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on Mining |
| By: | Toman, Michael A. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Many of the supply chains for critical minerals run through China, raising concerns over political, national security, and economic risks. In February 2026, the United States hosted representatives of 54 countries and the European Commission to “reshape the global market for critical minerals and rare earths” (US Department of State 2026). The United States proposed a “plurilateral” initiative, the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE). See Blakemore and Harmon (2026), Urecki (2026), Baskaran and Schwartz (2026), Froman (2026), and Northey and Bikales (2026). FORGE would “friendshore” critical mineral supplies among allied countries by geographically diversifying supply chains through investments in each country’s supply capacities.FORGE would create what Vice President JD Vance called a “preferential trading zone” that would establish “reference prices for critical minerals at each stage of production.” The price floors would protect new critical mineral investments by allies from price declines, thus lowering investment risk. To maintain the price floors, coalition countries would impose “adjustable tariffs to uphold pricing integrity.”The United States also announced the establishment of the US Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve, “Project Vault, ” See Baskaran (2026), Northey and Bikales (2026), Urecki (2026), and Brunelli and Moerenhout (2026). a public-private partnership financed by a $10 billion loan from EXIM and $2 billion of private capital. “The goal of the stockpile is to protect the private sector from supply disruptions and price volatility” (Uricke 2026). Vault incorporates deep involvement by the private sector in determining the necessary types and quantities of inventory holdings.This brief first considers the concerns about Chinese dominance of critical mineral markets, the implementation challenges of FORGE, and strategies for addressing those challenges. It then considers how Vault complements FORGE by giving buyers of critical minerals an additional tool for hedging their purchases against upward price shocks. |
| Date: | 2026–08–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:ibrief:ib-26-06 |
| By: | Shokravi, Hashem; Weiss, Daniel; Spiller, Beia (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | In 2022, the United States launched the Minerals Security Partnership to accelerate the development of diverse critical minerals supply chains in cooperation with industry and allied governments. The partnership brought together 14 countries and the European Union (DOS 2025). It aligned with the Biden administration’s “friend-shoring” strategy, which focused on diversifying supply chains by relocating key manufacturing capacity away from China and toward allied economies. Around the same period, the European Parliament passed the Critical Raw Materials Act, which aimed to reduce reliance on any single country—an implicit reference to China. The act set several benchmarks requiring certain percentages of the European Union’s annual mineral consumption to be produced domestically by 2030: (1) at least 10 percent for extraction; (2) over 40 percent for processing; (3) 25 percent for recycling; and (4) no more than 65 percent of annual processing sourced from any single third country (European Commission 2024). It also promised to reduce administrative burdens and shorten timelines for processing and recycling permits.However, these ambitious goals lacked a clear implementation road map and strategy. Long project timelines and unclear financing limited their feasibility; a critical mineral refinery typically requires years to become commercially mature, even with sustained technological and financial support. Few instruments were available to counter perceived foreign coercion, and cooperating governments were left relying on tariffs or export controls in other sectors, particularly semiconductors. |
| Date: | 2026–08–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:ibrief:ib-26-05 |
| By: | Thomas Lapi (UPCité - Université Paris Cité) |
| Abstract: | Minerals and metals are crucial to modern technologies. Over the past decades, China has built up a dominant position on the value chain of energy and digital technologies through domestic mining, refining and manufacturing. Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI) in the metal sector are integral to this strategy: by establishing a global value chain system, the expansion of Chinese firms abroad contributes to securing the supply of raw materials for domestic industries. This paper assesses global Chinese FDI in the metal sector from 2005 to 2024 and discusses their integration into China's global political strategy. Using quantitative and qualitative analysis, we show that China's investments reflect an integrated supply security approach, with interlinked investments in metals, energy and transport infrastructures, exemplified with a case study in Peru. We identified a sharp decline of Chinese FDI in the Australian metal sector over the period studied, reflecting geopolitical tensions and the tightening relationship between Australia and the United States. Chinese firms preferentially target countries with high-market concentration of strategic materials such as Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Peru. Overall, this mining diplomacy strengthens China's dominant position in the value chains of strategic technologies. |
| Keywords: | Geopolitics, Foreign Direct Investments, Supply chains, Critical raw materials, China |
| Date: | 2026–10–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05712330 |
| By: | C.O. Olaniyi (University of South Africa); N.M. Odhiambo (University of South Africa) |
| Abstract: | Transitioning to a carbon-neutral renewable energy (REN) option to decarbonize ecosystems and mitigate carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and the negative impacts of climate change is consistent with United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 7 and 13. Scholars have identified natural resource wealth and institutions as critical factors in the REN transition in resource-rich countries. Financial barriers are arguably the most significant impediments to transitioning to REN, as REN is more capital-intensive and costly to produce, invest in, and use than traditional fossil fuel-based energy. Meanwhile, weak institutions and corruption in most resource-rich countries culminate in the resource curse phenomenon and the mismanagement of natural resource wealth. It implies that institutions (weak or strong) modify the natural resource rent contribution to the REN transition. Previous research has paid little attention to the impact of the interplay between natural resources and institutional quality on the REN transition in resource rich African countries. This study examines how institutions moderate the contribution of natural resource wealth to accelerating or inhibiting the REN switch in resource-rich African countries for the period 2000-2021, using fully modified ordinary least squares, a Driscoll-Kraay nonparametric covariance matrix, and moments-based quantile regression estimators. This study departs from earlier studies by determining the institutional quality threshold above which institutions significantly stimulate natural resource rents to accelerate Africa's REN transition. The findings indicate that institutions in resource-rich African countries breed inefficient bureaucracies and corruption in natural resource rent administration. These undermine the ability |
| Keywords: | institutional quality, dynamic panel threshold, natural resource rents, renewable energy transition, resource-rich African countries |
| JEL: | N27 O13 Q20 |
| Date: | 2024–12–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:afa:wpaper:wp122024 |
| By: | Piyush Akimitsu |
| Abstract: | Artificial intelligence depends on a stack of inputs, models on compute, compute on chips, and chips on electricity and refined minerals. This paper measures the concentration of each layer on one scale, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), from cited and reproducible data. Three findings follow. First, concentration forms a clear gradient. It is modest downstream, where public and regulatory attention is heaviest and model usage and cloud fall below the 1{, }800 mark United States agencies treat as highly concentrated. It rises steeply upstream, where public discourse is sparse. There advanced packaging scores 8{, }100, leading-edge lithography reaches the ceiling of 10{, }000, and one country dominates the production or refining of several critical minerals, gallium near that maximum. Second, these upstream layers are chokepoints and a strategic vulnerability for the whole AI economy. Antitrust cannot reach them, because they lie in foreign or state hands. Contesting them falls to export controls and domestic industrial policy. Third, placing reserves beside refining shows the concentration is built rather than geological, a variable industrial policy can move. A rise in an upstream input's price barely changes the cost of the product built from it, because the input is only a small share of that cost. A chokepoint's threat is therefore the loss of the input itself rather than a higher price. |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2607.29572 |
| By: | Ibadoghlu, Gubad |
| Abstract: | This article examines the structural tension between Azerbaijan's international climate commitments and its expanding role as a major natural gas exporter to Europe. Since hosting COP29 in 2024, Azerbaijan has positioned itself as an active participant in global environmental governance while simultaneously accelerating hydrocarbon production, developing new gas fields (including Absheron Phase II, Babek, and non-associated gas at ACG), and deepening its strategic energy partnership with the EU through the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Drawing on the concept of "exported emissions, " the article argues that while European states may reduce territorial emissions by substituting Azerbaijani gas for more carbon-intensive fuels, a substantial share of the associated methane emissions-generated during extraction, processing, compression, and transmission-remains externalized to Azerbaijan and other points along the supply chain. The analysis assesses whether existing environmental, health and safety, and human rights safeguards imposed by EU legislation, EBRD, EIB, IFC, OECD, and Equator Principles standards, as well as the new EU Methane Regulation (2024/1787), are adequate to address this challenge. It finds that although TAP operates under one of the most extensive formal governance frameworks applied to energy infrastructure, effective implementation depends heavily on independent monitoring, transparency, and civic space-all of which are significantly constrained in Azerbaijan and, to varying degrees, in Georgia and Türkiye. Restrictions on civil society, journalists, and human rights defenders limit the ability of independent actors to verify compliance, creating a gap between formal regulatory commitments and actual environmental and social outcomes. The article concludes that Azerbaijan's declining performance in the World Economic Forum's 2026 Energy Transition Index-driven by weaknesses in institutional and regulatory "Transition Readiness" rather than technical system performance-illustrates a broader dilemma facing hydrocarbon-exporting states: the credibility of climate commitments ultimately hinges not only on renewable energy targets, but on methane governance, transparency, and protection of the civic space needed to hold gas export infrastructure accountable throughout its operational lifecycle. |
| Keywords: | Azerbaijan, Southern Gas Corridor, Trans Adriatic Pipeline, European Energy Security, SOCAR, Exported/Embodied Emissions, Methane Emissions, Energy Transition, COP29, Civic Space, Resource Governance, Human Rights and Environmental Accountability |
| JEL: | K32 P18 Q42 Q43 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:342434 |
| By: | Thomas S. Gundersen; Ewoud Quaghebeur; Håkon Tretvoll (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | Commodity price shocks can be a key driver of business cycles in resource-rich small open economies. We assess their importance for the Norwegian economy by estimating a structural VAR model and measuring the contribution of oil price shocks to fluctuations in economic activity. Focusing on the oil price collapse of 2014–2016, the VAR evidence indicates sizable spillovers from oil prices to the non-resource economy. We develop and estimate a small open economy DSGE model with a resource extraction sector that demands both materials and investment goods from the rest of the economy. Investment adjustment costs in the oil sector generate gradual and persistent spillovers to mainland activity following oil price shocks. Hence, the model is consistent with the empirical responses obtained from the VAR. Applying the framework to the COVID-19 pandemic, we find that while pandemic-specific shocks dominated the contraction, oil price movements also contributed non-negligibly to the downturn. |
| Keywords: | business cycles; small open economy; commodity prices |
| JEL: | E32 F41 F44 Q43 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:1039 |
| By: | Gräf, Miriam |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:161200 |
| By: | Vidal, Florian; Halloy, José (Université Paris Cité) |
| Abstract: | This article analyses the contemporary international system through a pluridisciplinary lens integrating imperial history, complex systems theory, and Earth system science. Situated within the dynamics of the Anthropocene, it reconceptualizes contemporary great-power competition by examining socio-technical systems (STS) predicated on the intensive consumption of fossil fuels and mineral resources. We posit that the prevailing STS metabolic regime is unsustainable in the long term, owing to the significant constraints imposed by geological and planetary boundaries. These limitations will become increasingly pronounced as the effects of the systemic crisis intensify. This regime not only perpetuates imperialist logics, visible in rivalries over resources essential for technological dominance, but also generates a ‘zombified’ technosphere that actively disrupts Earth system processes and jeopardizes planetary habitability. The article consequently advocates for de-imperialism as an essential trajectory, requiring a shift to networked and systemic geopolitics via the active dismantling of imperial structures. |
| Date: | 2026–05–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:q53np_v1 |
| By: | C. Nondo (Jackson State University); T. Saungweme (University of South Africa); N.M. Odhiambo (University of South Africa) |
| Abstract: | The objective of this study is to empirically examine the short and long-run relationship between natural resource rent, economic growth, governance mechanisms based on the Polity IV, gross capital formation, inflation, and population in Zambia over the period 1986-2018. This study employs the autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) to estimate the underlying long-run and short-run relationships between the variables. The study uses three proxies of governance quality, namely autocracy, executive recruitment, and democracy, and estimates three regression models. Furthermore, interaction terms are included to explore how different forms of governance quality influence the economic impact of natural resources. The results confirmed a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables included in the estimated models. The results further show that the impact of natural resource rents on economic growth depends on the model specification. It is also time-variant, depending on whether the model is estimated in the short run or the long run. Overall, our results do not support the existence of the resource-curse phenomenon in Zambia, regardless of the time frame considered. Instead, the results indicate that natural resources have the potential to spur economic growth in the short run when both executive recruitment and democracy are used as governance proxies, and in the long run when democracy is used. The results also show that governance modulates the impact of natural resource rents on economic growth, but only when proxied by democracy. However, the findings vary depending on the timeframe. While democracy positively influences growth through natural resources in the long run, it has adverse effects in the short run. The results of the study suggest that policymakers in Zambia should enact cautious measures that encourage responsible approaches to utilizing natural resource rents to foster sustainable economic growth. This involves using natural resource rents to boost human and physical capital, as well as diversify the economy. |
| Keywords: | Economic growth, governance, natural resources; resource curse; Zambia |
| JEL: | C22 O13 O43 O55 Q34 |
| Date: | 2024–12–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:afa:wpaper:wp082024 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Ghana's ECF program has delivered substantial stabilization and debt-sustainability gains following the 2022 debt crisis. It has helped restore macroeconomic stability, sharply reduce inflation, rebuild international reserves, and ease acute financing pressures. These improvements were supported by fiscal consolidation, progress on debt restructuring, and renewed confidence in the cedi following favorable commodity-price developments, particularly gold. Nonetheless, vulnerabilities persist. Fiscal adjustment remains heavily reliant on spending compression despite large development and security needs; financial‑sector risks remain elevated with high non-performing loans, particularly among state‑owned and some private banks; and sizable fiscal risks from SOEs. |
| Keywords: | exchange rate; exchange restriction; IMF advice; BoG requirement; reform agenda; Debt service; Debt sustainability analysis; Global; Middle East |
| Date: | 2026–08–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/212 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Selected Issues |
| Keywords: | electricity sector; sector value chain; banking sector development; Ghana's generation; banking-sector stress test; Gold; Gold prices; Financial sector; Tariffs; West Africa; Africa; Global; Europe |
| Date: | 2026–08–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/213 |