounts for PHP and traditional raw oysters. However, after a blind taste test consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for traditional raw oysters. The premium for traditional oysters persists after objective information on risk and processing technology is provided. The results are robust over PHP technologies. Key Words: experimental auction market, food safety, risk preference elicitation, consumer perceptions, oysters
    JEL: C9 D8 I18
    Date: 2011
  3. By: Bernard Caillaud (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA); Romain De Nijs (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique)
    Abstract: This paper proposes a dynamic model of duopolistic competition under behaviorbased price discrimination with the following property: in equilibrium, a firm may reward its previous customers although long term contracts are not enforceable. A firm can offer a lower price to its previous customers than to its new customers as a strategic means to hamper its rival to gather precise information on the young generation of customers for subsequent profitable behavior-based pricing. The result holds both with myopic and forward-looking, impatient enough consumers.
    Keywords: Price discrimination ; Dynamic pricing ; Loyalty reward
    Date: 2011–09
  4. By: Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
    Abstract: We analyse the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with heterogeneous players to investigate the effects of micro-founded differentiated products demand. The present analysis, which modifies and extends Zhang et al. (2007) (Zhang, J., Da, Q., Wang, Y., 2007. Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players. Economic Modelling 24, 138–148) and Tramontana, F., (2010) (Tramontana, F., 2010. Heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function. Economic Modelling 27, 350–357), reveals that a higher degree of product differentiation may destabilise the market equilibrium. Moreover, we show that a cascade of flip bifurcations may lead to periodic cycles and ultimately chaotic motions. Since a higher degree of product differentiation implies weaker competition, then a theoretical implication of our findings, that also constitute a policy warning for firms, is that a fiercer (weaker) competition tends to stabilise (destabilise) the unique positive Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the economy.
    Keywords: Bifurcation; Chaos; Cournot; Oligopoly; Product differentiation
    JEL: L13 D43 C62
    Date: 2011–09–17
  5. By: Kurt W. Rotthoff; Craig A. Depken, II; Peter A. Groothuis
    Abstract: Corporate sponsorship plays an important role in the entertainment business. The question becomes: what influences the value of a sponsorship contract? Empirical analysis of this question is relatively limited because of a lack of complete data on contract values. This is especially true in NASCAR where sponsorship values are generally not released to the public. We analyze a proportional proxy for driver sponsorship value: the value of time on camera. We find that the value of time on camera is influenced by driver performance but also by their experience and, in the case of two drivers, their family name-brand capital. The results confirm that sponsorship value in NASCAR is not only determined by what a driver has done most recently but, to some extent, what their fathers had done before them. Key Words: Sports, Sponsorship, NASCAR, Naming Rights, Return on Investment, Advertising
    Date: 2011
  6. By: Sergio Aquino de Souza
    Abstract: The key contribution of this paper is to show how to incorporate more information into the empirical strategy in order to avoid the need of valid instruments, which are difficult to find in many instances. I use information on price elasticity to propose a methodology that is able to determine the parameters of a simplified Mixed Logit Model. I also apply this methodology to the ready-to-eat cereal industry and simulate the competitive and welfare effects of the introduction of new products.
    Keywords: Discrete-Choice, Demand Models, Competition
    JEL: L11 D12
    Date: 2011

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