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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Gorkem Celik; Roland Strausz |
| Abstract: | This paper studies monopolistic certification in markets where sellers possess partial private information about product quality. A certifier can provide information through two channels: screening sellers’ private information (soft information) and acquiring new quality data (hard information). We prove that any certification menu achieving less than maximal screening is Pareto dominated by one with full screening. Among Pareto-efficient menus, the certifier’s profit-maximising menu provides maximal soft information while restricting hard information provision. The two channels diverge because screening creates value the certifier can fully capture, whereas hard information amplifies costly information rents. Using power value functions, we derive comparative statics showing that information restrictions target low-quality sellers when information value is moderate, but high-quality sellers receive perfect quality revelation when information value is high. |
| Keywords: | certification, disclosure, screening, information acquisition, monopolistic distortions |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2026–07–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0104 |
| By: | Ichihashi, Shota; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol |
| Abstract: | We study a mechanism design problem of a monopoly platform that matches content of varying quality, ads with different ad revenues, and consumers with heterogeneous tastes for content quality. The optimal mechanism balances revenue from advertising and revenue from selling access to content: Increasing advertising revenue requires serving content to more consumers, which may reduce access revenue. Contrary to the standard monopolistic screening, the platform may serve content to consumers with negative virtual values while, to reduce information rents, limiting their access to higher-quality content. Then, an increase in ad profitability reduces its incentive to invest in content quality. |
| JEL: | D42 D82 L15 O31 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19675 |
| By: | Hattori, Keisuke |
| Abstract: | Organizations want their members valuable and replaceable; members who value being missed may prefer to be valuable because they are irreplaceable. This paper studies a team in which members choose productive effort and replaceability investments such as documentation, cross-training, and succession preparation. The desire to be missed makes a member want her absence to matter, raising effort but making replaceability costly because becoming replaceable means leaving a smaller void. The result is a tradeoff between motivation and resilience. When work is loosely connected, the effort gain can dominate; when tightly connected, the same motive undermines the backup the team most needs. Leadership sharpens this tradeoff. Concentrating dependence on a coordination hub raises material welfare because she backs up the largest void most heavily, but once the desire becomes strong enough to collapse backup, the same hub becomes the team's largest point of failure. |
| Keywords: | teams, replaceability, mattering, resilience, leadership, key-person risk |
| JEL: | D23 M54 D91 L23 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:341791 |
| By: | Peitz, Martin; Sato, Susumu |
| Abstract: | We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within-group and cross-group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group. We explore the effects of platform entry, a change of incumbent platforms’ quality under free entry, and the degree of compatibility. We show how the analysis can be extended to partial user participation. |
| Keywords: | Oligopoly theory; Aggregative games; Network effects; Two-sided markets; Two-sided single-homing; Entry |
| JEL: | L13 L41 D43 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19584 |
| By: | Schöttner, Anja; Upton, Harvey |
| Abstract: | A principal hiring an agent chooses between employment and self-employment. Under employment, the principal can control the manner in which the agent performs the assignment (the ‘work design’), whereas this is legally forbidden under self-employment. Due to incomplete contracts, the relationship is governed by relational agreements, which are influenced by the allocation of control. We show that employment typically results in an over-demanding work design, compared to an under-demanding work design under self-employment, and that employment relationships are more rigid and better suited to favorable production environments. We further examine the impact of taxation, minimum wages, and formal performance pay. |
| JEL: | D86 M55 L23 L24 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19688 |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann (Yale University); Marek Bojko (Yale University) |
| Abstract: | We study efficient dynamic mechanism design with independent private values when agents do not share a common prior over the stochastic environment. Each agent privately observes the stochastic kernel governing the evolution of her own type and may hold arbitrary beliefs about the kernels of others. We extend the agentsÕ type space to include the kernel itself and show that the dynamic team mechanism of Athey and Segal (2013) and the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and VŠlimŠki (2010) implement the socially efficient allocation in periodic ex-post equilibrium. We further show that kernels can be elicited only once, at the outset, and that the same mechanisms induce the efficient private acquisition of the stochastic kernels. |
| Date: | 2026–07–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2540 |
| By: | Itai Ashlagi; Shahr Dobzinski Jacob D. Leshno; Sigal Oren |
| Abstract: | Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying three classes of signals, each capturing a distinct dimension of bidders` values: their overall level (demand), their relative strength (ranking), and their dispersion while preserving bidder anonymity (competitiveness). We characterize the optimal signal and corresponding auction mechanism within each class, and find that competitiveness signals are particularly effective. Under certain regularity conditions, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any ranking signal or demand signal. Moreover, for signals that induce a monotone allocation, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any other binary signal. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.06623 |
| By: | Ma, Tianyu (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Riedel, Frank (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | We analyze first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in which bidders are uncertain about the distribution of their opponents’ valuations and have smooth ambiguity preferences. We characterize the unique non- decreasing symmetric equilibrium, whose bidding function solves a nonlinear ordinary differential equation with an endogenous ambiguity-adjusted distribution. Bids increase in ambiguity aversion, lie between the Bayesian benchmarks generated by the least and most competitive candidate priors, and converge to the maxmin benchmark. Under constant relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA), the equilibrium biding function is explicit. We also compare auction formats. Under an ex ante predictive criterion, the second-price auction dominates under ambiguity neutrality, but sufficiently strong ambiguity aversion reverses the ranking. Under a model-based criterion, the first- price auction performs better in less competitive environments and worse in more competitive ones, while compressing the range of possible revenues. Bidder preferences also depend on ambiguity attitudes: CRAA bidders weakly prefer the second-price auction, whereas bidders with increasing absolute ambiguity aversion weakly prefer the first-price auction. |
| Keywords: | First-price auctions, smooth ambiguity, ambiguity aversion, Knightian uncertainty, auction design, revenue comparison |
| Date: | 2026–08–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:769 |
| By: | Aman Ray; Srikanth Pai (Assistant Professor, Madras School of Economics, Chennai, India.) |
| Abstract: | We study a two-party spatial competition model that extends the Hotelling–Downs framework by allowing voter abstention. Voters share a common voting window size and participate only if at least one party lies within that window. Parties choose policy positions to maximize their vote-share margin. We show that if a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, both parties must choose the same policy position that generalizes the median voter principle. In the classical model, the median splits the total electorate into two equal halves; here, the equilibrium position must split the participating voters within a fixed voting window into two equal parts. We then give necessary and sufficient conditions on the voter distribution for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We identify broad classes of voter distributions under which pure-strategy equilibria exist.Length: 20 pages |
| Keywords: | Spatial competition · Abstention · Median voter theorem Nash equilibriumClassification-JEL: |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mad:wpaper:2026-306 |
| By: | Anna D’annunzio (UNINT - Università degli Studi Internazionali di Roma = University of International Studies of Rome); Yassine Lefouili (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Bruno Jullien (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Leonardo Madio (Unipd - Università degli Studi di Padova = University of Padua) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how horizontal mergers affect firms' incentives to invest in R&D leading to the development of new products. We characterize the impact of a merger to monopoly and a 3-to-2 merger on equilibrium innovation efforts and consumer surplus, absent efficiency gains and spillovers. We show that a 3-to-2 merger directly alters the outsider's innovation incentives by shifting its best-response function upward, and we analyze how this mechanism affects merger outcomes for innovation and consumer surplus. Finally, we examine how efficiency gains and remedies modify post-merger innovation efforts. |
| Keywords: | R&D Investments, Amp, Product Innovation, Horizontal Mergers |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05680914 |
| By: | Kamenica, Emir; Lin, Xiao |
| Abstract: | When does a Sender, in a Sender-Receiver game, strictly value commitment? In a setting with finite actions and finite states, we establish that, generically, Sender values commitment if and only if he values randomization. In other words, commitment has no value if and only if a partitional experiment is optimal under commitment. Moreover, if Sender's preferred cheap-talk equilibrium necessarily involves randomization, then Sender values commitment. We also ask: how often (i.e., for what share of preference profiles) does commitment have no value? For any prior, any independent, atomless distribution of preferences, and any state space: if there are n actions, the likelihood that commitment has no value is at least 1/n^n. As the number of states grows large, this likelihood converges precisely to 1/n^n. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian persuasion |
| JEL: | D80 D83 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19759 |
| By: | Parakhonyak, Alexei; Rhodes, Andrew |
| Abstract: | We consider a model in which consumers wish to buy a product repeatedly over time, but need to engage in costly search to learn prices and find a product that matches them well. The optimal search rule has two reservation values, one for newly-searched products, and another for products that were searched in the past. Depending on the search cost, firms either keep price steady over time, or gradually raise price to take advantage of a growing pool of high-valuation repeat customers. The model generates rich search and purchase dynamics, as consumers may optimally ``stagger'' search over time, initially trying different products, settling on one and buying it for a while, before choosing to search again for something better. We also show that consumers may be better off when firms can offer personalized prices based on their search history. |
| Keywords: | Consumer search |
| JEL: | D43 D83 L13 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19853 |
| By: | Bergemann, Dirk; Gan, Tan; Li, Yingkai |
| Abstract: | We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in advance, to a rule that maps the information of the sender into decisions-when the receiver knows neither the sender’s true preferences nor the full range of information the sender could supply. To handle this dual uncertainty, we adopt a unified robust framework that nests max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max competitive ratio as special cases. Across all criteria, the same answer emerges: the optimal rule is always a quota rule. |
| Keywords: | communication;commitment;partial alignment;quota rules;min-max regret;max-min utility;competitive ratio |
| JEL: | D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2026–07–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:140351 |
| By: | Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Wang, Qian |
| Abstract: | We consider models of repeated oligopoly competition where firms set quantities and one or more firms have private information about their marginal costs. This structure gives rise to strategic incentives to signal information about costs using output choices in order to affect rivals' future outputs. Consistent with the standard intuition from reaction functions, strategic incentives with quantity-setting tend to lead to higher equilibrium output and lower equilibrium prices, which are the opposite changes to those observed in similar models where price-setting is assumed. We emphasize a more surprising, and to the best of our understanding novel, difference: the effects of strategic incentives in quantity-setting games remain substantial, or even become stronger, as market structure becomes less concentrated. In contrast, in price-setting games, we always find smaller effects in less concentrated markets. |
| Keywords: | Oligopoly; Asymmetric information; Signaling; Pooling equilibria; Separating equilibrium; Firm conduct; Pass-through |
| JEL: | L1 L13 L4 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19757 |
| By: | Della Lena, Sebastiano (Monash University); Merlino, Luca (ECARES, Universite libre de Bruxelles); Zenou, Yves (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | We study opinion dynamics in a social network consisting of two groups. Agents update their opinions by conforming to members of their own group while rejecting the views of the opposing group (affective polarization), and by listening to a media outlet that may provide biased information. We characterize the long-run opinions and identify when affective polarization and media bias lead to ideological polarization, persistent disagreement, or failures of learning. We also derive when information interventions or censorship improve { the accuracy of average opinions} and reduce disagreement, and when they backfire: better information helps only under specific media bias configurations and when directed to the agents we identify as most effective at propagating it through the network. |
| Keywords: | signed networks, opinion dynamics, affective polarization, group antagonism, information campaigns, targeting |
| JEL: | C7 D7 D85 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18823 |
| By: | Hector Chade (Arizona State University); Victoria Marone (Yale University); Amanda Starc (Northwestern University); Jeroen Swinkels (Northwestern University) |
| Abstract: | We analyze a multidimensional screening model in which a principal offers a menu of quality-price pairs to a consumer with multiple dimensions of private information and a quasilinear utility function. We derive necessary conditions for optimality, and use them to provide insight into optimal exclusion, positive trade, and screening. We then recast the problem in terms of incremental quality levels and prices, the so-called demand-profile approach (DPA). Under DPA, the problem decouples across increments and can be solved one at a time. We provide novel conditions under which DPA recovers the solution to the full problem exactly or approximately, and which make the necessary conditions sufficient for optimality: essentially, valuations must be sufficiently correlated across quality increments. Applied to empirical estimates of demand for health insurance, we show that DPA is approximately valid, and we apply it to understand equilibrium outcomes in a monopoly insurance market. |
| Date: | 2026–06–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2541 |
| By: | Peitz, Martin; Sobolev, Anton |
| Abstract: | A seller can offer an experience good directly to consumers and indirectly through an intermediary. When selling indirectly, the intermediary provides recommendations based on the consumer’s match value and the prices at which the product is sold. The intermediary faces the trade-off between extracting rents from consumers who strongly care about the match value versus providing less informative recommendations but also serving consumers who do not. We analyze the allocative and welfare effects of prohibiting price parity clauses and/or regulating the intermediary’s recommender system. Prohibiting price parity clauses is always welfare decreasing in our model. |
| Keywords: | E-commerce |
| JEL: | L12 L15 D21 D42 M37 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19659 |
| By: | Bobkova, Nina |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how the voting rule impacts which characteristics of an alternative voters learn about. Before casting their vote, voters face a trade-off between learning about an objective quality of the alternative or about their idiosyncratic match. I show that the further the quota is from majority rule, the less voters learn about the objective quality of the alternative and the more dispersed are their beliefs about it. Among all quotas, the majority rule uniquely (i) aligns votes and beliefs, (ii) maximizes voters’ ex-ante utility, and (iii) aggregates full information for large elections. |
| Keywords: | Committees; Information acquisition |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19777 |
| By: | Benkert, Jean-Michel; Letina, Igor |
| Abstract: | We provide a model of investment in innovation that is dynamic, features multiple heterogeneous research projects of which only one potentially leads to success, and in each period, the researcher chooses the set of projects to invest in. We show that if a search for innovation starts, it optimally does not end until the innovation is found—which will be never with a strictly positive probability. |
| Keywords: | Innovation |
| JEL: | D83 O31 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19732 |
| By: | Weijie Zhong |
| Abstract: | I develop a duality-based multi-dimensional screening framework with a geometric characterization of combinatorial preferences. For a mechanism to be optimal, the type distribution pins down \emph{required} directions of binding feasibility constraints, while the complementarity among bundles determines the \emph{covered} directions; optimality reduces to full coverage of required directions. I apply the framework to a one-parameter family in which every bundle containing a fixed \emph{core} of items earns a complementarity premium. Two thresholds organize the optimum: above a lower threshold the grand bundle must be offered; above a higher threshold a \emph{core-peripheral} menu -- a bundled core with optional add-ons that are not sold standalone -- is optimal. The tight distributional condition for finiteness of the higher threshold is \emph{inclusivity}, that the menu exclude no near-top buyer. |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2607.07982 |
| By: | Heidhues, Paul; Johnen, Johannes; Köszegi, Botond |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of consumer-protection regulations limiting post-purchase harm when there are many markets and consumers have limited attention to examine prices or product features. Such regulation lowers the attention necessary for valuable purchases, which can allow a consumer to purchase in more markets, or serve to induce competition. The first benefit is most important when few markets are regulated, while the second emerges when regulatory scope is sufficiently broad to create “spare†— i.e., in equilibrium unused — attention. Because little spare attention can enforce competition in many markets, consumer welfare can be highly non-linear in regulatory scope. The benefits of regulating a market often accrue in other markets, and there is a sense in which overly tight regulation outperforms overly lax regulation. Broad consumer protection can help the economy reach productive efficiency, and when this is achieved less regulation may suffice. |
| Keywords: | Consumer protection; Regulation; Competition; Participation; Limited attention |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19560 |
| By: | Markovich, Sarit; Rayo, Luis |
| Abstract: | We consider a monopolistic platform who offers a menu of products differing in quality, such as their level of data privacy. Because of network externalities, the adoption of these products is subject to equilibrium multiplicity, which we handle using a novel notion of focality able to accommodate menus. The optimal menu depends critically on the platform’s focality, with a focal platform trading too little, and a nonfocal one too much, relative to the social optimum. This is because the nonfocal platform relies on consumers with the highest willingness to trade—such as those with the least privacy concerns—to build its network. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19792 |
| By: | Youming Liu; Francisco Rivadeneyra; Edona Reshidi |
| Abstract: | We study competition between a welfare-maximizing public platform and a profit-maximizing private platform in a two-sided payment market. We characterize the public platform’s optimal pricing and show that it balances the benefits of increased competition against the welfare costs of network fragmentation. While introducing a public platform generally raises aggregate welfare and financial inclusion, the competing private platform may respond by raising its fees, disadvantaging merchants that continue to accept payments from the private platform. Finally, we show that cost-recovery and zero-fee mandates constrain public pricing, making welfare improvements uncertain and conditional on network effects, user switching behavior, and the degree of platform differentiation. |
| Keywords: | Money and payments, Digital assets and fintech, Payment and financial market infrastructures, Retail payments |
| JEL: | D4 E42 E58 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:26-10 |
| By: | Prummer, Anja; Squintani, Francesco |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the recent surge in union drives, we present a theoretical model of the factors that influence unionization. An employee seeking to unionize their workplace assembles organizers to persuade coworkers to vote in favor. If unionization benefits workers, it is more likely to succeed when the organizers are credible. Credibility depends on the organizers not being overly biased and/or bearing significant orga- nizational costs. Our theory explains why grassroots movements, rather than estab- lished unions, often succeed in organizing workplaces. Interestingly, the likelihood of successful unionization, when it benefits workers, is non-monotonic with respect to organizational costs. When such costs are low, a firm that opposes unionization and targets organizers may paradoxically increase the chances of success. However, the unionization drive is ineffective if the firm’s opposition is sufficiently strong, as this makes organizational costs prohibitive. |
| Keywords: | Unions; Campaigns |
| JEL: | D71 D83 D23 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19843 |
| By: | Mei Dong; Janet Hua Jiang; Ling Sun |
| Abstract: | Conventional wisdom suggests that information transparency about prices lowers prices and markups by intensifying seller competition. However, in markets with costly buyer entry, price transparency also draws in more buyers, increasing demand-side competition and putting upward pressure on prices. We show that this buyer entry effect may dominate, and prices and markups may rise with information transparency. |
| Keywords: | Models and tools, Economic models |
| JEL: | D40 D83 L11 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:26-4 |
| By: | Andrew Ellis; Michele Piccione; Shengxing Zhang |
| Abstract: | We introduce a framework for studying the equilibrium effects of machine learning. Agents process information using a Chow and Liu (1968) tree, a widely-used machine learning procedure that admits a closed-form solution. We apply the model to an asset market with dispersed information based on Hellwig (1980). The price mechanism fails to aggregate the information extracted by the algorithm, even approximately. While there are partial equilibrium benefits from access to algorithms, the equilibrium price aggregates less information than the rational equilibrium. Equilibrium typically features diverse world-models, demands, and utilities, even with ex ante identical agents. |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2607.13670 |
| By: | Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny |
| Abstract: | Competing research waves start and grow as scientists choose their specialization driven by career incentives. We build a strategic experimentation framework where agents irreversibly choose between two risky fields, and information arrives faster as more agents specialize in a field. In the `bad news' case, if no news arrives, all agents join a bandwagon wave into one field. In the `good news' case, both fields are explored in two sequential surges, followed by slow entry into the initially inferior field. We describe how the equilibrium depends on the information-production technology, and assess the impact of first-mover advantages, congestion, and deadlines. |
| Keywords: | Poisson Bandits; Irreversibility |
| JEL: | D83 O31 O35 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19808 |
| By: | Antler, Yair; Spiegler, Ran |
| Abstract: | We develop a market model in which products generate state-dependent potential hidden charges. Firms differ in their ability to realize this potential. Unlike firms, consumers do not observe the state. They try to infer hidden charges from market prices, using idiosyncratic subjective models. We show that an interior competitive equilibrium is uniquely given by what is formally a Bellman equation. Using this representation, we show that relative to rational expectations, add-on charges are lower whereas headline prices and social welfare are higher. Market responses to shocks display patterns that are impossible under rational expectations. For example, although fully revealing, equilibrium prices can vary with consumers' private information. |
| Keywords: | Competitive equilibrium; Boundedly rational expectations; Add-ons; Hidden fees |
| JEL: | D41 D84 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19562 |