nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2007‒02‒17
five papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of the Beira Interior

  1. Product Intelligence: Its Conceptualization, Measurement and Impact on Consumer Satisfaction By Rijsdijk, S.A.; Hultink, E.J.; Diamantopoulos, A.
  2. Advertising and Newspaper Differentiation: On the Role of Readers’ Advertising Taste By Kind, Hans Jarle; Koethenbuerger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm
  3. Newspapers and Advertising: The Effects of Ad-Valorem Taxation under Duopoly By Kind, Hans Jarle; Schjelderup, Guttorm; Stähler, Frank
  4. Pricing and Trust By Steffen Huck; Gabriele K. Ruchala; Jean-Robert Tyran
  5. Impact of Electronic Trading Platforms on the Brokered Interdealer Market for Government of Canada Benchmark Bonds By Natasha Khan

  1. By: Rijsdijk, S.A.; Hultink, E.J.; Diamantopoulos, A. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University)
    Abstract: In the last decade, companies have developed a large number of intelligent products. Due to the use of information technology, these products, for example, are able to work autonomously, cooperate with other products, or adapt to changing circumstances. Although intelligent products appear an attractive category of products, they have received little attention in the literature. The present article provides a conceptualization of the new construct of product intelligence and describes the development procedure of a measure for the construct. In addition, the article sets up and empirically tests a conceptual framework in which product intelligence leads to consumer satisfaction through the innovation attributes of relative advantage, compatibility, and complexity. Managerial implications for new product development and marketing of intelligent products are considered and suggestions for further research provided.
    Keywords: Intelligent products;Smart products;Adoption;Innovation;New product development;
    Date: 2007–01–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:eureri:30009608&r=mkt
  2. By: Kind, Hans Jarle (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Koethenbuerger, Marko (Center for Economic Studies, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität); Schjelderup, Guttorm (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: Newspapers have an incentive to moderate their profile in order to gain a larger readership and thus higher advertising revenue. We show that this incentive is weakened both if readers are ad-haters and if they are ad-lovers.
    Keywords: Media; Two-sided Markets; Product Differentiation; Hotelling
    JEL: D40 D43
    Date: 2007–02–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2007_004&r=mkt
  3. By: Kind, Hans Jarle (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Schjelderup, Guttorm (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Stähler, Frank (Dept. of Economics, University of Otago)
    Abstract: Newspapers are two-sided platforms that sell their product both to readers and advertisers. Media firms in general, and newspapers in particular, are considered important providers of information, culture and language in most countries. Newspapers are therefore given preferential tax treatment. We show that lower ad valorem taxes lead newspapers to become more differentiated. Thereby the competitive pressure falls, possibly resulting in higher newspaper prices and reduced quality investments.
    Keywords: Two-sided markets; ad-valorem taxes
    JEL: D40 D43 H21 H22 L13
    Date: 2007–02–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2007_005&r=mkt
  4. By: Steffen Huck (University College London); Gabriele K. Ruchala (University College London); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. The effect in monopolies is more or less in line with standard intuition. As price falls volume increases and so does quality, such that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. However, quite in contrast to standard intuition, we also observe an efficiency rise in response to regulation in oligopolies. Both, transaction volume and traded quality are, in fact, maximal in regulated oligopolies.
    Keywords: markets; price competition; price regulation; reputation; trust; moral hazard; experience goods
    JEL: C72 C90 D40 D80 L10
    Date: 2007–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0704&r=mkt
  5. By: Natasha Khan
    Abstract: This study examines the impact of increased transparency, brought about by the introduction of three electronic trading systems, on the brokered interdealer market for Government of Canada benchmark securities. Using the CanPX dataset for the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmarks, the paper finds some evidence of decreased bid-ask spreads for the 30-year benchmark in the months following the introduction of the electronic platforms. Bid-ask spreads are not significantly different in the pre- and post-transparency periods for the 2-, 5- or 10-year benchmarks. The price-impact coefficient, calculated using dollar value as a measure of order flow, also decreased in the post-event period for the 30-year benchmark but is not statistically different for any of the other benchmarks. Overall, there is little evidence that liquidity improved or was lowered by the introduction of the electronic systems.
    Keywords: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing
    JEL: G10 G14
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:07-5&r=mkt

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