nep-mig New Economics Papers
on Economics of Human Migration
Issue of 2020‒01‒20
four papers chosen by
Yuji Tamura
La Trobe University

  1. Diversity, Immigration, and Redistribution By Alberto F. Alesina; Stefanie Stantcheva
  2. On the Radar: System Embeddedness and Latin American Immigrants' Perceived Risk of Deportation By Asad, Asad L.
  3. Arming opposition: Measuring the effect of arms transfers on internal conflict By Quentin Gallea
  4. The Long Arm of the Arab State By Tsourapas, Gerasimos

  1. By: Alberto F. Alesina; Stefanie Stantcheva
    Abstract: This paper provides a simple conceptual framework that captures how different perceptions, attitudes, and biases about immigrants or minorities can shape preferences for redistribution. Through the lens of this framework, we review the empirical literature on the effects of racial diversity and immigration on support for redistribution in the US and Europe.
    JEL: H21 H41 J15 P16
    Date: 2020–01
  2. By: Asad, Asad L. (Cornell University)
    Abstract: Scholars suggest the applicability of the system avoidance concept to the U.S. immigration regime. On this theory, whereas undocumented immigrants are expected to be “on the run” from record-keeping bodies, documented immigrants are expected to feel secure “on the radar.” Yet, federal policy changes since the 1980s have made documented and undocumented immigrants alike vulnerable to deportation. How can researchers better account for the complex relationships between system involvement, avoidance, and deportability? Drawing on in-depth, multi-year interviews with Latin American-headed households in Dallas, Texas, this article examines how noncitizens with varying degrees of involvement in the U.S. immigration regime perceive the risk of deportation. Undocumented immigrants in this study recognize the precarity of their status, but they sometimes believe themselves less vulnerable to deportation than documented immigrants. Meanwhile, documented immigrants in this study underscore the relative stability of their status, but they sometimes view themselves as more vulnerable to deportation than undocumented immigrants. To explain these perspectives, the article develops the concept of “system embeddedness” to denote individuals’ perceived legibility to institutions that maintain formal records (i.e., a state of existing “in the system”). System embeddedness is one mechanism through which perceived visibility to the federal immigration regime entails risk, and perceived invisibility safety, for some noncitizens. In viewing the U.S. immigration regime as a source of risk, noncitizens can be chilled out of opportunities for political, economic, and social mobility through legalization in ways that likely disadvantage their U.S.-citizen children.
    Date: 2018–10–28
  3. By: Quentin Gallea
    Abstract: The main contribution of this paper is to provide the first causal estimation of the effect of weapons imports on confl icts in the recipient country for a global set of suppliers. The second main contribution is to suggest a novel approach to correct the errors with a Shift-Share (Bartik) instrument using arbitrary clustering and its implementation in STATA using the command acreg. Using small arms and light weapons country-year transfers data from 1992 to 2011, I estimate the effect of arms import on the con flict life-cycle (onset, duration, intensity and termination) and number of refugees from the recipient country. To address endogeneity issues, I am using supply shortages generated by suppliers' war involvement outside the recipient country's continent (Shift-Share instrumental variable) as exogenous negatives shocks on arms import. The two-stage least squares estimation shows that arms imports increase the onset of internal con flict, the number of internal con flicts, the percentage of battle-related deaths and the number of refugees fleeing the country. The 2SLS model predicts as well that if Europe would stop sending weapons to Africa for a year, it would reduce the number of refugees by 500,000.
    Keywords: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation, Internal Con ict, Migration, Rebellion, Arms imports
    JEL: C26 D74 F22 H56 O10 O19
    Date: 2019–12
  4. By: Tsourapas, Gerasimos (University of Birmingham)
    Abstract: Under what conditions do authoritarian states exercise control over populations abroad? The securitisation of cross-border mobility has been a common theme in examining immigration policies in the Global North. The securitisation of emigration and diasporas in non-democratic contexts remains neglected; this is particularly true with regard to Arab states’ extraterritorial authoritarian practices. This article argues that authoritarian states develop a range of migration policies that are driven by the contradictory pressures of economic and political imperatives or, put differently, an "illiberal paradox": if a state does not expect economic gains from cross-border mobility, it is more likely to securitise its emigration policy; otherwise, it is more likely to securitise its diaspora policy. The article illustrates this trade-off via a most-similar comparison of Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. Drawing on Arabic and non-Arabic primary and secondary sources, it sketches a novel area of research on migration and security.
    Date: 2019–03–26

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