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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Ganguly, Chirantan (Management School, Queens University Belfast,); Ray, Indrajit (Economics Section, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University,) |
| Abstract: | We consider a Bayesian game, namely the Battle of the Sexes with private information, in which each player has two types, High and Low. We allow cheap talk regarding playerstypes before the game. We prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium exists (for a low range of prior probability of the High-type) and has a desirable type-coordination property : it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the playerstypes are different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful, for a medium range of prior probability of the High-type. We also prove that there is no (non-babbling) truthful cheap talk equilibrium if only one player talks. |
| Keywords: | Battle of the Sexes ; Private Information ; Cheap Talk ; Coordination ; Full Revelation. JEL classification numbers: C72 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wcreta:35&r=mic |
| By: | Conti, Chiara; Marini, Marco A. |
| Abstract: | This paper focusseses on the strategic use of firms' R&D agreements to overcome R&D inefficiencies in presence of asymmetric information and research spillovers. We introduce a duopoly game where initially one firm is not fully informed on its rival's R&D productivity. We show that, without R&D agreements, the usual underinvestment problem can be exacerbated by the presence of asymmetric information. However, by proposing a R&D agreement, the uninformed firm may not only gain from the internalization of R&D investment spillovers, but also use it strategically as a screening device to assess the true type of its rival. According to the model, firms are more likely to pursuit R&D agreements in presence of similar productivity and less when their productivity gap is high. This is consistent with the empirical findings highlighting the importance of firms' similarities for R&D collaborations. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric Information; Screening; Duopoly; R&D investments; R&D Spillovers; R&D agreements. |
| JEL: | D43 D8 D82 L00 L13 L19 |
| Date: | 2017–07–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80423&r=mic |
| By: | Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean; Marini, Marco A.; Tarola, Ornella |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To this aim, we introduce a three-stage game in which, at the first stage, three independent firms can decide to merge with their competitors via a sequential game of coalition formation and, at the second and third stage, they can optimally revise their qualities and prices, respectively. We study whether such binding agreements (i.e. full or partial mergers) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game, and analyze their effects on equilibrium qualities, prices and profits. We find that, although profitable, the merger-to-monopoly of all firms is not an outcome of the finite-horizon negotiation, where only partial mergers arise. Moroever, we show that all stable mergers always include the firm initially producing the bottom quality good and reduce the number of variants on sale. |
| Keywords: | Mergers, Price Collusion, Vertically Differentiated Products, Sequential Game of Coalition Formation. |
| JEL: | C7 D21 L1 L11 L13 L16 L4 L41 L43 |
| Date: | 2017–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80528&r=mic |
| By: | Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt; Mats Köster |
| Abstract: | We show that continuous models of stimulus-driven attention can account for skewness-related puzzles in decision-making under risk. First,we delineate that these models provide awell-defined theory of choice under risk. We therefore prove that in continuous—in contrast to discrete—models of stimulus-driven attention each lottery has a unique certainty equivalent that is monotonic in probabilities (i.e., it monotonically increases if probability mass is shifted to more favorable outcomes). Second, we show that whether an agent seeks or avoids a specific risk depends on the skewness of the underlying probability distribution. Since unlikely, but outstanding payoffs attract attention, an agent exhibits a preference for right-skewed and an aversion toward left-skewed risks. While cumulative prospect theory can also account for such skewness preferences, it yields implausible predictions on their magnitude. We show that these extreme implications can be ruled out for continuous models of stimulus-driven attention. |
| Date: | 2017–07–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kls:series:0097&r=mic |
| By: | Dutta, Bhaskar (University of Warwick and Ashoka University); Vartiainen, Hannu (University of Helsinki and Helsinki Centre of Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra(2015), have typically been based on the von Neumann- Morgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional ‘moves’ in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra(2016) point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta and Vohra (2016) restricted coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that incorporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the Dutta-Vohra analysis by allowing for history dependent expectations. The paper provides characterization results for two solution concepts corresponding to two versions of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing nonemptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other solutions. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wcreta:33&r=mic |
| By: | Strausz, Roland (Humboldt University Berlin) |
| Abstract: | In mechanism design with (partially) verifiable information, the revelation principle holds if allocations are modelled as the Cartesian product of outcomes and verifiable information, giving rise to evidence-contingent mechanisms. Consequently, incentive constraints characterize the implementable set. The revelation principle does not hold when an allocation is modelled as only an outcome so that mechanisms are non-contingent. Yet, any outcome implementable by an evidence-contingent mechanism is implementable by a non-contingent mechanism, provided it can both extend and restrict reporting information. A type-independent bad outcome implies the latter property. |
| Keywords: | revelation principle; mechanism design; verifiable information; |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2017–08–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:45&r=mic |
| By: | Gonçalves, Ricardo (Católica Porto Business School and CEGE, Universidade Católica Portuguesa); Ray, Indrajit (Economics Section, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University,) |
| Abstract: | We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fi xed discrete bid levels for the wallet game with two bidders, following Gonçalves and Ray (2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate some separating and pooling equilibria with two and three discrete bid levels. We also compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria and thereby nd the optimal choices of bid levels for these cases. |
| Keywords: | Japanese-English auctions ; wallet game ; discrete bids, partitions ; pooling equilibrium; separating equilibrium. JEL classification numbers: C72 ; D44 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wcreta:34&r=mic |
| By: | Satoh, Atsuhiro; Tanaka, Yasuhito |
| Abstract: | We consider a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game with two sets of alternative strategic variables which are related by invertible functions. They are denoted by (s1, s2, ..., sn) and (t1, t2, ..., tn) for players 1, 2, ..., n. The number of players is larger than two. We consider a symmetric game in the sense that all players have the same payoff functions. We do not postulate differentiability of the payoff functions of players. We will show that the following patterns of competition, 1) all players choose si, 2) all players choose ti and 3) m players choose ti, i=1, ..., m and n-m players choose sj, j=m+1, ..., n where 1 |
| Keywords: | multi-person zero-sum game, two strategic variables |
| JEL: | C72 D43 |
| Date: | 2016–12–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75838&r=mic |
| By: | Luciano Fanti; Marcella Scrimitore |
| Abstract: | This paper reconsiders the issue of the endogenous choice of delegation in a market in which a vertically integrated producer (VIP) sells an input to a downstream competitor. The choice of whether to hire a manager or not is made at a preplay stage of a game developed by assuming that, within managerial firms, owners provide their managers with incentives affecting both the VIP's decision regarding the input price and retail competition. Our findings rule out that both the symmetric choices of being managerial or entrepreneurial can be implemented in equilibrium when firms compete à la Cournot, which contrasts with previous literature. The paper brings into focus the role of product differentiation in delivering asymmetric equilibria as solutions of the endogenous delegation game. |
| Keywords: | Managerial delegation, duopoly, vertically integrated firm. |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L21 |
| Date: | 2017–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2017/220&r=mic |
| By: | Elmar Mertens (Bank of International Settlements); Christian Matthes (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond); Thomas Lubik (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond) |
| Abstract: | We study equilibrium determination in an environment where two kinds of agents have different information sets: The fully informed agents know the structure of the model and observe histories of all exogenous and endogenous variables. The less in-formed agents observe only a strict subset of the full information set. All types of agents form expectations rationally, but agents with limited information need to solve a dynamic signal extraction problem to gather information about the variables they do not observe. We show that for parameters values that imply a unique equilibrium under full information, the limited information rational expectations equilibrium can be indeterminate. In a simple application of our framework to a monetary policy problem we show that limited information on part of the central bank implies indeterminate outcomes even when the Taylor Principle holds. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed017:337&r=mic |
| By: | Hitoshi Matsushima (University of Tokyo); Shunya Noda (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate general mechanism design problems in which agents can take hidden actions that influence state distribution. Their action choices exert significant externality effects on their valuation functions through this influence. We characterize all mechanisms that resolve the hidden action problem (i.e., that induce a targeted action profile). A variety of action choices shrinks the set of mechanisms that induce the targeted action profile, leading to the equivalence properties in the ex-post term with respect to payoffs, payments, and revenues. When the agents can take unilateral deviations to change the state distribution in various directions (i.e., when the action profile satisfies richness), pure-VCG mechanisms—the simplest form of canonical VCG mechanism, which is implemented via open-bid descending procedures that determine the losers’ compensation—are the only mechanisms that induce an efficient action profile. Contrariwise, the popular pivot mechanism, implemented by ascending auctions that determine the winner’s payment, generally fails to induce any efficient action profile. |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf415&r=mic |
| By: | Simon GB Cowan |
| Abstract: | Abstract Monopoly third-degree price discrimination raises social welfare above the level with a uniform price when direct demand functions have constant curvatures that differ across markets and are below 1, and the maximum willingness to pay is identical across markets. |
| Keywords: | third-degree price discrimination, monopoly, social welfare |
| JEL: | D42 L12 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:829&r=mic |
| By: | Fahn, Matthias (LMU Munich and CESifo); Hakenes, Hendrik (University of Bonn and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased preferences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual\'s long-run self. If agents interact repeatedly and can monitor each other, a relational contract involving teamwork can help to improve performance. The mutual promise to work harder is credible because the team breaks up after an agent has not kept this promise - which leads to individual underproduction in the future and hence a reduction of future utility. |
| Keywords: | self-control problems; teamwork; relational contracts; |
| JEL: | L22 L23 |
| Date: | 2017–07–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:42&r=mic |
| By: | Banerjee, Swapnendu; Poddar, Sougata |
| Abstract: | Abstract Study of patent licensing in spatial competition is relatively sparse. We study optimal licensing policies of an outside innovator in spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. We also introduce the notion of selling the property rights of innovation. We then examine the incentive of the innovator who sell the rights and compare that with conventional licensing contracts. We address this problem in linear city with two competing asymmetric firms (potential licensees). We show the optimal licensing policy is pure royalty to both firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small, otherwise it is fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling innovation to one of the firms. This holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of pre-innovation cost asymmetry between the firms. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing. |
| Keywords: | Outside innovator, Cost-reducing innovation, Patent Licensing, Patent Selling, Welfare, Linear city model |
| JEL: | D43 D45 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80432&r=mic |
| By: | Klebert Kentia; Christoph K\"uhn |
| Abstract: | Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze GCCs like their European and American counterparts by solving option holder's and writer's optimal investment problems in the underlying securities. By this, partial hedging opportunities are taken into account. We extend results in the literature by solving the stochastic game corresponding to GCCs with both continuous time stopping and trading. Namely, we construct Nash equilibria by rewriting the game as a non-zero-sum stopping game in which players compare payoffs in terms of their exponential utility indifference values. As a by-product, we also obtain an existence result for the optimal exercise time of an American claim under utility indifference valuation by relating it to the corresponding nonlinear Snell envelope. |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1707.09351&r=mic |
| By: | Navarro-Martinez, Daniel; Loomes, Graham; Isoni, Andrea; Butler, David; Alaoui, Larbi |
| Abstract: | We build a satisficing model of probabilistic choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a boundedly rational deliberation process. The decision maker accumulates evidence for and against alternative options by repeatedly sampling from her underlying set of EU preferences until the evidence favouring one option satisfies her desired level of confidence. Notwithstanding its EUT core, the model produces patterns of behaviour that violate standard axioms, while at the same time capturing the systematic relationship between choice probabilities, response times and confidence judgments, which is beyond the scope of theories that do not take deliberation into account. |
| Keywords: | Expected utility; bounded rationality; deliberation; probabilistic choice; confidence; response times. |
| JEL: | D03 D81 |
| Date: | 2017–06–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79893&r=mic |
| By: | Idan Hodor (Hebrew University); Andrea Buffa (Boston University) |
| Abstract: | We study the equilibrium implications of an economy in which asset managers are each subject to a different benchmark. We demonstrate how heterogeneous benchmarking endogenously generates a mechanism through which fundamental shocks propagate across assets. Despite independent asset fundamentals, heterogeneous benchmarking may give rise to negative short-run asset return correlation. We show that an asset that is included in a benchmark can not only be negatively correlated with assets included in a different benchmark, but also with assets belonging to the same benchmark. Our results are in line with the weakened comovements across investment styles and industry-sector portfolios. Moreover, the presence of institutions with different benchmarks triggers additional price pressure amplifying return volatility beyond the levels characterizing an economy in which all benchmarks are identical. Our setting is tractable and we obtain our results in closed-form. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed017:374&r=mic |
| By: | Rudi Bekkers; Christian Catalini; Arianna Martinelli; Cesare Righi; Timothy Simcoe |
| Abstract: | Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) require participants to disclose patents that might be infringed by implementing a proposed standard, and commit to license their “essential” patents on terms that are at least fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). Data from these SSO intellectual property disclosures have been used in academic studies to provide a window into the standard setting process, and in legal proceedings to assess parties’ relative contributions to a standard. We develop a simple model of the disclosure process to illustrate the link between SSO rules and patent-holder incentives, and examine some of the model’s predictions using a novel dataset constructed from the disclosure archives of thirteen major SSOs. The central message of the paper is that subtle differences in the rules used by different SSOs can influence which patents are disclosed, the terms of licensing commitments, and ultimately long-run citation and litigation rates for the underlying patents. |
| JEL: | D22 K2 K21 L15 L17 L24 L63 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23627&r=mic |
| By: | Hitoshi Matsushima (University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | We investigate implementation of social choice functions, where we impose severe restrictions on mechanisms, such as boundedness, permitting only tiny transfers, and uniqueness of an iteratively undominated strategy profile in the ex-post term. We assume that there exists some partial information about the state that is verifiable. We consider the dynamic aspect of information acquisition, where players share information, but the timing of receiving information is different across players. By using this aspect, the central planner designs a dynamic, not a static, mechanism, in which each player announces what he (or she) knows about the state at multiple stages with sufficient intervals. By demonstrating a sufficient condition on the state and on the dynamic aspect, namely full detection, we show that a wide variety of social choice functions are uniquely implementable even if the range of players’ lies that the verified information can directly detect is quite narrow. With full detection, we can detect all possible lies, not by the verified information alone, but by processing a chain of detection triggered by this information. This paper does not assume either expected utility or quasi-linearity. |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf416&r=mic |
| By: | Tim Worrall (University of Edinburgh); Alessia Russo (University of Oslo); Francesco Lancia (University of Vienna) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the dynamic and steady state properties of optimal intergenerational insurance when enforcement is limited. It considers a pure exchange and stochastic overlapping generations economy. The optimal allocation is chosen by a benevolent government whose welfare function values the initial old and places a positive, but vanishing weight on the welfare of future generations. The optimal allocation is constrained to be self-enforceable. That is, generations must have no incentive to default on the consumption allocation at any history of states. We show that the optimal intergenerational insurance when enforcement is limited takes the form of a history-dependent pension plan payable by the young to the old generation. In a simple two-state example we show how the degree of insurance depends on the history of states, in particular, insurance falls with more consecutive good states for the young but reverts whenever the bad state occurs. Finally, we solve for the optimal time-dependent and stationary contracts and numerically compare the welfare loss of these schemes relative to the fully optimal history-dependent scheme. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed017:319&r=mic |
| By: | Luciano Fanti; Marcella Scrimitore |
| Abstract: | In a market in which a vertically integrated producer (VIP) also supplies an essential input to a retail rival, we explore the role of managerial delegation when it shapes downstream firms' incentives and determine the endogenous choice of delegation under both Cournot and Bertrand. The equilibrium choice of acting as a managerial firm, which is a standard result in literature of strategic delegation, is shown to be robust to the presence of a VIP in both the quantity competition and the price competition framework, regardless of the degree of product differentiation. The paper, however, highlights the different motives pushing the integrated firm and the independent retailer towards delegation, which also revert the standard result that delegation causes a prisoner's dilemma-type equilibrium under Cournot and a more profitable outcome under Bertrand. This result sheds new light on the role and implications of the managerial delegation in the real-world market structures. |
| Keywords: | Strategic delegation, outsourcing, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, vertical integration. |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L21 |
| Date: | 2017–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2017/219&r=mic |
| By: | Juan Beccuti; Christian Jaag |
| Abstract: | We consider a game in which Bitcoin miners compete for a reward of each solved puzzle in a sequence of them. We model it as a sequential game with imperfect information, in which miners have to choose whether or not to report their success. We show that the game has a multiplicity of equilibria and we analyze the parameter constellations for each of them. In particular, the minimum requirement to find it optimal not to report is decreasing with the number of miners who are not reporting, and increasing the heterogeneity among players reduces the likelihood that they choose not to report. |
| Keywords: | Bitcoin, Mining, Proof of work, Game theory |
| JEL: | C72 D84 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chc:wpaper:0060&r=mic |
| By: | Anil K. Jain |
| Abstract: | The provision of public goods in developing countries is a central challenge. This paper studies a model where each agent’s effort provides heterogeneous benefits to the others, inducing a network of opportunities for favor-trading. We focus on a classical efficient benchmark – the Lindahl solution – that can be derived from a bargaining game. Does the optimistic assumption that agents use an efficient mechanism (rather than succumbing to the tragedy of the commons) imply incentives for efficient investment in the technology that is used to produce the public goods? To show that the answer is no in general, we give comparative statics of the Lindahl solution which have natural network interpretations. We then suggest some welfare-improving interventions. |
| Keywords: | Networks ; Public goods ; β-core ; Repeated games ; Coalitional deviations ; Institutions ; Centrality ; Lindahl equilibrium |
| JEL: | H41 O43 D60 |
| Date: | 2017–07–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgif:1210&r=mic |
| By: | Piero Gottardi (European University Institute); Douglas Gale (New York University) |
| Abstract: | We study an environment where the capital structure of banks and firms are jointly determined in equilibrium, so as to balance the benefits of the provision of liquidity services by bank deposits with the costs of bankruptcy. The risk in the assets held by firms and banks is determined by the technology choices by firms and the portfolio diversification choices by banks. We show competitive equilibria are efficient and the equilibrium level of leverage in banks and firms depend on the nature of the shocks affecting firm productivities. When these shocks are co-monotonic, banks optimally choose a zero level of equity. Thus all equity should be in firms, where it does “double duty,†protecting both firms and banks from default. On the other hand, if productivity shocks have an idiosyncratic component, portfolio diversification by banks may be a more effective buffer against these shocks and, in these cases, it may be optimal for banks, as well as firms, to issue equity. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed017:380&r=mic |
| By: | Tanaka, Yasuhito; Hattori, Masahiko |
| Abstract: | With zero fixed cost, convexity of a cost function implies super-additivity, and concavity of a cost function implies sub-additivity. But converse relations do not hold. However, in addition to the zero fixed cost condition we put the following assumption. (1) If a cost function is convex in some interval, it is convex throughout the domain. (2) If a cost function is concave in some interval, it is concave throughout the domain. Then, super-additivity implies convexity and sub-additivity implies concavity. Subsequently, super-additivity and convexity are equivalent, and sub-additivity and concavity are equivalent. |
| Keywords: | cost function, convexity, concavity, super-additivity, sub-additivity |
| JEL: | D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80502&r=mic |
| By: | Hart, Oliver; Zingales, Luigi |
| Abstract: | What is the appropriate objective function for a firm? We analyze this question for the case where shareholders are prosocial and externalities are not perfectly separable from production decisions. We argue that maximization of shareholder welfare is not the same as maximization of market value. We propose that company and asset managers should pursue policies consistent with the preferences of their investors. Voting by shareholders on corporate policy is one way to achieve this. |
| Keywords: | firm objective; Friedman; prosocial; shareholder value |
| JEL: | G30 K22 L21 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12186&r=mic |