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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Jihwan Do (Yonsei University); Nicolas Riquelme (Universidad de los Andes) |
| Abstract: | We revisit Cournot competition with asymmetric demand information by introducing a common input supplier. We characterize a unique equilibrium where information spills over through screening and signaling in vertical contracting. The equilibrium outcomes either coincide with those under complete information or involve quantity distortions. Compared to the independent-supplier case, the presence of the common supplier enhances both consumer and producer surplus under mild downstream competition. Under intense competition, producer surplus can decline, although consumer surplus may still increase. Our findings reveal informational efficiency gains of upstream mergers and the possibility of a welfare improvement even when direct efficiency gains are absent. |
| Keywords: | Cournot competition; Asymmetric information; Common agency; Information transmission; Vertical contracting; Screening; Signaling. |
| JEL: | D82 D86 L13 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2025rwp-251 |
| By: | Bontems, Philippe; Calmette, Marie-Françoise; Martimort, David |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the forthcoming terminations of most highways concessions in France, we propose a versatile model of dynamic regulation and contract renewals that describes a long-term relationship between the public authority and an incumbent operator with private information about its costs that may face potential entrants. We discuss various issues including the nature of discriminatory biases towards entrants, their consequences on investments, the public or private nature of the management of concessions, the role of the operator's financial constraints, the consequences of allotments. So doing, we isolate a few principles that should guide policy-makers when deciding upon concession renewals. |
| Keywords: | Procurement; concession contracts; contract renewal; highways; transportation;; auctions; asymmetric information |
| JEL: | D82 D86 L51 L91 L98 |
| Date: | 2025–07–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130653 |
| By: | Crémer, Jacques |
| Date: | 2025–07–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130643 |
| By: | Joshua S. Gans |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a transparent, simplified version of Carnehl and Schneider (2025)’s model of knowledge creation. Our tractable framework, which yields closed-form solutions for key welfare trade-offs, preserves the essential economic mechanisms while eliminating mathematical complexity. We derive four main insights. First, contrary to the original model’s emphasis on “moonshots, ” our analysis demonstrates that expanding knowledge and then deepening it (the moonshot approach) is never socially optimal under direct welfare comparisons. The original model’s case for moonshots relies on second-best arguments involving research costs and dynamic externalities, not on direct welfare considerations. Second, we identify a novel misalignment between private and social incentives in multidisciplinary research contexts. Even without research costs — where the original model predicts perfect alignment — researchers bridging large knowledge gaps between disciplines choose locations that create suboptimal knowledge structures. Third, we analyse how citation-based incentive systems affect knowledge creation trajectories. We show that systems privileging unique contributions over shared ones align private behaviour with social welfare objectives, while those rewarding shared contributions lead to excessive knowledge deepening. Fourth, our analysis provides precise characterisations of optimal knowledge creation paths under various initial conditions and offers clear guidance for science policy. By clarifying when interventions can address misalignments between researchers’ incentives and social welfare, our simplified model offers practical insights for the design of research funding mechanisms. |
| JEL: | D83 O31 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33815 |
| By: | Jihwan Do (Yonsei University); Jeanine Miklos-Thal (University of Rochester) |
| Abstract: | The cloud services industry, which is currently dominated by a few large providers, has come under scrutiny from antitrust authorities worldwide. One concern is that "egress fees"—charges for transferring data out of a provider's cloud-could harm competition and welfare by discouraging multi-clouding, whereby a user combines services from several providers. Motivated by this policy concern, we analyze the effects of banning price discrimination against multi-stop shoppers in a market where multi-product firms sell complementary goods to buyers with elastic demands, and multi-stop shoppers impose higher service costs than one-stop shoppers. We find that if buyers are locked into a specific product combination, then a ban on price discrimination against multi-stop shoppers raises social welfare for a wide range of demand functions. If product choices are endogenous and buyers' product preferences are weak, however, then a ban on price discrimination tends to harm social welfare. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2025rwp-250 |
| By: | Jihwan Do (Yonsei University); Jeremy Kettering (Alvernia University) |
| Abstract: | We examine a model of imperfect competition characterized by endogenous entry, where two firms decide whether to enter the market or remain out and subsequently determine their output upon entry. A key aspect of the model is the presence of uncertain market demand, with one firm possessing an informational advantage over its competitor. It is shown that in the unique equilibrium with endogenous entry, informational asymmetry distorts the entry incentives for the better-informed firm, potentially causing it to earn lower profits than its rival. Moreover, market entry may be excessive from a consumer surplus viewpoint, and more precise information can have non-monotonic effects on welfare due to the entry distortions. Within this framework, we also analyze various regulatory measures and policies aimed at enhancing consumer welfare. |
| Keywords: | Oligopoly; Market entry; Asymmetric information; Competition policy; Strategic disadvantage of information |
| JEL: | D43 D82 L13 L50 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2025rwp-253 |
| By: | Yusuke Yamaguchi (Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, JAPAN, Toulouse School of Economics, FRANCE, and Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, JAPAN) |
| Abstract: | Bilateral bargaining is often facilitated by an intermediary. In many settings, however, the intermediary shares interests with one of the negotiating parties and lacks both commitment and enforcement power. This paper examines how such a biased intermediary affects bargaining outcomes. I consider a stylized bilateral trade framework and compare two bargaining games: a seller-offer bargaining game, in which the seller proposes a price, and a mediated bargaining game, in which the intermediary proposes a price and traders pay her commissions. By focusing on the set of communication equilibria in both games, I characterize the outcomes achievable when players are allowed general preplay and intraplay communication. I show that if the intermediary's bias is sufficiently small, the mediated bargaining game can yield a higher expected social surplus than the seller-offer bargaining game in the second-best scenario. This result provides a rationale for the widespread use of biased intermediaries in practice, even when their bias is common knowledge. |
| Keywords: | Bargaining; Intermediary; Bias; Communication equilibrium |
| JEL: | C78 D82 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2025-20 |
| By: | Philipp Strack (Yale University); Kai Hao Yang (Yale University) |
| Abstract: | A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination constraint: consumers with the same cost, but different characteristics must face identical prices. Such constraints arise in regulated markets like credit or insurance. The setting reduces to an optimal transport, and we characterize the optimal pricing rule. Under this rule, consumers may retain surplus, and either group may benefit. Strengthening the constraint to cover transaction prices redistributes surplus, harming the low-value group and benefiting the high-value group. |
| Date: | 2025–06–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2447 |
| By: | Yulia Evsyukova (University of Mannheim and ZEWÐLeibniz Centre for European Economic Research); Federico Innocenti (Università di Verona); Niccolò Lomys (CSEF and Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II) |
| Abstract: | We study how framing interplays with information design. Whereas Sender conceives all contingencies separately, Receiver cannot initially distinguish among some of them, i.e., has a coarse frame. To influence Receiver’s behavior, Sender first decides whether to refine Receiver’s frame and then designs an information structure for the chosen frame. Sender faces a trade-off between keeping Receiver under the coarse frame — thus concealing part of the information structure — and reframing — hence inducing Receiver to revise preferences and prior beliefs after telling apart initially indistinguishable contingencies. Sender benefits from re-framing if this enhances persuasion possibilities or makes persuasion unnecessary. Compared to classical information design, Receiver’s frame becomes more critical than preferences and prior beliefs in shaping the optimal information structure. Although a coarse worldview may open the doors to Receiver’s exploitation, re-framing can harm Receiver in practice, thus questioning the scope of disclosure policies. |
| Keywords: | Framing; Information Design; Disclosure Policies. |
| JEL: | D1 D8 D9 G2 G4 M3 |
| Date: | 2024–12–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:743 |
| By: | Anna Maria C. Menichini (Università di Salerno and CSEF); Peter Simmons (University of York) |
| Abstract: | We propose a rationale for the joint financing of two independent projects based on the reduction in audit costs resulting from endogenous sequential verification. This cost reduction occurs not only when joint financing offers coinsurance benefits, but, remarkably, also in the presence of contagion losses -where the failure of one project negatively impacts the other. This is because the benefits from endogenous verification - namely, the cost saving from audits optimally decreasing in the reported outcome - may offset the additional cost arising from contagion, specifically, the potential need to audit a successful project due to the failure of the other. We provide a detailed characterisation of the optimal contract, showing that under certain conditions it may take the form of standard debt. Furthermore, we conduct a comparative static analysis relating the optimality of joint financing to the quality of accounting information. Importantly, we find that with fully transparent accounting information, joint financing always dominates single financing even under contagion. The results remain robust across scenarios involving simultaneous audits and multiple projects. |
| Keywords: | financial contracts, auditing, joint financing, project finance, conglomerates. |
| JEL: | D82 D86 G32 G34 |
| Date: | 2024–12–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:742 |
| By: | Marcin P\k{e}ski; Colin Stewart |
| Abstract: | A researcher wants to ask a decision-maker about a belief related to a choice the decision-maker made; examples include eliciting confidence or cognitive uncertainty. When can the researcher provide incentives for the decision-maker to report her belief truthfully without distorting her choice? We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for nondistortionary elicitation and fully characterize all incentivizable questions in three canonical classes of problems. For these problems, we show how to elicit beliefs using variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.12167 |
| By: | Lionel de Boisdeffre (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents a pure exchange economy, where consumers may have asymmetric information, non-ordered preferences and a restricted access to purely financial markets. Under standard conditions, it shows that the two concepts of no-arbitrage price and equilibrium asset price coincide. Namely, any collection of state prices in realizable states is proved to support a sequential equilibrium. This result extends Cass (2006), De Boisdeffre (2007) and similar results of symmetric information, such as Martins-da-Rocha and Triki's (2005) or Cornet and Gopalan's (2010). Moreover, the de?nition and existence of the sequential equilibrium do not rely on Radner's (1972, 1979) rational expectation assumptions, which may be dropped |
| Keywords: | incomplete markets; restricted participation; arbitrage; existence of equilibrium, rational expectations, perfect foresight, asymmetric information |
| JEL: | D52 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:25014 |
| By: | Marie Obidzinski (Université Paris Panthéon Assas, CRED UR 7321, 75005 Paris, France); Yves Oytana (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France) |
| Abstract: | We study the design of optimal liability sharing rules when the use of an AI prediction by a human user may cause external damage. To do so, we set up a game-theoretic model in which an AI manufacturer chooses the level of accuracy with which an AI is developed (which increases the reliability of its prediction) and the price at which it is distributed. The user then decides whether to buy the AI. The AI’s prediction gives a signal about the state of the world, while the user chooses her effort to discover the payoffs in each possible state of the world. The user may be susceptible to an automation bias that leads her to overestimate the algorithm’s accuracy (overestimation bias). In the absence of an automation bias, we find that full user liability is optimal. However, when the user is prone to an overestimation bias, increasing the share of liability borne by the AI manufacturer can be beneficial for two reasons. First, it reduces the rent that the AI manufacturer can extract by exploiting the user’s overestimation bias by underinvesting or overinvesting in the AI accuracy. Second, due to the nature of the interaction between algorithm accuracy and the user effort, the user may be incentivized to increase her (too low) judgment effort. |
| Keywords: | liability sharing, advisory algorithm, automation bias, prediction, judgment effort |
| JEL: | K13 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2025-08 |
| By: | Qiuyu Lu (Ph.D. in Economics, Graduate School of Economics, the University of Osaka); Noriaki Matsushima (Osaka School of International Public Policy, the University of Osaka); Shiva Shekhar (Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University) |
| Abstract: | This study explores the welfare impact of personalized pricing for consumers in a duopolistic two-sided market, with consumers single-homing and developers affiliating with a platform according to their outside option. Personalized pricing, which is private in nature, cannot influence expectations regarding the network sizes, inducing the platforms to offer lower participation fees for developers. Those lower fees increase network benefits for consumers, allowing the platforms to exploit these benefits through personalized pricing. Personalized prices are higher when the network value for developers is high, benefiting competing platforms at the expense of consumers. These findings offer policy insights on personalized pricing. |
| Keywords: | Personalized pricing, Uniform prices, Two-sided market, Content developers |
| JEL: | L13 D43 M21 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osp:wpaper:25e003 |
| By: | Heski Bar-Isaac; Rahul Deb; Matthew Mitchell |
| Abstract: | We introduce a model of content moderation for sale, where a platform can channel attention in two ways: direct steering that makes content visible to consumers and certification that controls what consumers know about the content. The platform optimally price discriminates using both instruments. Content from higher willingness-to-pay providers enjoys higher quality certification and more views. The platform cross-subsidizes content: the same certificate is assigned to content from low willingness-to-pay providers that appeals to consumers and content from higher willingness-to-pay providers that does not. Cross-subsidization can benefit consumers by making content more diverse; regulation enforcing accurate certification may be harmful. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.12604 |
| By: | Jens Gudmundsson; Jens Leth Hougaard |
| Abstract: | Blockchain-based smart contracts offer a new take on credible commitment, where players can commit to actions in reaction to actions of others. Such reaction-function games extend on strategic games with players choosing reaction functions instead of strategies. We formalize a solution concept in terms of fixed points for such games, akin to Nash equilibrium, and prove equilibrium existence. Reaction functions can mimic "trigger" strategies from folk theorems on infinitely repeated games -- but now in a one-shot setting. We introduce a refinement in terms of safe play. We apply our theoretical framework to symmetric investment games, which includes two prominent classes of games, namely weakest-link and public-good games. In both cases, we identify a safe and optimal reaction function. In this way, our findings highlight how blockchain-based commitment can overcome trust and free-riding barriers. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.14413 |
| By: | Blumenthal, Benjamin; Nunnari, Salvatore |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we introduce reciprocity concerns in a political agency model with symmetric learning about politicians’ ability and moral hazard. Voters with reciprocity concerns are both prospective—that is, seek to select competent politicians—and retrospective—that is, reward fair actions and punish unfair ones. We focus on how electoral incentives induce politicians to exert effort (electoral control) and how voters remove incompetent politicians (electoral screening). We show that taking voters’ reciprocity concerns into account has important normative implications and can overturn results from standard models that neglect them: increasing transparency about the incumbent’s effort improves electoral control if and only if voters have sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns; increasing benefits from office improves electoral control if and only if voters have sufficiently low reciprocity concerns. Moreover, we show that reciprocity concerns can affect electoral screening, by affecting the competence threshold incumbents must clear to ensure reelection, generating incumbency advantages or disadvantages. |
| Date: | 2025–06–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:9mv2e_v1 |
| By: | Ayush Gupta |
| Abstract: | This paper establishes a general existence result for expected utility maximization in settings where the agent's decision affects the uncertainty faced by her. We introduce a continuity condition for choice-dependent probability measures which ensures the upper semi-continuity of expected utility. Our topological proof imposes minimal restrictions on the utility function and the random variable. In particular, we do not need common assumptions like the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) or the convexity of distribution functions condition (CDFC). Additionally, we identify sufficient conditions - continuity of densities and stochastic dominance - which help verify our assumptions in most practical applications. These findings expand the applicability of expected utility theory in settings with endogenous uncertainty. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.06846 |
| By: | Bos, Iwan; Cesi, Berardino; Marini, Marco A. |
| Abstract: | This note examines cartel stability in a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality-anchored buyers. It is shown that such buyers are a facilitating factor for collusion. |
| Keywords: | Captive Consumers, Cartel Stability, Collusion, Quality-Anchored Buyers, Ver- tical Product Differentiation. |
| JEL: | C7 C71 C72 D4 D43 L1 L13 |
| Date: | 2025–06–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:125064 |
| By: | Jihwan Do (Yonsei University); Lining Han (Wuhan University); Xiaoxi Li (Wuhan University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the monopoly data seller's problem when users are connected through an information-sharing network. When users' prior information is sufficiently noisy, the seller's optimal strategy targets a maximum independent set - the largest subset of users with no direct links. In this regime, data precision falls as the network becomes denser, yet we show - using the Caro–Wei bound, a classical result in graph theory - that it remains strictly above the socially efficient level in most networks. Further, any core-periphery network is Pareto-efficient, and any Pareto-efficient network exhibits a quasi-core-periphery structure. When users can coordinate network formation, the resulting equilibrium network also takes this form. Finally, we quantify the value of network information by comparing the seller profit to that with a misbelief. |
| Keywords: | Information markets, information-sharing network, monopolistic pricing, maximum independence set |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2025rwp-249 |
| By: | Xienan Cheng; Mustafa Dogan; Pinar Yildirim |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the effects of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption in organizations. We ask: (1) How should a principal optimally deploy limited AI resources to replace workers in a team? (2) In a sequential workflow, which workers face the highest risk of AI replacement? (3) How does substitution with AI affect both the replaced and non-replaced workers' wages? We develop a sequential team production model in which a principal can use peer monitoring -- where each worker observes the effort of their predecessor -- to discipline team members. The principal may replace some workers with AI agents, whose actions are not subject to moral hazard. Our analysis yields four key results. First, the optimal AI strategy involves the stochastic use of AI to replace workers. Second, the principal replaces workers at the beginning and at the end of the workflow, but does not replace the middle worker, since this worker is crucial for sustaining the flow of information obtained by peer monitoring. Third, the principal may choose not to fully exhaust the AI capacity at her discretion. Fourth, the optimal AI adoption increases average wages and reduces intra-team wage inequality. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.12337 |
| By: | Costas Cavounidis; Massimiliano Furlan; Alkis Georgiadis-Harris |
| Abstract: | Alice wishes to reveal the state $X$ to Bob, if he knows some other information $Y$ also known to her. If Bob does not, she wishes to reveal nothing about $X$ at all. When can Alice accomplish this? We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition on the joint distribution of $X$ and $Y$. Shannon's result on the perfect secrecy of the one-time pad follows as a special case. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.12416 |
| By: | Gabriele Gratton; Barton E. Lee |
| Abstract: | We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles, including recruiting of public servants and isolating them from politics. Our results support the view that a more inclusive and representative bureaucracy protects against anti-elite populism. We provide empirical evidence that lack of trust in public servants is a key force behind support for anti-elite populist parties and argue that our model helps explain the rise of anti-elite populism in large robust democracies. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp25244 |
| By: | Giuseppe De Marco (University of Naples Parthenope and CSEF); Maria Romaniello (Università degli Studi della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli.); Alba Roviello (University of Napoli Federico II) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effects of guilt aversion in the Battle of Sexes game by exploiting the theory of psychological games and the concept of psychological Nash equilibrium. Then we examine the impact of ambiguity in the (second-order) beliefs by taking into account the theory of psychological games under ambiguity. Our results show that the sensitivity to guilt affects some equilibrium of the game since a player might be willing to accept a lower expected utility to compensate the otherÕs disutility from guilt. Ambiguity, in turn, makes this effect more evident as it makes it greater the disutility from guilt. |
| Keywords: | Battle of sexes, guilt aversion, psychological games, maxmin preferences. |
| Date: | 2024–12–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:741 |
| By: | Rabah Amir (University of Iowa); Adriana Gama (El Colegio de Mexico) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a thorough characterization of the properties of Cournot’s complementary monopoly model (or oligopoly with perfect complements) in a general setting, including existence, uniqueness and the comparative statics effects of entry. As such, this serves to unify various results from the extant literature that have typically been derived with limited generality. In addition, several studies have suggested that Cournot’s complementary monopoly model is the dual problem to the standard Cournot oligopoly model. This result crucially relies on the assumption that the firms have no production costs. This paper shows that if the production costs of the firms are different from zero, the nice duality between these two oligopoly settings breaks down. One implication of this breakdown is that, in contrast to the Cournot model, oligopoly with perfect complements can be a game of strategic complements in a global sense even in the presence of production costs. |
| Keywords: | oligopoly with perfect complements, price competition, horizontal integration, supermodularity |
| JEL: | C72 D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2025-04 |
| By: | Borys Grochulski; Zhu Wang |
| Abstract: | We build a model to explain the 6 percent real estate broker commission observed in the U.S. In our model, brokers operate a two-sided platform for trading homes. Using small-value handouts and exclusive buyer representation contracts, the platform captures the vast majority of buyers, thereby gaining a monopolist's position vis-á-vis the sellers. Home sellers' only outside option is to move while retaining ownership of their homes. Absentee homeownership, however, entails costs. As a monopolist, the platform sets its commission fee equal to the costs of absentee ownership. With these costs proportional to the home's value, the platform's optimal commission rate is the same for all homes, and remains insensitive to fluctuations in home valuations, while the platform's profit is pro-cyclical. The commission rate is also insensitive to reductions in underlying search costs because the seller's outside option does not involve selling the home. The model implies that commission rates should be higher where price rent ratios are higher—a prediction we verify in the data. We also consider optimal regulation: a ban on exclusive buyer representation contracts implements a second-best optimal allocation, in which the platform charges lower commissions that are sensitive to both home valuations and search costs. |
| Keywords: | real estate brokers; broker commission; two-sided platforms; monopolist pricing |
| JEL: | D42 L12 L85 |
| Date: | 2025–06–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedrwp:101191 |