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on Mining |
| By: | Michael Reiterer (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that the European Union (EU) and Japan face a converging security agenda in which economic, technological, and military vulnerabilities can no longer be addressed separately. The principal challenges are the weaponisation of trade, finance, energy, and supply chains; the intensifying US-China rivalry; Russia’s aggression and its wider destabilising effects; China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific; critical dependencies in raw materials, semiconductors, digital infrastructure, and renewable technologies; and uncertainty over the reliability of established alliance structures due to current US unpredictability. These pressures expose the limits of economic power when it is not supported by credible defence, cyber, space, intelligence, and industrial capabilities. At the same time, they create opportunities for the EU and Japan to jointly upgrade their partnership from trade and regulatory cooperation to comprehensive security governance. Existing agreements, partnerships, and associations, as well as cooperation on critical raw materials and semiconductors, provide a platform for action. Policy priorities should include faster strategic coordination; closer industry participation; more resilient supply chains; defence-industrial cooperation; joint work on dual-use technologies as well as cyber and space security; and coordination with responsible partners, such as India, ASEAN countries, Australia, and Canada. By linking resilience, deterrence, and rules-based multilateralism, the EU and Japan can strengthen their strategic room for manoeuvre become credible security partners – and therefore be at the table and not on the menu. |
| Keywords: | economic and military security, resilience, deterrence, technology, EU-Japan strategic partnership |
| JEL: | F02 F52 F55 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:110 |
| By: | Pierri Erika (European Commission - JRC); Orefice Martina (European Commission - JRC); Garcia-gutierrez Pelayo; Bobba Silvia; Gaudillat Pierre (European Commission - JRC); Mathieux Fabrice (European Commission - JRC); Huygens Dries (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | Article 8 of the Batteries Regulation ((EU) 2023/1542) sets out an obligation for manufacturers of industrial batteries with a capacity greater than 2 kWh to issue documentation on the percentage share of cobalt, lithium or nickel present in the active material that has been recovered from battery manufacturing waste or post-consumer waste, as well as the percentage share of lead in the battery that originates from waste. The methodology for calculating and verifying the recycled content share of cobalt, lithium, nickel and lead in batteries placed on the EU market is to be established in a Delegated Act. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) has been tasked by the Directorate‑General for the Environment (DG ENV) and the Directorate‑General for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) to produce techno-scientific recommendations that will underpin the forthcoming Delegated Act. Drawing on a systematic literature review, stakeholder workshops and bilateral industry meetings, the study provides a comprehensive overview of the battery value chain, focusing on the four targeted metals. It maps existing standards, certifications schemes and supply-chain practices and underscores the complexity of the battery value chain and the associated traceability challenges. The report examines the trade-offs of different chain of custody models – analysing possible effects on business continuity, resource efficiency, climate change mitigation, consumer’s confidence, ease of verification and administrative burden – and presents detailed calculation and verification blueprints for two traceability options. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc146717 |
| By: | Tania Masi; Roberto Ricciuti |
| Abstract: | Governments in resource-rich countries may use a sizable share of the revenue from their underground wealth to buy support through public employment. This occurs in both democratic governments (which need to be re-elected) and autocratic governments (which have to prevent riots and regime change). Using the Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators dataset provided by the World Bank, we analyse the effect of natural resources on public employment in developing countries from 2000 to 2018. We find that resource rents may have an effect on public sector characteristics. However, uncovering the heterogeneous effects of different types of natural resources, we find that oil and gas wealth may increase public employment in countries that are not fully democratic, while forest wealth has a positive impact for all values of democracy. At the same time, the public sector wage premium is positively affected by oil and forest in non-democratic countries and by gas when the level of democracy is very high. |
| Keywords: | natural resources, public sector, rentier states, patronage employment |
| JEL: | P16 N5 C23 O57 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12973 |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | The global steel industry is at a crossroads, facing the two interconnected challenges of addressing excess capacity and preparing for a low-emissions future. These two challenges are mutually reinforcing. Excess capacity affects the pace at which low-emission capacity adjustments take place, reduces companies’ ability to invest in low-emission capacity and R&D and alters market price signals. Conversely, policies promoting the adoption of low-emission technologies can help steer capacity towards more sustainable production when properly designed but also may trigger new waves of excess capacity if built in a way that displaces market-based low emission production without reducing overall capacity. Drawing on recent developments in the global steel sector, this paper examines the mechanisms through which excess capacity hampers the transition to low emission technologies. It finds that persistent overcapacity depresses steel prices, squeezes profit margins, increases earnings volatility and borrowing costs, and limits the availability of internal financing for technology deployment. Excess capacity also raises the relative price premium of low-emission steel products, weakening demand signals and delaying investment decisions. At the same time, subsidisation and capacity expansion in non-market economies risk perpetuating existing distortions and creating a new generation of excess capacity in low-emission forms. |
| Keywords: | excess capacity, industrial decarbonisation, industrial restructuring, low carbon, steel industry, transition |
| JEL: | H25 O25 Q55 |
| Date: | 2026–09–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaac:194-en |
| By: | Colin Weiss |
| Abstract: | In 2025, world international reserves held in gold surpassed foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities (figure 1), a fact drawing attention from media and policymakers (Nangle, 2025; European Central Bank, 2026; Storbeck and Hook, 2026, for example). Should this be interpreted as gold overtaking U.S. Treasury securities in its appeal as a reserve asset? I argue that the answer is no, as a comparison of world gold reserves and aggregate foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is problematic for a couple reasons. |
| Date: | 2026–09–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfn:103747 |
| By: | Moaz Elsayed; Christoph Grosse Steffen; Magali Marx |
| Abstract: | Not all supply-chain disruptions have the same macroeconomic consequences. We developed the Global Supply Chain Tension Index (GSTIX), a novel set of publicly available indicators. It distinguishes transportation disruptions from input-production disruptions, which reduce the availability of critical intermediate inputs. We show that the latter have more persistent effects on inflation. The GSTIX offers a tool for assessing inflationary pressures and informing policy. <p> Les perturbations des chaînes d’approvisionnement n’ont pas toutes les mêmes conséquences macroéconomiques. Nous avons développé l’indice de tension sur les chaînes d’approvisionnement mondiales (Global Supply Chain Tension Index, GSTIX), un nouvel ensemble d’indicateurs accessibles au public. Il établit une distinction entre les perturbations du transport et les perturbations de la production d’intrants, qui réduisent la disponibilité d’intrants intermédiaires critiques. Nous montrons que les secondes ont des effets plus persistants sur l’inflation. L’indice GSTIX constitue un outil permettant d’évaluer les tensions inflationnistes et d’éclairer la prise de décisions. |
| Date: | 2026–08–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:econot:458 |
| By: | Nikhil Devanathan; Alexandros E. Tzikas; Stephen P. Boyd |
| Abstract: | For more than four decades, the 60/40 stock/bond portfolio has served as a benchmark for delivering reasonable returns without excessive risk. More recently, a 50/30/20 stock/bond/alternative portfolio has been suggested. We use gold as the alternative and as an inflation hedge. In this paper we ask: how much improvement over these benchmark fixed-weight portfolios can be obtained using widely available public data and standard methods from quantitative finance? We restrict ourselves to long-only dynamic portfolios of stocks, bonds, and gold, plus cash, rebalancing monthly, using only publicly available data. We evaluate portfolios on the conventional metrics: return, volatility, Sharpe ratio (computed in excess of the federal funds rate), drawdown, and turnover, in addition to consistency of performance over time, judged by the consistency of the realized annual volatility. Over the 20--year period 2006--2026, using a conservative estimate of trading costs, we show that all risk-adjusted and drawdown metrics are improved using simple volatility control, where we dynamically mix the fixed-weight portfolios with cash so as to target a fixed volatility. This method relies on a simple estimate of portfolio volatility derived from past returns. We also demonstrate that more sophisticated portfolios based on convex optimization---similar to those used in quantitative hedge funds---yield further substantial improvement in return and risk-adjusted return. We consider two such portfolios, one that uses a simple estimate of future returns based on past returns, and one that forecasts future returns based on past returns and just a handful of widely available public economic data. These portfolios also outperform a suite of standard risk-based allocation methods, such as risk parity and minimum variance, evaluated on the same assets and data. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.07946 |
| By: | Gabriel K. Midagu; Ishara Musimwa; Yves B. Togba |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cvi:wpaper:2026-003-01 |
| By: | Luke Hartigan |
| Abstract: | I develop a statistical measure of Australia's common output cycle by combining frequency-domain filtering of industry-level output to isolate its cyclical component with a dynamic factor model featuring stochastic cycle dynamics. The common cycle has an estimated period of around six years and reveals substantial heterogeneity in the timing and strength with which industries participate in the common cycle. Manufacturing and wholesale trade are closely synchronised, while agriculture and mining are mostly driven by their own idiosyncratic cycles. I evaluate the common output cycle's ability to forecast inflation and find that its predictive performance is statistically indistinguishable from that of an AR(1) benchmark over the forecast horizons considered. I also find evidence of potential endpoint issues when estimating the common output cycle in real time. Overall, these findings suggest that the common output cycle is best viewed as a descriptive measure of the historical features of the Australian output cycle that are shared across industries. |
| Keywords: | business cycle measurement, Butterworth filters, dynamic factor model, inflation forecasting, Kalman filter, signal extraction, stochastic cycle |
| JEL: | C32 C38 C53 E32 E37 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2026-78 |
| By: | Phillip McCalman; Andrew Walter |
| Abstract: | Many countries screen foreign direct investment through discretionary approval regimes that operate primarily through delay rather than outright prohibition. Because few transactions are blocked, governments describe screening as "light touch." We show that this characterization is misleading. When approval is costly to reverse and information arrives over time, screening functions as a real option: regulatory delay creates uncertainty that is capitalized into asset prices during review. Using Australian data, we estimate a 2.9% approval-event abnormal return for target firms, equivalent to around 20% of expected target-shareholder surplus. This measures the market value of resolving screening uncertainty for announced transactions. Aggregated across transactions, the implied valuation exposure is large relative to estimates of goods-trade barriers and rises further once deterred deals are considered. Screening also generates spillovers to rival firms and persistent valuation effects through repeated review of subsequent acquisitions by foreign-owned firms, with international spillovers particularly for Chinese investors. |
| Keywords: | foreign investment screening, foreign direct investment, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, regulatory uncertainty, real options, event studies |
| JEL: | F21 F13 G14 G34 L51 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12975 |
| By: | Erik Dietzenbacher; Hylke Dijkstra; Konstantin M. Wacker (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Geopolitical tensions, security concerns, and the COVID-19 supply chain disruptions have prompted countries to reconsider their reliance on the origin of the inputs they use in production. Consequently, policy makers and researchers are increasingly interested in understanding shoring strategies and patterns of production relocation. While the interest in shoring has surged, the literature offers ample measures for (off-, re-, near-, friend-) shoring, ranging from intuitively appealing, simple indicators to more sophisticated, complex metrics based on input-output techniques. Those measures come with specific trade-offs and assumptions. Without a proper understanding of these measures, empirical analyses – and the policies based on them – risk being misinformed. Against this background, this paper compares five different measures – so-called domestic participation indicators (DPIs) – that aim to measure shoring and production locations. In particular, we examine how they behave under different forms of shoring. We use global multiregional input-output (GMRIO) tables from the OECD, covering 45 industries in 76 countries, to track the development of the five DPIs through the stages of (de-)globalisation between 1995 and 2022. We find that the direct DPIs explain the trends in globalisation well. |
| Keywords: | Offshoring, reshoring, domestic participation indexes, global value chains, input-output tables |
| JEL: | F15 F14 F62 L60 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:spaper:statr:14 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | The security situation remains highly volatile in Eastern DRC, with significant humanitarian pressures. Political risks are also rising, with a newly formed opposition coalition against any term extension through either a Constitutional change or a security-motivated delay to the 2028 presidential election. The war in the Middle East and the recent Ebola outbreak are further complicating the conduct of public policy. |
| Date: | 2026–09–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/246 |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Selected Issues |
| Date: | 2026–09–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2026/247 |
| By: | Hyunseob Kim; Doron Levit; Roni Michaely |
| Abstract: | Dual-class shares allocate control to founders whose firm-specific investments drive firm value but separate control from ownership, raising agency costs. We analyze this trade-off dynamically. Using new data on US dual-class firms spanning 52 years and difference-in-differences designs, we show that valuations rise following dual-class recapitalizations but decline over time, whereas innovative output increases persistently. These effects are concentrated in industries with greater firm-specific investments. We find corresponding results for stock unifications. Investment by mature dual-class firms is less sensitive to opportunities and voting premia increase with maturity. Our results support dynamic treatment effects and yield new policy implications. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.25972 |
| By: | Thiemo Fetzer (University of Warwick and University of Bonn); Christina Palmou (King's College London); Jakob Schneebacher (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Ivan Yotzov (Bank of England) |
| Abstract: | In a turbulent world, effective policy requires granular estimates of firm responses to shocks as they unfold. We develop a replicable framework that combines high-frequency administrative and survey microdata with a pre-registered shift-share design to estimate multi-margin firm responses in real time. We show that the resulting coefficient vectors can be interpreted as first-order perturbations of firms’ optimal-response functions. We apply the framework to the 2021–23 UK energy price shock and find that energy-intensive firms pass on cost increases, build cash reserves and shift towards homeworking. We find little evidence of aggregate employment losses or firm exits. Responses are highly heterogeneous: small firms drive price pass-through; large firms, capital investment. We show that our real-time estimates are consistent with the UK’s structural business survey, released two years later, and across survey instruments. We apply the framework out of sample and in real time to the energy price shock triggered by the 2026 US–Israeli strikes on Iran and discuss implications for the design of energy support schemes and environmental policy. |
| Keywords: | Real-time evaluation;firm dynamics;economic shocks;energy prices. |
| JEL: | C23 D22 D24 H23 L11 |
| Date: | 2026–08–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:023580 |
| By: | Sebastian Kranz |
| Abstract: | Recent crises have made supply security central to trade policy. We show how tradeable import certificates (TIC) implement targets for domestic production and reliable foreign supply while preserving gains from trade. A single certificate market per country decentralizes the welfare-maximizing allocation under heterogeneous targets, with certificate prices adjusting endogenously as conditions change. TIC robustly protect these targets against a range of deviations from trade agreements. A model of economic coercion microfounds the targets, linking them to shortage salience, supply reliability, bilateral trade dependence, and norms against yielding to coercion. Tariff-subsidy agreements require more information and are more vulnerable to hidden deviations. While a common carbon price provides a natural focal point for climate agreements, quantity-based security targets could be a more natural focal point for trade agreements than tariff and subsidy rates. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.20282 |
| By: | Manzoni Marina (European Commission - JRC); Farrell Eimear; Hernandez Quiros Lorena; Martin Bosch Jaume; Combetto Marco |
| Abstract: | Digital sovereignty has emerged as a central pillar of European strategic autonomy. EU digital sovereignty is defined as the capacity for strategic independence in the digital domain, while remaining open to global collaboration and aligning with democratic values. This Policy Brief focuses on digital sovereignty specifically through a public sector and public governance lens. It explores what digital sovereignty means when viewed not merely as technological independence, but as the capacity to contribute to the public good. It outlines the current status in the EU, provides an analysis of risks and opportunities, draws attention to the socio-economic importance and implications digital technologies have in enabling public governance and public services delivery, and provides a number of recommendations in identified strategic area of interventions. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc147599 |