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on Marketing |
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Issue of 2010‒06‒18
ten papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon |
| By: | Katja Brunk |
| Abstract: | This research investigates the process of how consumers form ethical perceptions of companies or brands by means of twenty in-depth interviews with general consumers. The study offers illustrative examples of evidence that the formation of consumer perceived ethicality (CPE) appears more in line with the configural model of impression formation, suggesting that perception formation is holistic and gestalt-like, rather than following the algebraic model, which takes a piecemeal information integration position. Given the explorative nature of the study, the paper concludes with developing research propositions for future – confirmative – testing. |
| Keywords: | Ethical Consumerism; Impression Formation; Brand Perceptions; Consumer Perceived Ethicality (CPE); Corporate Ethics/CSR; Qualitative Research |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/57818&r=mkt |
| By: | Gallardo Ramiro, M V |
| Abstract: | Inditex, S. A. is a leading textile holding. It has seven brand names, although the best known is Zara, its flagship. The key to its success lies in a swift response from production to market needs. The marketing strategy is locating its new brand names stores in major shopping streets. Moreover, the way it has to introduce its new ones is through its flagship. This article will study about the way of Inditex about making decisions about international investment. |
| Keywords: | Inditex; Sistema de Información de Gestión; Inversión Internacional; Información Segmentada |
| JEL: | M1 |
| Date: | 2010–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23210&r=mkt |
| By: | Angyridis , Constantine; Sen, Debapriya |
| Abstract: | This paper seeks to explain two related phenomena: (i) it is often the case that when the new variety of a product is launched, some consumers do not purchase the latest variety and (ii) the quality of the latest variety of a product is often not significantly superior compared to the existing variety. We consider a simple model of monopoly with two types of consumers: "regular" (type R) who cares only about the absolute quality of the product and "fastidious" (type F) who cares about the relative quality vis-a-vis the existing variety. We show that it is never optimal for the monopolist to exclusively serve type F. Moreover, we identify situations where although it is optimal for the monopolist to upgrade the quality of the product, this upgrade is not sufficient to meet the standards of type F. As a result, only type R buys the upgraded variety while type F chooses not to buy it. |
| Keywords: | Relative Preference; Absolute Preference; Singular Menu; Separating Menu |
| JEL: | D86 D82 D42 L15 |
| Date: | 2010–06–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23103&r=mkt |
| By: | Javorcik, Beata S.; Saggi, Kamal |
| Abstract: | How does the preferred entry mode of foreign investors depend on their technological capability relative to that of their rivals? This article develops a simple model of entry mode choice and evaluates its main testable implication using data on foreign investors in Eastern European countries and the successor states of the Soviet Union. The model considers competition between two asymmetric foreign investors and captures the following trade-off: while a joint venture (JV) helps a foreign investor secure a better position in the product market vis-à-vis its rival, it also requires that profits be shared with the local partner. The model predicts that the efficient foreign investor is less likely to choose a JV and more likely to enter directly relative to the inefficient investor. Our empirical analysis supports this prediction: foreign investors with more sophisticated technologies and marketing skills (relative to other firms in their industry) tend to prefer direct entry to JVs. This empirical finding is robust to controlling for host country–specific effects and other commonly cited determinants of entry mode. |
| JEL: | F13 O32 D F23 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:oxford:http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/14766/&r=mkt |
| By: | A. Mantovani |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the strategic effect of bundling when a multi-product firm producing two complements faces competition in both markets. I consider a demand structure where both Cournot and Bertrand competition can be evaluated. Bundling is completely ineffective when firms compete in quantities. On the contrary, under Bertrand competition, selling the two goods in a package is profitable when the goods produced by the rivals are perceived as close substitutes to those produced by the multi-product firm. Bundling drives prices up, and not only consumer surplus, but also social welfare shrinks, thus calling for the intervention of the antitrust agency. |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:705&r=mkt |
| By: | Carvajal, Andrés (Department of Economics, University of Warwick); Rostek, Marzena (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison,); Weretka, Marek (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison,) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the optimal bundling strategies of a multiproduct monopoly in markets in which a seller cannot monitor and thereby restrict the purchases of buyers to a single bundle, while buyers have resale opportunities. In such markets, the standard mechanism through which bundling increases seller profits, based on price discrimination, is not feasible. The profit-maximizing bundling strategy is characterized, given the restrictions on pricing policies resulting from resale and a lack of monitoring. The welfare implications of optimal bundling are analyzed. |
| Keywords: | Bundling ; Pricing ; Revenue Maximization ; Product Design JEL Codes: D42 ; L12 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:936&r=mkt |
| By: | Chi, Feng; Yang, Nathan |
| Abstract: | Our general objective is to characterize the recent and well publicized diffusion of Twitter among politicians in the United States 111th House of Representatives. Ultimately, Barrack Obama, Facebook and peers matter when it comes to the propensity and speed of Twitter adoption. A basic analysis of the distribution of first Tweets over time reveals clustering around the President's inauguration; which holds regardless whether the adopter is Democratic or Republican, or an incumbent or newcomer. After we characterize which representatives are most likely to adopt Twitter, we confirm the widespread belief that Facebook and Twitter are indeed complementary technology. Given their perceived desire for accessible government, a surprising result is that Republicans are more likely to adopt Twitter than Democrats. Finally, using the exact dates of each adopter's first Tweet, we demonstrate that the diffusion of Twitter is faster for those representatives with a larger number of peers already using the technology, where peers are defined by two social networks: (1) Politicians representing the same state; and (2) politicians belonging to the same committees; especially so for those in committee networks. This observed behavior can be rationalized by social learning, as the instances in which the peer effects are important correspond to the cases in which social learning is relevant. |
| Keywords: | Communication; diffusion of technology; political marketing; social interaction; social media; social learning. |
| JEL: | M3 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2010–06–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23225&r=mkt |
| By: | J. V. Meenakshi (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India); Abhijit Banerji (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India); Victor Manyong (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture); Keith Tomlins (Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich); Priscilla Hamukwala (University of Zambia); Nitya Mittal (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India) |
| Abstract: | Using a discrete choice experiment, this paper estimates the willingness to pay for biofortified orange maize in rural Zambia. The study design has five treatment arms, which enable an analysis of the impact of nutrition information, comparing the use of simulated radio versus community leaders in transmitting the nutrition message, on willingness to pay, and to account for possible novelty effects in the magnitude of premiums or discounts. The estimation strategy also takes into account lexicographic preferences of a subset of our respondents. The results suggest that (a) orange maize is well liked and can compete with white maize in the absence of a nutrition campaign, (b) there is a premium for orange maize with nutrition information, and (c) the mode of nutritional-message dissemination does not have a large impact on consumer acceptance, and (d) novelty effects do not translate into higher willingness to pay for orange maize. |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cde:cdewps:186&r=mkt |
| By: | Gallardo Ramiro, M V |
| Abstract: | Different strategies adopted by corporation’s management condition its market success. If a strategy were good enough, the rest of the corporations that operate on its activity segment which have similar characteristics would try to copy it. Inditex is leading the textile sector, meanwhile Hennes and Mauritz (H&M) is not getting closer enough to Inditex in order to obtain a vantage point forehead to it. This article is a comparative analysis about the policy, the strategy and the result of them. |
| Keywords: | Inditex; Hennes and Mauritz; Dirección Estratégica; Inversión Internacional; Información Segmentada |
| JEL: | M1 |
| Date: | 2010–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23154&r=mkt |
| By: | Jorn Altmann; Costas Courcoubetis; Marcel Risch (Technology Management, Economics and Policy Program(TEMEP), Seoul National University) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the design and implementation of the GridEcon Marketplace. In addition to supporting a market mechanism for trading computing resources on a pay-per-use basis, this marketplace also provides an environment for integrating value-added support services. These value-added services help consumers to use the utility computing market more efficiently. The GridEcon Market Mechanism for virtual machines specifies in detail the unit-of-trade, the bids and asks, as well as the matching algorithm. The marketplace and market mechanism are validated by using the GridEcon Platform, which is a service-oriented platform for composing market scenarios. Our validation results show that the GridEcon Marketplace fulfills all functional requirements and that the GridEcon Market Mechanism is computationally and economically efficient. |
| Keywords: | Grid Economics, Cloud computing, computing resource market, market mechanism design, utility computing, Grid computing, simulation, market scenario emulation. |
| JEL: | C02 C61 C63 D44 L11 L15 L86 L99 M21 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snv:dp2009:201059&r=mkt |