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on Mining |
| By: | John A Spray; Sneha D Thube; Alice Tianbo Zhang |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the economic effects of the global energy transition and the large uncertainty surrounding future fossil fuel demand on countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the paper’s baseline, coal demand is expected to shrink by 15 percent by 2035, although depending on global policy ambition and technological uptake, the decline could be as large as 45 percent. Model simulations indicate that one-third of global coal capital stock and one-quarter of Asia-Pacific coal capital stock could become stranded if the speed of the transition is underestimated. By contrast, global natural gas faces both upside and downside risks: when energy policy targets coal alone, natural gas extraction benefits, prompting an 18 percent rise in capital stock, whereas a fuel-agnostic transition would reduce gas capital stock by 16 percent. Impacts differ across countries, with high-cost coal exporters facing early losses, low-cost producers potentially gaining market share, and some gas exporters benefiting under select scenarios. At the same time, new growth opportunities will emerge for countries with strong critical mineral endowments and green energy potential. |
| Keywords: | energy transition scenarios; IMF-ENV model; stranded assets; Asia-pacific countries |
| Date: | 2026–01–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2026/001 |
| By: | Muhammad Sukri Bin Ramli |
| Abstract: | As the global economy transitions toward decarbonization, the aluminium sector has become a focal point for strategic resource management. While policies such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aim to reduce emissions, they have inadvertently widened the price arbitrage between primary metal, scrap, and semi-finished goods, creating new incentives for market optimization. This study presents a unified, unsupervised machine learning framework to detect and classify emerging trade anomalies within UN Comtrade data (2020 to 2024). Moving beyond traditional rule-based monitoring, we apply a four-layer analytical pipeline utilizing Forensic Statistics, Isolation Forests, Network Science, and Deep Autoencoders. Contrary to the hypothesis that Sustainability Arbitrage would be the primary driver, empirical results reveal a contradictory and more severe phenomenon of Hardware Masking. Illicit actors exploit bi-directional tariff incentives by misclassifying scrap as high-count heterogeneous goods to justify extreme unit-price outliers of >$160/kg, a 1, 900% markup indicative of Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) rather than commercial arbitrage. Topologically, risk is not concentrated in major exporters but in high-centrality Shadow Hubs that function as pivotal nodes for illicit rerouting. These actors execute a strategy of Void-Shoring, systematically suppressing destination data to Unspecified Code to fracture mirror statistics and sever forensic trails. Validated by SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations), the results confirm that price deviation is the dominant predictor of anomalies, necessitating a paradigm shift in customs enforcement from physical volume checks to dynamic, algorithmic valuation auditing. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.14410 |
| By: | Katharina Ledebur. Ladislav Bartuska; Klaus Friesenbichler; Peter Klimek |
| Abstract: | The automotive industry is undergoing transformation, driven by the electrification of powertrains, the rise of software-defined vehicles, and the adoption of circular economy concepts. These trends blur the boundaries between the automotive sector and other industries. Unlike internal combustion engine (ICE) production, where mechanical capabilities dominated, competitiveness in electric vehicle (EV) production increasingly depends on expertise in electronics, batteries, and software. This study investigates whether and how firms' ability to leverage cross-industry diversification contributes to competitive advantage. We develop a country-level product space covering all industries and an industry-specific product space covering over 900 automotive components. This allows us to identify clusters of parts that are exported together, revealing shared manufacturing capabilities. Closeness centrality in the country-level product space, rather than simple proximity, is a strong predictor of where new comparative advantages are likely to emerge. We examine this relationship across industrial sectors to establish patterns of path dependency, diversification and capability formation, and then focus on the EV transition. New strengths in vehicles and aluminium products in the EU are expected to generate 5 and 4.6 times more EV-specific strengths, respectively, than other EV-relevant sectors over the next decade, compared to only 1.6 and 4.5 new strengths in already diversified China. Countries such as South Korea, China, the US and Canada show strong potential for diversification into EV-related products, while established producers in the EU are likely to come under pressure. These findings suggest that the success of the automotive transformation depends on regions' ability to mobilize existing industrial capabilities, particularly in sectors such as machinery and electronic equipment. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.13178 |
| By: | Sultan, Samina |
| Abstract: | Die engen transatlantischen Handelsbeziehungen geraten durch die Zollpolitik von US-Präsident Trump stark unter Druck. Das spiegelt sich schon in der Exportentwicklung der deutschen Branchen der ersten drei Quartale 2025 wider. Im Durchschnitt über alle Branchen hinweg sind die deutschen Exporte in die USA in diesem Zeitraum um 7, 8 Prozent gesunken, während sie im Mittel des Vergleichszeitraums der Jahre 2016 bis 2024 noch um durchschnittlich fast 5 Prozent gestiegen sind. Besondersstark leiden die deutschen US-Exporte von Kraftwagen und Kraftwagenteilen, Maschinen und auch von chemischen Erzeugnissen, die zusammen für mehr als zwei Fünftel der deutschen US-Exporte stehen. In Summe ziehen allein diese drei Branchen die USAusfuhr Deutschlands um über 5, 2 Prozentpunkte im Vorjahresvergleich nach unten. Das sind mehr als zwei Drittel des Gesamtrückgangs bei den deutschen Exporten in die USA. Die vergleichsweise starke Zollbelastung von Kraftwagen und Kraftwagenteilen bis zur Zolleinigung zwischen der EU und der USA im August 2025 dürfte wesentlich dazu beigetragen haben, dass die deutschen Kfz-Ausfuhren in die USA mit minus 14 Prozent im Vergleich zum Vorjahreszeitraum besonders stark zurückgegangen sind. Auch die deutschen Maschinenausfuhren in die USA unterliegen teils einem deutlich höheren Zollsatz von 50 Prozent, der für Stahl und Aluminium sowie Produkte daraus greift. Demgemäß sind die deutschen Maschinenexporte in die USA in den ersten drei Quartalen 2025 um 9, 5 Prozent gesunken. Bei Metallen erklären stärkere Vorzieheffekte im ersten Quartal den Zuwachs an Exporten, während in den nachfolgenden Quartalen auch hier die Ausfuhren zurückgehen. Bei pharmazeutischen und ähnlichen Erzeugnissen spielen Vorzieheffekte und mögliche Umlenkungseffekte ebenso eine Rolle zur Erklärung des Exportwachstums wie auch die Tatsache, dass diese länger als andere Waren von US-Importzöllen verschont blieben (und zum Teil auch jetzt noch von Zöllen ausgenommen sind). In wichtigen Branchen sind die deutschen US-Exporte somit auf das Niveau von 2022 oder gar Anfang 2019 zurückgeworfen. Hätte es aber nach der Coronapandemie nicht einen deutlichen Aufschwung bei den deutschen US-Exporten bis zur Wahl Donald Trumps im Herbst 2024 gegeben, wäre der Einbruch noch deutlich schmerzhafter. Da die US-Importzölle vorerst nicht auf das vorherige Niveau sinken dürften, kann die Entwicklung im dritten Quartal 2025 möglicherweise als eine Annäherung an das "neue Normal" bei den deutschen US-Exporten betrachtet werden. Das trifft das ohnehin unter Druck geratene deutsche Exportmodell hart. Das lässt sich etwa an der Tatsache festmachen, dass die Entwicklung bei den deutschen Ausfuhren in die USA die Entwicklung bei den weltweiten Exporten Deutschlands um 0, 81 Prozentpunkte gedrückt hat, während sie noch im vergangenen Jahr einen positiven Wachstumsbeitrag geleistet haben. Die Entwicklung der deutschen US-Exporte hat bei einigen Branchen einen erheblichen Einfluss auf die weltweiten Branchenexporte Deutschlands. Bei Kraftwagen und Kraftwagenteilen etwa ist die negative Entwicklung bei den deutschen US-Exporten für annähernd die Hälfte des weltweiten Exportrückgangs verantwortlich. Auch bei den deutschen Maschinenausfuhren sind die Einbußen in den USA ein wichtiger Faktor für den gesamten Rückgang von 3, 3 Prozent. In etwas geringerem Maß gilt das auch für chemische Erzeugnisse. |
| Abstract: | The close transatlantic trade relations are coming under significant strain due to U.S. President Trump's tariff policies. This is already reflected in the export performance of German industries during the first three quarters of 2025. On average across all sectors, German exports to the U.S. fell by 7.8 percent during this period, whereas in the comparable timeframe from 2016 to 2024 they had still grown by nearly 5 percent on average. German exports of motor vehicles and parts, machinery, and chemical products - together accounting for more than two-fifths of German exports to the U.S. - are particularly hard hit. Combined, these three sectors alone have dragged Germany's exports to the U.S. down by over 5.2 percentage points compared to the previous year, representing more than two-thirds of the overall decline in German exports to the U.S. The relatively high tariff burden on motor vehicles and parts until the tariff agreement between the EU and the U.S. in August 2025 likely contributed significantly to the sharp drop of 14 percent in German automotive exports to the U.S. compared to the previous year. German machinery exports to the U.S. are partially also subject to a substantially higher tariff rate of 50 percent, which applies to steel, aluminium, and related products. Accordingly, German machinery exports to the U.S. fell by 9.5 percent in the first three quarters of 2025. For metals, stronger front-loading effects in the first quarter explain the initial increase in exports, while subsequent quarters saw declines. For pharmaceutical and similar products, front-loading and possible diversion effects also help explain export growth, as these goods were exempt from U.S. import tariffs for longer than other products (and some remain exempt even now). In key sectors, German exports to the U.S. have thus been pushed back to levels seen in 2022 or even early 2019. Without the significant upswing in German exports to the U.S. following the COVID-19 pandemic until Donald Trump's re-election in fall 2024, the downturn would have been even more painful. Since U.S. import tariffs are unlikely to return to previous levels anytime soon, the development in the third quarter of 2025 may represent an approximation of the "new normal" for German exports to the U.S. This hits the already pressured German export model hard. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that the development of German exports to the US has depressed the development of Germany's global exports by 0.81 percentage points, whereas last year they still made a positive contribution to Germany's global export. The development of German exports to the U.S. has a significant impact on global exports for certain sectors. For motor vehicles and parts, the negative development in exports to the U.S. accounts for nearly half of the global export decline. Losses in the U.S. market are also a key factor behind the overall 3.3 percent drop in German machinery exports worldwide. To a somewhat lesser extent, this also applies to chemical products. |
| Keywords: | Zollpolitik, Amerikanisch, Export, Exportwirtschaft, Kfz-Industrie, Maschinenbau, Chemieindustrie, Deutschland |
| JEL: | F02 F10 F15 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:334499 |
| By: | Bilge Erten; Joseph E. Stiglitz; Eric Verhoogen |
| Abstract: | The CHIPS and Science Act, enacted in August 2022, is a key element of the revival of U.S. industrial policy. We examine the short-term employment effects of the act. Drawing on quarterly industry-by-county data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), we implement two county-level difference-in-difference designs, the first comparing counties with pre-existing semiconductor facilities to other counties with high-tech industries and the second comparing counties with semiconductor fabrication facilities (which were targeted for the bulk of the CHIPS funding) to counties with non-fabrication semiconductor facilities. Using both approaches, we find robust, positive employment impacts in affected counties. The effects began at the time of the passage in the Senate of a precursor bill, in anticipation of the signing of the CHIPS Act. Our preferred estimates suggest an increase of 110 jobs per affected county in the first design and 180 jobs per affected county in the second design. We also find robust positive impacts on local construction employment. Evidence on total employment and GDP at the county level, as well as on employment in upstream input sectors, is mixed. Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations (which come with caveats) suggest national direct employment effects of approximately 15, 000-16, 000 jobs in the core semiconductor sector and indirect effects of 28, 000-35, 000 jobs in related sectors. |
| JEL: | J01 L52 L63 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34625 |
| By: | Viral V. Acharya; Toomas Laarits |
| Abstract: | We explain how the “Tariff War” shock of April 2025 affected the safe-asset status of US Treasuries. Convenience yield erosion for long bonds is consistent with a reduction in the hedging property, reflected in a rising stock-bond covariance. Decomposing the Treasury yield into risk-free rate, credit spread, and convenience yield components reveals that covariance due to the convenience yield component increased for long bonds. The short end of the Treasury curve, however, continued to exhibit the safe-asset hedging property. These effects are consistent with a withdrawal of safe-asset investors from long-term Treasuries and a rotation towards shorter-term Treasuries and gold. |
| JEL: | E4 E5 F3 G11 G12 G15 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34640 |
| By: | Albora Giambattista (European Commission - JRC); Benoit Florence; Caldarola Bernardo (European Commission - JRC); Di Girolamo Valentina; Diodato Dario (European Commission - JRC); Napolitano Lorenzo (European Commission - JRC); Sciarra Carla (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | Over the past 25 years, the world has witnessed a significant surge in patenting activity, underscoring the crucial role of frontier technologies in driving economic growth and competitiveness. While the EU remains a leading global innovator, its competitive edge is under threat. To address this challenge, the EU must create a vibrant industrial ecosystem that nurtures innovation. Advanced Materials, with their potential to transform industries and enable breakthrough innovations, are a crucial component of this ecosystem, and offer a unique opportunity to strengthen the EU's economic growth, competitiveness, strategic autonomy, and digital and green transformation. This report is intended to lend support to the implementation of EU policies aimed at revitalising the EU economy – such as the forthcoming Advanced Materials Act – by identifying areas where Europe can enhance its technological leadership. The analysis is grounded in the Economic Complexity approach, which provides a framework to analyse the existing technological capabilities of the EU, and to identify untapped diversification opportunities for the Member States and their regions. The results of this report suggest that the EU leadership in many traditional technologies is threatened by rising innovation activities by its main competitors, mainly China and the US. To close its innovation gap, the EU can leverage its existing capabilities to enhance competitiveness in Advanced Materials, particularly in areas such as Biomaterials, Glass, and Cements. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc144431 |
| By: | Foster Gillian (European Commission - JRC); Cristobal Garcia Jorge (European Commission - JRC); Gallo Federico; Gaudillat Pierre (European Commission - JRC); Marschinski Robert (European Commission - JRC); Tonini Davide (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) has made progress in managing construction and demolition waste (CDW), but more needs to be done to promote preparing for reuse and high-quality recycling. The scope of the current study is the universe of policy measures intended to reduce waste, increase recycling, and achieve cost savings in CDW management in the EU. This study serves to define the state-of-play in the EU and winnow the universe of policies to those that are most promising given current technological and market conditions. Based on analysis of the policies with the highest potential positive impacts, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) recommends considering eight targeted actions at the EU level and ten additional targeted actions at the national and local levels to improve CDW reduction, reuse, and recycling. These policy measures range from legally binding rules to soft regulation and include measures such as extending producer responsibility, promoting selective demolition, and harmonising landfill charges. The measures require further in-depth impact assessment if promoted. The current study offers reliable evidence based on quantitative/qualitative analyses that provide new empirical data and results for use in future impact assessments. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc143206 |
| By: | Sillero Illanes Carmen (European Commission - JRC); Durth Melanie; González Raul; Castilla Barea Juan C.; Caro Gómez Esperanza |
| Abstract: | This report documents the findings of a review of the space ecosystem of Andalusia (Spain), carried out in 2025 within the framework of REGDUALOSA (Regions, Dual Use, Open Strategic Autonomy), an exploratory research initiative of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. The review was developed in partnership with the Regional Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining and explores some of the policy pathways Andalusia might take to develop the space domain as a dual-use industry, thereby boosting regional competitiveness and contributing to European strategic autonomy. The analysis adapts the POINT methodology developed by the JRC, combining documentary research, expert interviews, and stakeholder consultations. The study positions Andalusia within a volatile global landscape in which competitiveness, security, defence, and preparedness have emerged as central priorities of the European Union. Recent geostrategic tensions and the imperative of enhancing European defence capabilities, as underscored in the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 and the Readiness 2030 initiative, highlight the urgency of consolidating the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Andalusia, home to Spain’s second-largest aerospace cluster, aspires to develop its space domain, while diversifying beyond its traditional reliance on aerostructures. The report advances seven lines of action: scaling up the industry through defence integration and international expansion; streamlining access to finance; reinforcing industrial competitiveness; strengthening multi-level governance; fostering demand-driven innovation; and addressing talent shortages. Furthermore, it incorporates preparedness as a driver of transformative innovation and explores its interlinkages with dual-use technologies, promoting policy experimentation to address responses to climate-related disasters and hybrid threats. The report thus provides a timely foundation for Andalusia’s forthcoming steps. The participation of the Regional Government of Andalusia in the Experimentation Journey on Territorial Preparedness, under the Preparatory Action Innovation for Place-Based Transformation led by the Joint Research Centre and financed by the European Parliament, constitutes a unique opportunity to translate the insights of this report into new initiatives in cooperation with other European territories. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc143531 |
| By: | Ninon Moreau-Kastler (EU Tax Observatory) |
| Abstract: | Can developed countries enforce that goods consumed domestically do not contribute to human rights violations in developing countries where they are sourced? This paper studies the enforcement of new due diligence policies, which constrain firms to curb foreign sourcing linked to human rights violations through transparency and reporting. I study the US Dodd-Frank Act Conflict Mineral Rule (2010), a limiting the use of conflict minerals extracted in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries in supply chains of US eletronic firms. The law increased administrative cost of complying firms, showing that subtantial regulatory constraints were created. I test how diligence obligations shaped exports of targeted countries, and whether they are circumvented through opaque territories called legal havens. Using a triple difference strategy and the structural gravity framework, I find that this policy decreased DRC and adjoining countries’ exports of conflict minerals by 76%. One fourth of this decrease is due to circumvention through legal havens, which then re-export more intensively to countries hosting foreign suppliers of US-regulated firms. |
| Keywords: | trade diversion; legal haven; due diligence; minerals; supply chains |
| JEL: | F14 F63 F59 H73 K33 O13 O24 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbp:wpaper:037 |