nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2006‒09‒23
five papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Regulation of Television advertising By Simon P. Anderson
  2. Towards a Dynamic Communication Model: A Useful Tool in Relationship Communication By Finne, Åke; Grönroos, Christian
  3. Public and Private Activity in Commercial TV Broadcasting By Hansen, Bodil O.; Keiding, Hans
  4. Consumer Choice and Revealed Bounded Rationality By Paola Manzini; Marco Mariotti
  5. THE STRATEGIES BEHIND THEIR ACTIONS: A METHOD TO INFER REPEATED-GAME STRATEGIES AND AN APPLICATION TO BUYER BEHAVIOR By Jim Engle-Warnick; Bradley Ruffle

  1. By: Simon P. Anderson
    Abstract: Regulation of television advertising typically covers both the time devoted to commercials and restrictions on the commodities or services that can be publicized to various audiences (stricter laws often apply to children’s programming). Time restrictions (advertising caps) may improve welfare when advertising is overprovided in the market system. Even then, such caps may reduce the diversity of programming by curtailing revenues from programs. They may also decrease program net quality (including the direct benefit to viewers). Restricting advertising of particular products (such as cigarettes) likely reflects paternalistic altruism, but restrictions may be less efficient than appropriate taxes.
    Keywords: television, advertising, regulation, length caps, advertising content
    JEL: D42 L15 M37
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vir:virpap:363&r=mkt
  2. By: Finne, Åke (Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration); Grönroos, Christian (Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: In order to bring insight into the emerging concept of relationship communication, concepts from two research traditions will be combined in this paper. Based on those concepts a new model, the dynamic relationship communication model, will be presented. Instead of a company perspective focusing on the integration of outgoing messages such as advertising, public relations and sales activities, it is suggested that the focus should be on factors integrated by the receiver. Such factors can be historical, future, external and internal factors. Thus, the model put a strong focus on the receiver in the communication process. The dynamic communication model is illustrated empirically using it as a tool on 78 short stories about communication. The empirical findings show that relationship communication occurs in some cases; in some cases it does not occur. The model is a useful tool in displaying relationship communication and how it differs from other communication. The importance of the time dimension, historical and future factors, in relationship communications is discussed. The possibility of reducing communications costs by the notion of relationship communication is discussed in managerial implications.
    Keywords: Relationship communication; IMC; meaning creation; relationship marketing; marketing communication
    Date: 2006–09–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhb:hanken:0513&r=mkt
  3. By: Hansen, Bodil O. (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School); Keiding, Hans (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)
    Abstract: We consider a model of commercial television market, where private broadcasters coexist with a public television broadcaster. Assuming that the public TV station follows a policy of Ramsey pricing whereas the private stations are profit maximizers, we consider the equilibria in this market and compare with a situation where the public station is privatized and acts as another private TV broadcaster. A closer scrutiny of the market for commercial television leads to a distinction between target rating points, which are the prime unit of account in TV advertising, and net coverage, which is the final goal of advertisers. Working with net coverage as the fundamental concept, we exploit the models of competition between public and private price and quantity in order to show that privatization of the public TV station entails a welfare loss and results in TV advertising becoming more expensive.
    Keywords: TV broadcasting; imperfect competition; Ramsey pricing; welfare comparison
    JEL: L11 L33 L82
    Date: 2006–09–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2006_002&r=mkt
  4. By: Paola Manzini (Queen Mary, University of London and IZA); Marco Mariotti (Queen Mary, University of London)
    Abstract: We study two boundedly rational procedures in consumer behavior. We show that these procedures can be detected by conditions on observable demand data of the same type as standard revealed preference axioms. This provides the basis for a non-parametric analysis of boundedly rational consumer behavior mirroring the classical one for utility maximization.
    Keywords: Bounded rationality, Revealed preference, Consumer choice
    JEL: D1 D11
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp571&r=mkt
  5. By: Jim Engle-Warnick; Bradley Ruffle
    Abstract: We introduce a Bayesian method to infer repeted-game strategies in the form of if-then statements that best describe individuals' observed actions. We apply this method to buyer behavior in posted-offer market experiments. While the strategies of one-quarter of the buyers in our experiments correspond to the game-theoretic prediction of passive price-taking, for three-quarters of the buyers we infer repeated-game strategies that condition on time, price, and combinations of time and price. Our analysis fills a gap in a literature that studies the convergence of pricing behavior in posted-offer markets but has not addressed the market as a repeated game. We propose that strategy inference should at least complement existing methods of statistical inference on observed strategic behavior.
    JEL: C91 D42
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2005-04&r=mkt

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