
on Microeconomics 
By:  Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Johannes Horner (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) 
Abstract:  We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated firstprice auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation is efficient and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner’s bids are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists. 
Keywords:  First price auction, Repeated auction, Private bids, Information revelation 
JEL:  D44 D82 D83 
Date:  2010–08 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1764r&r=mic 
By:  Philip Brookins (Department of Economics, Florida State University); Dmitry Ryvkin (Department of Economics, Florida State University) 
Abstract:  We prove the existence of monotone pure strategy Bayesian equilibria in two types of contests between groups under incomplete information: (i) individuallevel private information group contests, where each player only knows her own ability, and (ii) grouplevel private information group contests, where each player knows the abilities of all members of her group. In the latter case, we also show that the equilibrium is unique. We provide the results of exploratory numerical computations and discuss the qualitative properties of the equilibria. 
Keywords:  contest, group, incomplete information 
JEL:  D72 C72 C02 
Date:  2014–09 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2014_09_02&r=mic 
By:  Kei Kawakami 
Abstract:  This paper studies how much information can be revealed when agents with private information lack commitment to actions in a given mechanism as well as to the mechanism itself. In a twoperson decision problem, agents are allowed to hold on to an outcome in one mechanism while they play another mechanism and learn new information. Formally, decision rule is maximally informative if it is (i) posterior implementable and (ii) robust to a posterior proposal of another posterior implementable decision rule. Focusing on a twoperson problem, we identify environments where maximally informative decision rules exist. We also show that a maximally informative decision rule must be implemented by a mechanism with a small number of actions (at most 5 for two agents). The result indicates that lack of commitment to a mechanism signi?cantly reduces the amount of information revelation in equilibrium. Keywords: Information aggregation, Limited commitment, Posterior e¢ ciency, Posterior implementation, Renegotiationproofness. 
Keywords:  Information aggregation, Limited commitment, Posterior effeciency,Posterior implementation, Renegotiationproofness. 
Date:  2013 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1178&r=mic 
By:  Hörner, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas; Rady, Sven 
Abstract:  This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuoustime games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these equations retain the tractability of Markov equilibrium, while allowing for punishments and rewards: the best and worst equilibrium payoff are explicitly solved for. Second, they capture behavior of the discretetime game: as the period length goes to zero in the discretized game, the SSE payoff set converges to their solution. Third, they encompass a large payoff set: there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the discretetime game with frequent interactions with higher asymptotic efficiency. 
Keywords:  TwoArmed Bandit; Bayesian Learning; Strategic Experimentation; Strongly Symmetric Equilibrium 
JEL:  C73 D83 
Date:  2014–08–17 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:469&r=mic 
By:  Eric Danan (THEMA  THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications  université de CergyPontoise); Thibault Gajdos (GREQAM  Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'AixMarseille  Université de la Méditerranée  AixMarseille II  Université Paul Cézanne  AixMarseille III  Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)  CNRS : UMR7316); JeanMarc Tallon (CES  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne  CNRS : UMR8174  Université Paris I  PanthéonSorbonne, EEPPSE  Ecole d'Économie de Paris  Paris School of Economics  Ecole d'Économie de Paris) 
Abstract:  We analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals ans society with sets of possible von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the classical neutrality assumption to this setting and characterize the class of neutral social welfare function. This class turns out to be considerably broader for indeterminate than for determinate utilities, where it basically reduces to utilitarianism. In particular, aggregation rules may differ by the relationship between individual and social indeterminacy. We characterize several subclasses of neutral aggregation rules and show that utilitarian rules are those that yield the least indeterminate social utilities, although they still fail to systematically yield a determinate social utility. 
Keywords:  Aggregation ; vNM utility ; indeterminacy ; neutrality ; utilitarianism 
Date:  2013 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs00788647&r=mic 
By:  Marcus Pivato (Université de CergyPontoise, THEMA and Department of Mathematics, Trent University, Canada) 
Abstract:  We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function. We also show that, if people's utility functions are generated according to certain plausible random processes, then in a large population, this condition will be satisfied with very high probability. Thus, in a large population, the utilitarian outcome will be selected by any Condorcet consistent voting rule. In particular, it will be the subgameperfect equilibrium outcome of several voting games. 
Date:  2014 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:201417&r=mic 
By:  Ning Sun (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics); Zaifu Yang (Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, United Kingdom) 
Abstract:  We propose a dynamic auction mechanism for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods. These goods can be split into two distinct sets so that items in each set are substitutes but complementary to items in the other set. The seller has a reserve value for each bundle of goods and is assumed to report her values truthfully. In each round of the auction, the auctioneer announces the current prices for all items, bidders respond by reporting their demands at these prices, and then the auctioneer adjusts simultaneously the prices of items in one set upwards but those of items in the other downwards. We prove that although bidders are not assumed to be pricetakers and thus can strategically exercise their market power, this dynamic auction always induces the bidders to bid truthfully as pricetakers, yields an efficient outcome and also has the merit of being a detailfree, transparent and privacy preserving mechanism. 
Keywords:  Dynamic auction, gross substitutes and complements, incentives, efficiency, indivisibility, incomplete information 
JEL:  D44 
Date:  2014–09 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:523&r=mic 
By:  Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco 
Abstract:  We introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politicians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives can control the attention they get, then â€the showiest is the bestâ€: the equilibrium ordering of salience (weakly) reproduces the quality ranking and the best alternative is the one that gets picked most often. This result also holds under more general conditions. However, if those conditions fail, then even the worst alternative can be picked most often. 
Keywords:  Consideration sets, bounded rationality, stochastic choice, 
Date:  2014 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:556&r=mic 
By:  Basu, Kaushik; Pattanaik, Prasanta K. 
Abstract:  Much of game theory is founded on the assumption that individual players are endowed with preferences that can be represented by a realvalued utility function. However, in reality human preferences are often not transitive. This is especially true for the indifference relation, which can lead an individual to make a series of choices which in their totality would be viewed as erroneous by the same individual. There is a substantial literature that raises intricate questions about individual liberty and the role of government intervention in such contexts. The aim of this paper is not to go into these ethical matters but to provide a formal structure for such analysis by characterizing games where individual preferences are quasitransitive. The paper identifies a set of axioms which are sufficient for the existence of Nash equilibria in such'games.' 
Keywords:  Disease Control&Prevention,Economic Theory&Research,Teaching and Learning,Information Security&Privacy,Biodiversity 
Date:  2014–09–01 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7037&r=mic 
By:  Tim Hellmann (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Jakob Landwehr (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Abstract:  We study the structure of pairwise stable networks from a very general point. Rather than assuming a particular functional form of utility, we simply assume that the society is homogeneous, i.e. that agents’ utilities differ only with respect to their network position while their names do not matter. Existence of certain stable network structures is then implied by fairly general assumptions on externalities between links. Depending on the form of link externalities, either the empty or complete network are always pairwise stable, stable symmetric networks exist, or stable networks with a connected subgroup exist. If the society becomes more homogeneous, then it is possible to characterize the set of all pairwise stable networks: they are nested split graphs (NSG). We illustrate these results with many examples from the literature, including utility profiles that depend on centrality measures such as Bonacich centrality. In particular, for low discount factors every pairwise stable network is an NSG if utility is given by Bonacich centrality. 
Keywords:  Network Formation, Pairwise Stability, Existence, Homogeneity, Convexity, Strategic Complements, Bonacich Centrality 
JEL:  A14 C72 D85 
Date:  2014–08 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:517&r=mic 
By:  Simon MIEGIELSEN 
Abstract:  This paper examines the informativeness of consumer information networks and their effect on price competition between .rms. Under the proposed information mechanism, consumers share their initial information with the members of their network and as such become better informed. The main result of this paper shows how informative such networks are by characterizing how many different pieces of information a network is likely to contain. This informativeness is crucial for the degree of competition, as consumers comparing more prices induce firms to compete more fiercely. We find that larger networks imply better information transmission, which intensifies competition and decreases all the percentiles of the price distribution. An increase in the number of firms makes networks more informative, and decreases all the percentiles as well. Our results are robust to the introduction of sequential search and network segregation, but an increase in segregation decreases information transmission and increases all percentiles. 
Date:  2014–06 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces14.14&r=mic 
By:  Joerg Bleile (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Abstract:  An agent needs to determine a belief over potential outcomes for a new problem based on past observations gathered in her database (memory). There is a rich literature in cognitive science showing that human minds process and order information in categories, rather than piece by piece. We assume that agents are naturally equipped (by evolution) with a efficient heuristic intuition how to categorize. Depending on how available categorized information is activated and processed, we axiomatize two different versions of belief formation relying on categorizations. In one approach an agent relies only on the estimates induced by the single pieces of information contained in so called target categories that are activated by the problem for which a belief is asked for. Another approach forms a prototype based belief by averaging over all categorybased estimates (so called prototypical estimates) corresponding to each category in the database. In both belief formations the involved estimates are weighted according to their similarity or relevance to the new problem. We impose normatively desirable and natural properties on the categorization of databases. On the stage of belief formation our axioms specify the relationship between different categorized databases and their corresponding induced (category or prototype based) beliefs. The axiomatization of a belief formation in Billot et al. (Econometrica, 2005) is covered for the situation of a (trivial) categorization of a database that consists only of singleton categories and agents basically do not process information categorical. 
Keywords:  Belief formation, prior, casebased reasoning, similarity, categorization, prototype 
JEL:  D81 D83 
Date:  2014–07 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:519&r=mic 
By:  Marcus Pivato (Université de CergyPontoise, THEMA and Department of Mathematics, Trent University) 
Abstract:  Given a large enough population of voters whose utility functions satisfy certain statistical regularities, we show that voting rules such as the Borda rule, approval voting, and evaluative voting have a very high probability of selecting the social alternative which maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function. We also characterize the speed with which this probability approaches one as the population grows. 
Keywords:  utilitarian; relative utilitarian; approval voting; Borda; scoring rule. 
JEL:  D63 D71 
Date:  2014 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:201416&r=mic 
By:  Eric Hoffmann (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas); Tarun Sabarwal (Department of Economics, University of Kansas) 
Abstract:  In a 2007 paper, "A global game with strategic substitutes and complements", by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155175, an argument is made to show existence of BayesianNash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement. 
Date:  2014–09 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kan:wpaper:201403&r=mic 
By:  Tasos Kalandrakis (W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, 107 Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 146270158) 
Abstract:  Computation of exact equilibrium values for nplayer dividethedollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. This approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilibria in terms of two variables that satisfy a pair of piecewise linear equations. 
Date:  2014–08 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:roc:wallis:wp65&r=mic 
By:  Nicolas Gravel (AMSE  AixMarseille School of Economics  Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS)  École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)  Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM)); Michel Poitevin (CIREQ  Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative  Université de Montréal, CIRANO  Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations  UQAM  Université du Québec à Montréal) 
Abstract:  This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from the view point of a welfarist social planner when households with identical utility functions for nonrival public good and private consumption have private information about their contributive capacities. It shows that the superiority of a centralized provision of a nonrival public good over a federal one does not always hold. Specifically, when differences in households contributive capacities are large, it is better to provide the public good in several distinct jurisdictions rather than to pool these jurisdictions into a single one. In the specific case where households have logarithmic utilities, the paper provides a complete characterization of the optimal jurisdiction structure in the twotype case. "C'est pour unir les avantages divers qui résultent de la grandeur et de la petitesse des nations que le fédératif a été créé." (Alexis de Toqueville) 
Keywords:  federalism; jurisdictions; asymmetric information; equalization; city mergers 
Date:  2014–09 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs01063191&r=mic 
By:  József Sákovics (The University of Edinburgh) 
Abstract:  I put forward a concise and intuitive formula for the calculation of the valuation for a good in the presence of the expectation that further, related, goods will soon become available. This valuation is tractable in the sense that it does not require the explicit resolution of the consumer's lifetime problem. 
Keywords:  distributed choice, quasilinear utility, value for money. 
JEL:  D01 D03 D11 D91 
Date:  2014–09–10 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:247&r=mic 
By:  F. Barigozzi; N. Burani 
Abstract:  We study optimal contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive services of one worker, who is privately informed about her ability and her motivation. Firms differ both in their production technology and in the mission they pursue and a motivated worker is keen to be hired by the missionoriented firm. We find that the matching of worker types to firms is always Paretoefficient. When the difference in firms’ technology is high, only the most efficient firm is active. When the difference is not very high, then agent types sort themselves by motivation: the missionoriented firm hires motivated types and the profitoriented firm employs nonmotivated ones, independently of ability. Effort provision is higher when the worker is hired by the missionoriented firm, but a compensating wage differential might exist: the motivated worker is paid less by the missionoriented firm. Such an earnings penalty is driven entirely by motivation, is increasing in ability and is associated to low power of incentives. 
JEL:  D82 D86 J31 M55 
Date:  2014–06 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp953&r=mic 
By:  Peter VALLENTYNE; Luc LAUWERS 
Date:  2014–09 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces14.27&r=mic 
By:  Mariotti, Marco; Veneziani, Roberto 
Abstract:  We analyse the liberal ethics of noninterference applied to social choice. A liberal principle capturing noninterfering views of society and inspired by John Stuart Mill s conception of liberty, is examined. The principle captures the idea that society should not penalise agents after changes in their situation that do not aÂ¤ect others. An impossibility for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule that satis es unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must be dictatorial. This raises some important issues for liberal approaches in social choice and political philosophy. 
Keywords:  Liberalism, Harm Principle, NonInterference, Impossibility, 
Date:  2014 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:560&r=mic 
By:  SÃ¡kovics, JÃ³zsef; Friedman, Daniel 
Abstract:  We derive a rational model of separable consumer choice which can also serve as a behavioral model. The central construct is [lambda] , the marginal utility of money, derived from the consumer's restoflife problem. We present a robust approximation of [lambda], and show how to incorporate liquidity constraints, indivisibilities and adaptation to a changing environment. We fi nd connections with numerous historical and recent constructs, both behavioral and neoclassical, and draw contrasts with standard partial equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive description of consumer choice. 
Keywords:  distributed choice, moneysworth demand, value for money, 
Date:  2013 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:533&r=mic 