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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Alejandro Francetich; Burkhard C. Schipper |
| Abstract: | We analyze a principal-agent procurement problem in which the principal (she) is unaware some of the marginal cost types of the agent (he). Communication arises naturally as some types of the agent may have an incentive to raise the principal's awareness (totally or partially) before a contract menu is offered. The resulting menu must not only reflect the principal's change in awareness, but also her learning about types from the agent's decision to raise her awareness in the first place. We capture this reasoning in a discrete concave model via a rationalizability procedure in which marginal beliefs over types are restricted to log-concavity, ``reverse'' Bayesianism, and mild assumptions of caution. We show that if the principal is ex ante only unaware of high-cost types, all of these types have an incentive raise her awareness of them -- otherwise, they would not be served. With three types, the two lower-cost types that the principal is initially aware of also want to raise her awareness of the high-cost type: Their quantities suffer no additional distortions and they both earn an extra information rent. Intuitively, the presence of an even higher cost type makes the original two look better. With more than three types, we show that this intuition may break down for types of whom the principal is initially aware of so that raising the principal's awareness could cease to be profitable for those types. When the principal is ex ante only unaware of more efficient (low-cost) types, then \textit{no type} raises her awareness, leaving her none the wiser. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.20918 |
| By: | Azova, Arina; Lukyanov, Georgy |
| Abstract: | We embed observational learning (BHW) in a symmetric duopoly with random arrivals and search frictions. With fixed posted prices, a mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium exists and yields price dispersion even with ex-ante identical firms. We provide closed-form cascade bands and show wrong cascades occur with positive probability for interior parameters, vanishing as signals become precise or search costs fall; absorption probabilities are invariant to the arrival rate. In equilibrium, the support of mixed prices is connected and overlapping; its width shrinks with signal precision and expands with search costs, and mean prices comove accordingly. Under Calvo price resets (Poisson opportunities), stationary dispersion and mean prices fall; when signals are sufficiently informative, wrong-cascade risk also declines. On welfare, a state-contingent Pigouvian search subsidy implements the planner’s cutoff. Prominence (biased first visits) softens competition and depresses welfare; neutral prominence is ex-ante optimal. |
| Keywords: | social learning; informational cascades; price dispersion; search; vertical differentiation. |
| JEL: | C73 D43 D83 L13 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:131066 |
| By: | Hideo Konishi (Department of Economics, Boston College); Michel Le Breton (Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse Capitole University); Shlomo Weber (Southern Methodist University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we define additive dyadic social interactions games (ADG), in which each player cares not only about the selected action, but also about interactions with other players, especially those who choose the same action. This class of games includes alliance formation games, network games, and discrete choice problems with network externalities. While it is known that games in the ADG class admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is a maximizer of the game's potential, the potential approach does not always apply if all coalitional deviations are allowed. We then introduce a novel notion of a strong landscape equilibrium, which relies on a limited scope of coalitional deviations. We show the existence of a strong landscape equilibrium for a class of basic additive dyadic social interactions games (BADG), even though a strong Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Somewhat surprisingly, a potential-maximizing strong landscape equilibrium is not always a strong Nash equilibrium even if the set of the latter is nonempty. We also provide applications and extensions of our results. |
| Keywords: | Social Interactions Game, Potential Function, Coalition Formation, Strong Nash Equilibrium, Strong Landscape Equilibrium |
| JEL: | C71 C72 C78 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1120 |
| By: | Alejandro Francetich; Burkhard C. Schipper |
| Abstract: | We consider a principal who wishes to screen an agent with \emph{discrete} types by offering a menu of \emph{discrete} quantities and \emph{discrete} transfers. We assume that the principal's valuation is discrete strictly concave and use a discrete first-order approach. We model the agent's cost types as non-integer, with integer types as a limit case. Our modeling of cost types allows us to replicate the typical constraint-simplification results and thus to emulate the well-treaded steps of screening under a continuum of contracts. We show that the solutions to the discrete F.O.C.s need not be unique \textit{even under discrete strict concavity}, but we also show that there cannot be more than two optimal contract quantities for each type, and that -- if there are two -- they must be adjacent. Moreover, we can only ensure weak monotonicity of the quantities \textit{even if virtual costs are strictly monotone}, unless we limit the ``degree of concavity'' of the principal's utility. Our discrete screening approach facilitates the use of rationalizability to solve the screening problem. We introduce a rationalizability notion featuring robustness with respect to an open set of beliefs over types called \textit{$\Delta$-O Rationalizability}, and show that the set of $\Delta$-O rationalizable menus coincides with the set of usual optimal contracts -- possibly augmented to include irrelevant contracts. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.20921 |
| By: | Andrea Attar (CEIS & DEF University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Eloisa Campioni (CEIS & DEF University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Thomas Mariotti (Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS); Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University) |
| Abstract: | We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a principal's payoff guarantee against her competitors' threats. Second, they can support equilibrium outcomes and payoffs that cannot be supported with standard mechanisms. These results call for a novel approach to competing mechanisms, which we develop to identify a canonical game and a canonical class of equilibria, thereby establishing a new revelation principle for this class of environments. |
| Keywords: | Incomplete Information, Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, Revelation Principle. |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2025–06–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:615 |
| By: | Christian Ewerhart |
| Abstract: | In games with compact pure strategy spaces, the continuity of the payoff functions is preserved in the expected payoff functions of the mixed extension. This note provides an elementary proof of this fact, showing that the commonly assumed Hausdorff property is, in fact, not needed. |
| Keywords: | Compact games, expected payoffs, weak* topology, continuity, Hausdorff separability axiom |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:479 |
| By: | Kailin Chen |
| Abstract: | This paper studies an exponential bandit model in which a group of agents collectively decide whether to undertake a risky action $R$. This action is implemented if the fraction of agents voting for it exceeds a predetermined threshold $k$. Building on Strulovici (2008), which assumes the agents' payoffs are independent, we explore the case in which the agents' payoffs are correlated. During experimentation, each agent learns individually whether she benefits from $R$; in this way, she also gains information about its overall desirability. Furthermore, each agent is able to learn indirectly from the others, because in making her decisions, she conditions on being pivotal (i.e., she assumes her vote will determine the collective outcome). We show that, when the number of agents is large, increasing the threshold $k$ for implementing $R$ leads to increased experimentation. However, information regarding the overall desirability of $R$ is effectively aggregated only if $k$ is sufficiently low. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.16608 |
| By: | Heng-fu Zou (Institute for Advanced Study, Wuhan University) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a continuous-time model of contracting between a principal and many agents under moral hazard, linking dynamic contract theory to the mean field game (MFG) framework. Outputs depend on effort, competition, and both idiosyncratic and common shocks. The principal designs contracts using filtered signals that benchmark agents against peers. We show that the first-order approach remains valid: effort is linear in exposure with slope determined by the informativeness of filtered outputs. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation implies that optimal incentives depend jointly on marginal revenue, signal variance, and intertemporal insurance. The optimal filter is the generalized least squares residual, which asymptotically eliminates common shocks as group size grows. In a linear-quadratic specialization, equilibrium exists, is unique, and is globally stable, with the uniqueness result coinciding with the Lasry-Lions MFG fixed-point condition. The framework unifies tournaments, RPE, and dynamic contracts, and explains empirical puzzles in executive pay, sales teams, and finance. |
| Date: | 2025–10–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cuf:wpaper:797 |
| By: | Dube, Devwrat |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a combinatorial optimisation problem that we call the knapsack sequencing problem (KSP). KSP arises when the server in a sequencing problem is constrained to work in fixed-duration shifts. Each shift can be viewed as a knapsack, but unlike standard knapsack or bin-packing problems, KSP incorporates a temporal structure that distinguishes early and late shifts. The main challenge lies not in incentivising truth-telling but in algorithmically identifying the optimal partition of agents into shifts; a challenge compounded by the fact that KSP is strongly NP-hard, with the decision version being strongly NP-complete. We propose necessary conditions that efficient sequencing rules must satisfy, which help reduce the search space for feasible partitions. We show that the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism, using the efficient sequencing rule and VCG transfers, is strategy-proof for KSP. We establish the existence of first-best mechanisms—mechanisms that are efficient, strategy-proof, and budget balanced—for a subclass (unit-capacity) of KSP requiring n shifts to serve n agents. We also show, via a three-agent example, that when budget balance is imposed together with efficiency, strategy-proofness may fail. This research highlights the difficulties in extending classical sequencing results to settings with shift constraints and contributes both theoretical insights and algorithmic considerations relevant to resource allocation mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Knapsack Sequencing Problem, Combinatorial Optimisation, Mechanism Design, VCG Mechanisms, Strategy-proofness, Budget-balance, Computational Complexity |
| JEL: | C61 C63 D61 D82 |
| Date: | 2025–10–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126600 |
| By: | Jason Hartline; Aleck Johnsen; Yingkai Li |
| Abstract: | We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism is scale invariant, which randomizes between selling at the second-price and a 2.45 multiple of the second-price. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.21231 |
| By: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
| Abstract: | We develop an incomplete-contracting model in which the government engages a private contractor to provide a public good. Over time, adaptations of the good to changing circumstances may become desirable. The contractor privately learns the costs of implementing these adaptations. We compare two organizational forms. In a public-private partnership, the government actively participates in project management and, by incurring information-gathering costs, may ascertain the contractor's adaptation costs. Under traditional procurement, the government lacks direct involvement in project management, preventing it from ascertaining the adaptation costs. We show that the government's potentially enhanced access to the contractor's information in a public-private partnership can either support or undermine the case for such partnerships. |
| Keywords: | public-private partnerships; traditional procurement; asymmetric information; incomplete contracts; information gathering |
| JEL: | D23 D86 H41 H57 L33 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126368 |
| By: | Gambato, Jacopo; Ganglmair, Bernhard; Krämer, Julia |
| Abstract: | In a model of asymmetric regulation, a firm can comply with two regulatory targets, and a regulator can audit the firm for compliance. Inspection by the regulator is imperfect, and it assesses the firm's compliance with the targets with different success probabilities. The firm fully complies only if compliance costs are low. Otherwise, the firm always prioritizes the requirement that is easier to enforce. Expanding regulatory capacity positively affects compliance with the easy-to-enforce target; however, a higher capacity can harm compliance with the hard-to-enforce target. |
| Keywords: | agency resources, asymmetric enforcement, compliance, multi-tasking, regulation |
| JEL: | H32 K20 L51 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:330314 |
| By: | Christian Ewerhart |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits the n-player rent-seeking contest with homogeneous valuations and increasing returns. Our main result says that, for any m ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, there are threshold values 1 |
| Keywords: | Rent-seeking contests, increasing returns, asymmetric equilibria, monotone comparative statics |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:477 |
| By: | David Lagziel; Ehud Lehrer |
| Abstract: | We examine information structures in settings with privately informed agents and an informationally constrained mediator who supplies additional public signals. Our focus is on characterizing the set of posteriors that the mediator can induce. To this end, we employ a graph-theoretic framework: states are represented as vertices, information sets correspond to edges, and a likelihood ratio function on edges encodes the posterior beliefs. Within this framework, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions, internal and external consistency, for the rationalization of posteriors. Finally, we identify conditions under which a single mediator can implement multiple posteriors, effectively serving as a generator of Blackwell experiments. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.20986 |
| By: | Mario Ghossoub; Qinghua Ren; Ruodu Wang |
| Abstract: | We study Pareto-optimal risk sharing in economies with heterogeneous attitudes toward risk, where agents' preferences are modeled by distortion risk measures. Building on comonotonic and counter-monotonic improvement results, we show that agents with similar attitudes optimally share risks comonotonically (risk-averse) or counter-monotonically (risk-seeking). We show how the general $n$-agent problem can be reduced to a two-agent formulation between representative risk-averse and risk-seeking agents, characterized by the infimal convolution of their distortion risk measures. Within this two-agent framework, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal allocations, and we identify when the infimal convolution yields an unbounded value. When existence fails, we analyze the problem under nonnegative allocation constraints, and we characterize optima explicitly, under piecewise-linear distortion functions and Bernoulli-type risks. Our findings suggest that the optimal allocation structure is governed by the relative strength of risk aversion versus risk seeking behavior, as intuition would suggest. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.18236 |
| By: | Ali Shirali |
| Abstract: | From media platforms to chatbots, algorithms shape how people interact, learn, and discover information. Such interactions between users and an algorithm often unfold over multiple steps, during which strategic users can guide the algorithm to better align with their true interests by selectively engaging with content. However, users frequently exhibit inconsistent preferences: they may spend considerable time on content that offers little long-term value, inadvertently signaling that such content is desirable. Focusing on the user side, this raises a key question: what does it take for such users to align the algorithm with their true interests? To investigate these dynamics, we model the user's decision process as split between a rational system 2 that decides whether to engage and an impulsive system 1 that determines how long engagement lasts. We then study a multi-leader, single-follower extensive Stackelberg game, where users, specifically system 2, lead by committing to engagement strategies and the algorithm best-responds based on observed interactions. We define the burden of alignment as the minimum horizon over which users must optimize to effectively steer the algorithm. We show that a critical horizon exists: users who are sufficiently foresighted can achieve alignment, while those who are not are instead aligned to the algorithm's objective. This critical horizon can be long, imposing a substantial burden. However, even a small, costly signal (e.g., an extra click) can significantly reduce it. Overall, our framework explains how users with inconsistent preferences can align an engagement-driven algorithm with their interests in a Stackelberg equilibrium, highlighting both the challenges and potential remedies for achieving alignment. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.16368 |
| By: | Roberto Corrao; Joel P. Flynn; Karthik Sastry |
| Abstract: | We introduce a model of incentive contracting in which the principal, in addition to writing contracts, must engage in contractibility design: creating an evidence structure that allows them to prove when the agent has breached the contract. Designing an evidence structure entails both (i) front-end costs borne ex ante, such as those of drafting contracts, and (ii) back-end costs borne ex post, such as those of generating evidence. We find that, under even small front-end costs, optimal contracts are coarse, specifying finitely many contingencies out of a continuum of possibilities. In contrast, under even large back-end costs, optimal contracts are complete. Applied to the design of procurement contracts, our results rationalize: (i) the discreteness of contracts, (ii) the presence of similarly vague contracts in low-stakes and high-stakes settings, and (iii) the discontinuous adjustment of contracts to changes in the economic environment. |
| JEL: | D82 D86 K0 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34379 |
| By: | Axel Gautier; Jean-Christophe Poudou |
| Abstract: | In many industries, platforms compete with incumbents that are open to all consumers, whereas platforms require user affiliation. Consequently, platforms face two layers of competition: for the market, to attract users, and in the market, to compete with incumbents. We develop a dynamic model integrating these layers, showing that as platform affiliation grows, in the market competition intensifies, pushing incumbents toward more aggressive pricing. Conversely, for the market competition diminishes, reducing the platform's incentive to compete aggressively. This interplay generates dynamic pricing behavior that can be non-monotonic over time, capturing the shifting incentives driving platform-incumbent competition across both dimensions. |
| Keywords: | platform competition, Uber economy, competition for the market, market affiliation |
| JEL: | L11 L13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12218 |
| By: | Francis Bloch; Bhaskar Dutta; Marcin Dziubi\'nski |
| Abstract: | We propose and study a model of strategic network design and exploration where the hider, subject to a budget constraint restricting the number of links, chooses a connected network and the location of an object. Meanwhile, the seeker, not observing the network and the location of the object, chooses a network exploration strategy starting at a fixed node in the network. The network exploration follows the expanding search paradigm of Alpern and Lidbetter (2013). We obtain a Nash equilibrium and characterize equilibrium payoffs in the case of linking budget allowing for trees only. We also give an upper bound on the expected number of steps needed to find the hider for the case where the linking budget allows for at most one cycle in the network. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.16994 |
| By: | C\'esar Barilla |
| Abstract: | A decision-maker periodically acquires information about a changing state, controlling both the timing and content of updates. I characterize optimal policies using a decomposition of the dynamic problem into optimal stopping and static information acquisition. Eventually, information acquisition either stops or follows a simple cycle in which updates occur at regular intervals to restore prescribed levels of relative certainty. This enables precise analysis of long run dynamics across environments. As fixed costs of information vanish, belief changes become lumpy: it is optimal to either wait or acquire information so as to exactly confirm the current belief until rare news prompts a sudden change. The long run solution admits a closed-form characterization in terms of the "virtual flow payoff". I highlight an illustrative application to portfolio diversification. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.17757 |
| By: | Heng-fu Zou |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a new dynamic framework for designing intergovernmental fiscal transfers by combining incentive regulation, fiscal feder alism, and mean field games. Building on Laffont and Tirole's classic theory of cost observation and hidden effort, we model a central government that offers linear transfer contracts to a continuum of local governments whose costs evolve stochastically. Local cost dynamics follow Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross, or mean-reverting geometric Brownian motion processes and may experience rare jump shocks. Each locality chooses unobservable cost-reducing effort, while the center optimizes the transfer rule to induce truthful reporting and efficiency. Using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck equations, we characterize stationary and transitional equilibria and show that yardstick competition provides the strongest incentives with minimal fiscal cost. The model yields explicit conditions for long-run fiscal sustainability and illustrates how robust transfers can sustain effciency and equity under uncertainty. |
| Date: | 2025–10–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cuf:wpaper:793 |
| By: | Richard Peter (University of Iowa [Iowa City]); Pascal Toquebeuf (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces mean-preserving capacities for Choquet expected utility. A capacity is defined as mean-preserving when the value assigned to an event falls within an interval centered around its subjective probability, with the interval's size reflecting the perceived level of ambiguity. These capacities are based on the complementary independence axiom and feature a centrally symmetric core for decision-makers who are averse to ambiguity. To illustrate their practical value, we explore a series of economic applications including portfolio choice, self-insurance and self-protection, the value of a statistical life, and precautionary saving. Mean-preserving capacities offer intuitive predictions for both ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-loving individuals, often requiring fewer or no ancillary assumptions than alternative models. Moreover, they simplify the analysis of greater ambiguity considerably. |
| Keywords: | Choquet expected utility, Mean-preserving capacity, Comparative statics, Ambiguity attitude, Ambiguity |
| Date: | 2025–10–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05324776 |
| By: | L. Elisa Celis; Lingxiao Huang; Milind Sohoni; Nisheeth K. Vishnoi |
| Abstract: | Meritocratic systems, from admissions to hiring, aim to impartially reward skill and effort. Yet persistent disparities across race, gender, and class challenge this ideal. Some attribute these gaps to structural inequality; others to individual choice. We develop a game-theoretic model in which candidates from different socioeconomic groups differ in their perceived post-selection value--shaped by social context and, increasingly, by AI-powered tools offering personalized career or salary guidance. Each candidate strategically chooses effort, balancing its cost against expected reward; effort translates into observable merit, and selection is based solely on merit. We characterize the unique Nash equilibrium in the large-agent limit and derive explicit formulas showing how valuation disparities and institutional selectivity jointly determine effort, representation, social welfare, and utility. We further propose a cost-sensitive optimization framework that quantifies how modifying selectivity or perceived value can reduce disparities without compromising institutional goals. Our analysis reveals a perception-driven bias: when perceptions of post-selection value differ across groups, these differences translate into rational differences in effort, propagating disparities backward through otherwise "fair" selection processes. While the model is static, it captures one stage of a broader feedback cycle linking perceptions, incentives, and outcome--bridging rational-choice and structural explanations of inequality by showing how techno-social environments shape individual incentives in meritocratic systems. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.20606 |
| By: | Ciucci, Salvatore |
| Abstract: | There are many evidences which prove that cartels’ price leads to an economic inefficiency, due to the reduced consumers welfare. Antitrust authorities have set up different ways to defeat and prevent collusive agreements, but as widely showed by the literature, deterring collusion may have adverse effects, like higher price in surviving cartels, reduced turnover of firms’ employees, and disincentive for competing firms to cooperate, in the sense that if firms exchange information about the evolution of demand or costs, then they may adopt better choices; moreover, deterring collusion may have even a pro-collusion effect. The paper suggests an additional anti-cartel tool which does not have side effects, and supporting no cost, it can get worse collusion stability. Analysing a supergame of collusion, in a Bertrand duopoly framework in which is run a two-stage lottery, we show that deviation strategy becomes more attractive, even if lottery jackpot tends to zero. |
| Keywords: | Political Economy, Public Economics |
| Date: | 2025–10–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:373385 |
| By: | Andreas Haupt |
| Abstract: | Algorithmic recommendation based on noisy preference measurement is prevalent in recommendation systems. This paper discusses the consequences of such recommendation on market concentration and inequality. Binary types denoting a statistical majority and minority are noisily revealed through a statistical experiment. The achievable utilities and recommendation shares for the two groups can be analyzed as a Bayesian Persuasion problem. While under arbitrary noise structures, effects on concentration compared to a full-information market are ambiguous, under symmetric noise, concentration increases and consumer welfare becomes more unequal. We define symmetric statistical experiments and analyze persuasion under a restriction to such experiments, which may be of independent interest. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.16972 |