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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Jeanine Miklós-Thal; Avi Goldfarb; Avery M. Haviv; Catherine Tucker |
| Abstract: | When a user shares multi-dimensional data about themselves with a firm, the firm learns about the correlations of different dimensions of user data. We incorporate this type of learning into a model of a data market in which a firm acquires data from users with privacy concerns. User data is multi-dimensional, and each user can share no data, only non-sensitive data, or their full data with the firm. As the firm collects more data and becomes better at drawing inferences about a user’s privacy-sensitive data from their non-sensitive data, the share of new users who share no data (“digital hermits”) grows. At the same time, the share of new users who share their full data also grows. The model therefore predicts a polarization of users’ data sharing choices away from non-sensitive data sharing to no sharing and full sharing. |
| JEL: | L5 L51 L86 M3 |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30920&r=mic |
| By: | Ritesh Jain (University of Liverpool Management School.); Ville Korpela (Turku School of Economics); Michele Lombardi (University of Liverpool Management School, Università di Napoli Federico II, and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies. We offer two equivalent conditions, Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** and Partition Monotonicity. Similar to Bergemann et al. (2011) and Xiong (2022), Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** relies on the existence of a partition of the set of states. However, Partition Monotonicity provides a construction for the partition. |
| Keywords: | Implementation, Two Players, Rationalizability, Complete Information. |
| JEL: | C79 D82 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:660&r=mic |
| By: | Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Benjamin Monet; Vassili Vergopoulos |
| Abstract: | This paper studies decision-making in the face of two stochastically independent sources of uncertainty. It characterizes axiomatically a Subjective Expected Utility representation of preferences where subjective beliefs consist of a product probability measure. The two key axioms in this characterization both involve some behavioral notions of stochastic independence. Our result can be understood as a purely subjective version of the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) theorem that avoids the controversial use of exogenous probabilities by appealing to stochastic independence. We also obtain an extension to Choquet Expected Utility representations. |
| Keywords: | subjective probability, expected utility, stochastic independence, subjective independence, capacity, Choquet expectation. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03901731&r=mic |
| By: | Daijiro Kawanaka (Graduate school of Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) formulate loss-aversion models called Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) and Choice-acclimating Personal Equilibrium (CPE) so successfully that many papers have been applied their models to a variety of economic fields in this decade. In this paper, without assuming any specific functional form, I show that these two loss-aversion models satisfy strong mixture aversion in the sense that a non-degenerate lottery is strictly preferred to any mixture between the lottery and its certainty equivalent. This property distinguishes these loss-aversion models from many other standard models such as the expected utility theory and disappointment aversion so that this result allows experimental economists to test a class of these models in a simple setting. |
| Keywords: | Prospect theory, Loss aversion, Reference point, Mixture aversion, Betweenness |
| JEL: | D11 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:2302&r=mic |
| By: | Alfred Galichon (NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System, CIMS - Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences [New York] - NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Larry Samuelson (Yale University [New Haven]); Lucas Vernet (Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a notion of substitutability for correspondences and establish a monotone comparative static result, unifying results such as the inverse isotonicity of M-matrices, Berry, Gandhi and Haile's identification of demand systems, monotone comparative statics, and results on the structure of the core of matching games without transfers (Gale and Shapley) and with transfers (Demange and Gale). More specifically, we introduce the notions of unified gross substitutes and nonreversingness and show that if Q : P ⇒ Q is a supply correspondence defined on a set of prices P which is a sublattice of R N , and Q satisfies these two properties, then the set of equilibrium prices Q −1 (q) associated with a vector of quantities q ∈ Q is increasing (in the strong set order) in q; and it is a sublattice of P . |
| Date: | 2022–07–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03936102&r=mic |