|
on Marketing |
|
Issue of 2005‒10‒22
three papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao Universidade da Beira Interior |
| By: | Marette, Stéphan |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the economic effects of collective-quality promotion through a survey of the recent literature devoted to common labeling and professional groups. Benefits and costs of common labeling and professional groups for improving quality are detailed. Some empirical facts are presented, mainly focusing on some European examples, since many European countries have a long history of producer-owned marketing programs. This paper shows that in some cases the collective-quality promotion can be a successful strategy for firms/farmers. |
| Keywords: | collective-quality promotion, labeling, marketing organization, quality signals. |
| Date: | 2005–10–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12431&r=mkt |
| By: | Christopher Cotton (Cornell University) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces learning dynamics into a posted-offer pricing game, in which sellers observe past-period transactions before announcing a take-it or leave-it price, and buyers either accept or reject the announced price. We consider the impact that seller access to information regarding past transaction has on the long-term prices, and show that when sellers have imperfect information about the past, the long-term average sale price may be higher than when sellers perfectly observe the entire history of the game. It follows that limiting seller information can improve their long-term average welfare, and total long- term average sales revenue. This has interesting implications regarding firm incentives to provide information to their managers and sales agents. |
| Keywords: | learning, posted price games, limited memory, management incentives |
| JEL: | C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2005–10–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510007&r=mkt |
| By: | Christopher Cotton (Cornell University) |
| Abstract: | I present a sequential-auction game in which bidders know their own valuations, and have expectations regarding the valuations of others. Bidders choose to engage in sniping or multiple-bidding behavior depending on their expectations regarding relative level of their own valuations compared to the valuations of the other active bidders. Given the prevalence of online auction goods for which bidders should reasonably be expected to know their valuations, and the existence of auctions in which players engage in both snipping and multiple bidding behavior, this new model fills a previous void in the literature regarding behavior on eBay and other online auction sites. |
| Keywords: | internet, online auctions, eBay, sniping, multiple-bidding, sequential auctions |
| JEL: | C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2005–10–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510006&r=mkt |