nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2008‒06‒13
five papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of the Beira Interior

  1. Software Marketing on the Internet: the Use of Samples and Repositories By Alexia Gaudeul
  2. Using Contract Mechanisms to Coordinate Product line Decisions By Reddy Nalla, Vijayender; Veen, Jack van der; Venugopal, Venu
  3. Constant-Quality House Price Indexes for Switzerland By Steven C. BOURASSA; Martin HOESLI; Donato SCOGNAMIGLIO; Philippe SORMANI
  4. A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding By Ricardo Gonçalves
  5. Do College Football Games Pay for Themselves? The Impact of College Football Games on Local Sales Tax Revenue By Dennis Coates; Craig A. Depken, II

  1. By: Alexia Gaudeul (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)
    Abstract: This paper examines one of the most important marketing strategies by software producers on the Internet. That is whether to offer free samples and if so, whether to list the samples on shareware repositories. I show that firms with higher value products have a greater incentive to offer free samples but are more reluctant to do so if they are well known, and even when they do are less likely to be listed on shareware repositories. I then proceed to use four types of Probit-based models to corroborate the findings from the theoretical model.
    Keywords: Shareware; Software; Internet; Distribution; Intermediation; Directory; Repository; Advertising; Brand; Reputation; Asymmetric Information; Search; Sample.
    JEL: D42 D43 D82 D83 L13 L15 L81 L86
    Date: 2008–06
  2. By: Reddy Nalla, Vijayender; Veen, Jack van der; Venugopal, Venu (Nyenrode Business Universiteit)
    Abstract: In this paper we design contract mechanisms to increase the efficiency of product line decisions in a Supply Chain (SC). A two stage SC with a buyer and the supplier is considered. The end consumers are comprised of two segments with different willingness to pay. The final demand and the segments’ willingness to pay are assumed to be deterministic. Two different settings are analyzed: A generalized setting where the end consumer’s willingness to pay is proportional to the quality of the product and the second is a specialized case where the consumer’s willingness to pay is independent of the quality of the product. It is demonstrated that in both the settings a decentralized SC stocks less number of product variants when compared to centralized SC. Marketing literature suggests that the so-called “slotting allowance” is a mechanism to increase the efficiency of product line decisions. However, the literature on slotting allowance does not address the issue of coordination and win-win. In this paper we discuss the revenue and profit sharing mechanisms. It is shown that not only these mechanisms coordinate the SC but that they also provide win-win to both players
    Keywords: Product line decisions, Contract mechanisms, Channel coordination & win-win.
    Date: 2008
  3. By: Steven C. BOURASSA (University of Louisville, CEREBEM, BEM Management School); Martin HOESLI (University of Geneva, University of Aberdeen, CEREBEM, BEM Management School and Swiss Finance Institute); Donato SCOGNAMIGLIO (IAZI / CIFI); Philippe SORMANI (IAZI / CIFI)
    Abstract: The measurement of house price movements is a vital topic from both academic and practical perspectives and hence has been the focus of much research. There is almost unanimous consensus in the literature that house price indexes should control for the quality of properties; the most widely used methods to attain this aim are the hedonic and repeat sales approaches. The objective of this paper is to compare the Swiss house prices indexes published by the Swiss National Bank (SNB), which are constructed using medians of list prices as published in newspapers and on the internet, to hedonic indexes based on sale prices for the period 1985 to 2006. We find that the list price indexes exhibit quite a different price path than the hedonic indexes during the period. In particular, they appear to overstate price changes in housing markets. We attribute this, at least in part, to changes over time in the composition of the sample of properties on the market.
    Keywords: house price indexes, hedonic method, Switzerland
    JEL: E31 R31
    Date: 2008–05
  4. By: Ricardo Gonçalves (Faculdade de Economia e Gestão - Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto))
    Abstract: This paper analyses a model of a common value English auction with discrete bidding. In this model, we show that there exists a communication equilibrium in which the high signal bidder strategically chooses his first bid so as to maximise his expected utility. Straightforward bidding, or increasing the bid by the minimum amount possible, is the equilibrium strategy for both bidders in all other auction rounds. We relate this result to recent research on English auctions with discrete bidding and auctions where bidders may have noisy information about their opponent's signals.
    Keywords: English Auctions, discrete bidding, communication equilibrium
    JEL: D44
    Date: 2008–06
  5. By: Dennis Coates (Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Baltimore County); Craig A. Depken, II (Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina - Charlotte)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the net impacts of college football games on the sales tax revenues and taxable sales of four mid-sized cities in Texas. The paper addresses the question in the title, but also asks whether state policy makers might be justified in encouraging schools in their state to play one another based on the local economic impact those games will have. In general, our evidence suggests the answer to that question is no.
    Keywords: tourism, economic impacts, special events
    JEL: L83 H27
    Date: 2008–06

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