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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Achim Wambach (Dept. of Economics, University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule of the mechanism. Thus, in contrast to the standard analysis of a optimal auctions, the seller can explicitly design the disclosure of the information received by each bidder as his private information. We show that the optimal disclosure rule is a sequential disclosure rule, implemented in an ascending price auction. In the optimal disclosure mechanism, each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder only learns that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. We show that in the optimal auction, the posterior incentive and participation constraints of all the bidders are satisfied. In the special case in which the bidders have no private information initially, the seller can extract the entire surplus. |
| Keywords: | Independent private value auction, Sequential disclosure, Ascending auctions, Information structure, Interim equilibrium, Posterior equilibrium |
| JEL: | C72 D44 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1900&r=mic |
| By: | Giuseppe De Marco (Università di Napoli Parthenope and CSEF); Maria Romaniello (Seconda Università di Napoli) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider a model of games of incomplete information under ambiguity in which players are endowed with variational preferences. We provide an existence result for the corresponding mixed equilibrium notion. Then we study the limit behavior of equilibria under perturbations on the indices of ambiguity aversion. |
| Keywords: | Incomplete information games, multiple priors, variational preferences, equilibria |
| Date: | 2013–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:336&r=mic |
| By: | Billand, P.; Bravard, C.; Kamphorst, J.; Sarangi, S. |
| Abstract: | Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. We consider networks where agents have an incentive to confirm the information they receive from others. Our paper analyzes the social networks that are formed. We first study the existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we characterize the set of strictly efficient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly efficient networks and strict Nash networks. Finally, we check the robustness of our results by allowing for heterogeneity among agents, possibility of bilateral deviations of agents, and decay in network. |
| Keywords: | R&D COLLABORATION;NETWORK FORMATION;MULTI-MARKET OLIGOPOLIES |
| JEL: | C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-06&r=mic |
| By: | Linda Sass (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953): rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies. We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such extensive form Ellsberg games. |
| Keywords: | Knightian Uncertainty in Games, Objective Ambiguity, Strategic Ambiguity, Extensive Form Ellsberg Games, Kuhn's Theorem, Rectangularity |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D81 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:478&r=mic |
| By: | Rose-Anne Dana; Frank Riedel |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic and infinite{dimensional model with incomplete multiple prior preferences. In interior efficient allocations, agents share a common risk{adjusted prior and subjective interest rate. Interior efficient allocations and equilibria coincide with those of economies with subjective expected utility and priors from the agents' multiple prior sets. A specific model with neither risk nor uncertainty at the aggregate level is considered. Risk is always fully insured. For small levels of ambiguity, there exists an equilibrium with inertia where agents also insure fully against Knightian uncertainty. When the level of ambiguity exceeds a critical threshold, full insurance no longer prevails and there exist equilibria with inertia where agents do not insure against uncertainty at all. We also show that equilibria with inertia are indeterminate. |
| Keywords: | Knightian Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Incomplete Preferences, General Equilibrium Theory, No Trade, Dynamic General Equilibrium |
| JEL: | D51 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2013–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:16&r=mic |
| By: | Mario Bravo (Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Ingenieria (ISCI), Universidad de Chile); Mathieu Faure (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS) |
| Abstract: | Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume that agents do not know their own payoff function, and have no information on the other player. Furthermore, we assume that they have restrictions on their own action set such that, at each stage, their choice is limited to a subset of their action set. We prove that the empirical distributions of play converge to the set of Nash equilibria for zero-sum and potential games, and games where one player has two actions. |
| Keywords: | Reinforcement learning, fictitious play, Markovian procedures. |
| Date: | 2013–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1335&r=mic |
| By: | Oikonomou, V.K.; Jost, J |
| Abstract: | We define and study periodic strategies in two player finite strategic form games. This concept can arise from some epistemic analysis of the rationalizability concept of Bernheim and Pearce. We analyze in detail the pure strategies and mixed strategies cases. In the pure strategies case, we prove that every two player finite action game has at least one periodic strategy, making the periodic strategies an inherent characteristic of these games. Applying the algorithm of periodic strategies in the case where mixed strategies are used, we find some very interesting outcomes with useful quantitative features for some classes of games. Particularly interesting are the implications of the algorithm to collective action games, for which we were able to establish the result that the collective action strategy can be incorporated in a purely non-cooperative context. Moreover, we address the periodicity issue for the case the players have a continuum set of strategies available. We also discuss whether periodic strategies can imply any sort of cooperativity. In addition, we put the periodic strategies in an epistemic framework. |
| Keywords: | Game Theory;Rationalizability;Solution Concepts, Periodicity;Epistemic Game Theory |
| JEL: | C0 C02 C70 C72 |
| Date: | 2013–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48117&r=mic |
| By: | Giorgio Ferrari (Bielefeld University); Jan-Henrik Steg (Bielefeld University); Frank Riedel (Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study the corresponding social planner problem and the case of strategic interaction between the agents and we characterize the optimal investment policies by a set of necessary and sufficient stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Suitably combining arguments from Duality Theory and the General Theory of Stochastic Processes, we prove an abstract existence result for a Nash equilibrium of our public good contribution game. Also, we show that our model exhibits a dynamic free rider effect. We explicitly evaluate it in a symmetric Black-Scholes setting with Cobb-Douglas utilities and we show that uncertainty and irreversibility of public good provisions do not affect free-riding. |
| Keywords: | irreversible investment, singular stochastic control, first order conditions for optimality, stochastic games, Nash equilibrium, free-riding |
| JEL: | C02 C61 C62 C73 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:485&r=mic |
| By: | Subhasish M. Chowdhury (University of East Anglia); Iryna Topolyan (Mississippi State University) |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest link whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best-shot impact function. We fully characterize the equilibria and show that with symmetric valuation the equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation it is always an equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case that the highest valuation players in group 1 free-ride completely on a player with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and exert the same effort. We also characterize equilibria for the case in which one group follows either a best-shot or a weakestlink but the other group follows a perfectly substitute impact function. |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:aepppr:2012_49&r=mic |
| By: | Martin Dumav (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Maxwell B. Stinchcombe (Department of Economics, University of Texas, Austin) |
| Abstract: | A choice problem is risky (respectively ambiguous) if the decision maker is choosing between probability distributions (respectively sets of probability distributions) over utility relevant consequences. We provide an axiomatic foundation for and a representation of continuous linear preferences over sets of probabilities on consequences. The representation theory delivers: first and second order dominance for ambiguous problems; a utility interval based dominance relation that distinguishes between sources of uncertainty; a complete theory of updating convex sets of priors; a Bayesian theory of the value of ambiguous information structures; complete separations of attitudes toward risk and ambiguity; and new classes of preferences that allow decreasing relative ambiguity aversion and thereby rationalize recent challenges to many of the extant multiple prior models of ambiguity aversion. We also characterize a property of sets of priors, descriptive completeness, that resolves several open problems and allows multiple prior models to model as large a class of problems as the continuous linear preferences presented here. |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity, decision theory, multiple priors, descriptive completeness, continuous linear functionals on spaces of sets, constant and decreasing relative ambiguity aversion, zonoids |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:480&r=mic |
| By: | Georgios Gerasimou |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a model of choice that does not assume completeness of the decision maker\'s preferences. The model explains in a natural way, and within a unied framework of choice when preference-incomparable options are present, four behavioural phenomena: the attraction effect, choice deferral, the strengthening of the attraction effect when deferral is permissible, and status quo bias. The key element in the proposed decision rule is that an individual chooses an alternative from a menu if it is worse than no other alternative in that menu and is also better than at least one. Utility-maximising behaviour is included as a special case when preferences are complete. The relevance of the partial dominance idea underlying the proposed choice procedure is illustrated with an intuitive generalisation of weakly dominated strategies and their iterated deletion in games with vector payoffs. |
| Keywords: | Choice with incomplete preferences; attraction effect; status quo bias; games with vector payoffs; iterative dominance |
| JEL: | D01 |
| Date: | 2013–01–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:wpecon:1302&r=mic |
| By: | Yang, Yi-You |
| Abstract: | In exchange economies with indivisible objects, the substitutability of agents' preferences is essential for the guaranteed existence of Walrasian equilibrium. In this paper, we analyze the ranges of variation for agents' preferences that will guarantee the existence of equilibrium when some agents' preferences are known to satisfy the substitutability condition. Our approach is based on a classification result that partitions the set of economies into disjoint weak similarity classes such that whenever a weak similarity class contains an economy with an equilibrium, each economy in this class also has an equilibrium. The links among economies in the same weak similarity class are established with the notion of monotonization and tax systems. |
| Keywords: | Equilibrium; indivisibility; substitutability; free disposal; tax system. |
| JEL: | D5 D51 |
| Date: | 2013–07–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:47945&r=mic |
| By: | Anton Kolotilin (School of Economics, the University of New South Wales) |
| Abstract: | A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. I show that the sender optimally discloses only whether the receivers utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the senders and receivers welfare to be monotonic in information. Most notably, the senders welfare increases with the precision of the senders potential information and decreases with the precision of public information. |
| Keywords: | information, disclosure, persuasion, stochastic orders |
| JEL: | C44 D81 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-17&r=mic |
| By: | Bossert W.; Peters H.J.M. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent. |
| Keywords: | Consumer Economics: Theory; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; |
| JEL: | D11 D71 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umagsb:2013030&r=mic |
| By: | Steven, Brams; Marc, Kilgour |
| Abstract: | Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and (ii) men and women. In the case of the latter, it produces either one or two stable matches whereby no man and woman would prefer to be matched with each other rather than with their present partners. But stable matches can give one or both players in a pair their worst match, whereas the minimax algorithm that we propose, which finds all assignments that minimize the maximum rank of players in matches, avoids such assignments. Although minimax matches may not be stable, at least one is always Pareto-optimal: No other matching is at least as good for all the players and better for one or more. If there are multiple minimax matches, we propose criteria for choosing the most desirable among them and also discuss the settings in which minimax matches seem more compelling than deferred-acceptance matches when they differ. Finally, we calculate the probability that minimax matches differ from deferred-acceptance matches in a simple case. |
| Keywords: | Deferred-acceptance algorithm; minimax algorithm; matchings; stability |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D7 D71 D78 |
| Date: | 2013–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48113&r=mic |
| By: | Billand, P.; Bravard, C.; Chakrabarti, S.; Sarangi, S. |
| Abstract: | We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers accross markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. These links have two effects. First, the quality of the good produced by the firm which forms the link increases. Second, the quality of the good of the firm which receives the link decreases. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We that due to externalities, the equilibrium networks may be over-connected relative to socially optimal networks creating a role for policy intervention. We also find that in some situations firms may refrain from gathering information, even if it is costlesss. Moreover, even though intelligence gathering leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare. |
| Keywords: | OLIGOPOLY;MULTIMARKET;NETWORKS |
| JEL: | C70 L13 L20 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-04&r=mic |
| By: | Kohler, Stefan |
| Abstract: | This note presents a solution to Rubinstein (1982)'s open-ended, alternating-offer bargaining problem for two equally patient bargainers that exhibit similar degrees of inequality aversion. Inequality-averse bargainers may perceive envy if being worse off and guilt if being better off, but they still reach agreement in the first period under complete information. If the perceived guilt is strong, then the inequality-averse bargainers split the bargaining surplus equally regardless of their degree of envy. If guilt is weak, then the agreed split is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards a more unequal split. Envy and weak guilt have opposite effects on the bargaining outcome, and envy has a greater marginal impact than weak guilt. Similarly inequality-averse bargainers agree on the Rubinstein division if the strength of envy equals the discounted strength of guilt. As both bargainers sensation of inequality aversion diminishes, the bargaining outcome converges to the Rubinstein division. |
| Keywords: | alternating offers; bargaining; bargaining power; behavioral economics; envy; equity; fairness; guilt; negotiation; social preferences |
| JEL: | C78 D3 D63 |
| Date: | 2013–07–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40764&r=mic |
| By: | Geoffroy de Clippel (Dept. of Economics, Brown University); Kfir Elias (Tel Aviv University & University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Kareen Rozen (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Consumers purchase multiple types of goods and services, but may be able to examine only a limited number of markets for the best price. We propose a simple model which captures these features, conveying some new insights. A firm's price can deflect or draw attention to its market, and consequently, limited attention introduces a new dimension of competition across markets. We fully characterize the resulting equilibrium, and show that the presence of partially attentive consumers improves consumer welfare as a whole. When consumers are less attentive, they are more likely to miss the best offer in each market; but the enhanced cross-market competition decreases average price paid, as leading firms try to stay under the consumers' radar. |
| Keywords: | Limited attention, Price competition, Multiple markets |
| JEL: | D03 D04 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1901&r=mic |
| By: | Enchuan Shao |
| Abstract: | Recent studies in monetary theory show that if buyers can use lotteries to signal the quality of bank notes, counterfeiting does not occur in a pooling equilibrium. In this paper, I investigate the robustness of this non-existence result by considering an alternative trading mechanism. Specifically, a competitive search environment is employed in which sellers post offers and buyers direct their search based on those offers. In contrast to the previous studies, buyers’ ability to signal is fully eliminated in this environment. However, I find that counterfeiting does not exist if the equilibrium concept proposed by Guerrieri et al. (2010) is used. This is a refinement scheme in which sellers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs about the likelihood of meeting with different types of buyers are restricted. Moreover, a threat of counterfeiting can result in the collapse of a monetary equilibrium. An extension of the model is provided which allows the threat of counterfeiting to materialize, in that some buyers cannot observe the offers, and therefore search randomly. Counterfeit notes are produced by those buyers who randomly search. |
| Keywords: | Bank notes |
| JEL: | D82 D83 E42 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:13-22&r=mic |
| By: | Sam COSAERT; Thomas DEMUYNCK |
| Abstract: | The theory of revealed preferences offers an elegant way to test the neoclassical model of utility maximization subject to a linear budget constraint. In many settings, however, the set of available consumption bundles does not take the form of a linear budget set. In this paper, we adjust the theory of revealed preferences to handle situations where the set of feasible bundles is finite. Such situations occur frequently in many real life and experimental settings. We derive the revealed preference conditions for consistency with utility maximization in this finite choice-set setting. Interestingly, we find that it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where the underlying utility function is weakly monotone, strongly monotone and/or concave. Next, we provide conditions on the structure of the finite choice sets for which the usual revealed preference condition (i.e. GARP) is still valid. We illustrate the relevance of our results by means of an application based on two experimental data sets that contain choice behavior from children. |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces13.08&r=mic |
| By: | Aytimur, Refik Emre |
| Abstract: | Lobbying a coalition government is different than lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group likes the status quo more than the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution thanks to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. We show further that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group's preferences more heavily due to the interest group's forward-looking considerations. -- |
| Keywords: | lobbying,policy-making,coalition governments,status quo |
| JEL: | C78 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:162&r=mic |
| By: | David K. Levine; Salvatore Modica |
| Abstract: | In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently “extractive” in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare. |
| JEL: | A0 A1 A10 C0 C00 C70 C72 C73 D0 D00 D01 D02 D03 D3 D42 D61 D63 D71 D72 D73 D74 D78 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19221&r=mic |
| By: | Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji |
| Abstract: | This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation. |
| Keywords: | college admissions; marriage; matching; stochastic stability; learning |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9223&r=mic |
| By: | Fulvio Fontini (Department of Economics and Management, University of Padua, Italy); Katrin Millock (Paris School of Economics, CNRS, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne); Michele Moretto (Department of Economics and Management, University of Padua, Italy) |
| Abstract: | In many cases consumers cannot observe firms’ investment in quality or safety, but have only beliefs on the average quality of the industry. In addition, the outcome of the collective investment game of the firms may be stochastic since firms cannot control perfectly the technology or external factors that may affect production. In such situations, when only consumers’ subjective perceptions of the industry level of quality matter, the regulator may make information available to firms or subsidize their information acquisition. Under what conditions is it desirable to make information available? We show how firms’ overall level of investment in quality depends upon the parameters of the quality accumulation process, the cost of investment and the number of firms in the industry. We also show the potentially negative effects on the total level of quality from providing information on consumers’ actual valuation. |
| Keywords: | Collective Reputation, Option Value, Quality |
| JEL: | C73 D92 L15 Q52 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.53&r=mic |
| By: | Shirata, Yasuhiro |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ota:busdis:10252/5134&r=mic |
| By: | Carvalho, Jean-Paul; Koyama, Mark |
| Abstract: | We develop a model in which individuals choose education to improve their earnings and regulate the cultural traits they acquire via social transmission. When education makes individuals more receptive to mainstream culture, minority groups underinvest in education as a form of cultural resistance. Economic and cultural incentives interact in surprising ways that increase income inequality. An increase in the skill premium induces low-ability minority types to reduce education-a phenomenon we call resisting education. The model links technological progress, globalization and anti-discrimination policies (e.g. affirmative action, Jewish emancipation) to oppositional attitudes toward education. |
| Keywords: | Education; identity; inequality; cultural transmission; oppositional behavior; |
| JEL: | D10 D63 D71 I24 J24 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–07–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48048&r=mic |
| By: | Rothenhäusler, Dominik; Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora |
| Abstract: | We study how institutional design influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can share guilt more easily. This facilitates becoming a supporter. Conversely, an institution requiring more supporters must rely on people who have higher individual moral standards. We analyze individual thresholds for agreeing to a transgression, depending on the available options for sharing guilt by institutional design. On the aggregate level, we study how institutions affect the likelihood of immoral outcomes. -- Diese Arbeit untersucht den Einfluss von institutionellem Design auf moralische Übertretungen. Menschen unterscheiden sich im Ausmaß ihrer Schuldgefühle und können diese in einer Gruppe mit anderen teilen. Von den jeweiligen Institutionen hängt es ab, wie viel unterstützende Personen für unmoralisches Verhalten notwendig sind. Je mehr dies sind, desto leichter kann jede von ihnen Schuld auf andere abgeben. Dies wiederum erleichtert es, zum Unterstützer für Übertretungen zu werden. Umgekehrt muss eine Institution, für die mehr Unterstützer nötig sind, auf Personen vertrauen, die höhere individuelle moralische Standards haben. Wir analysieren individuelle Hemmschwellen für die Zustimmung zu Übertretungen in Abhängigkeit von den zur Verfügung stehenden Optionen, Schuld über das jeweilige institutionelle Design auf andere zu verteilen. Auf aggregierter Ebene studieren wir, wie Institutionen die Wahrscheinlichkeit von unmoralischem Verhalten beeinflussen. |
| Keywords: | Moral Decision Making,Shared Guilt,Group Absolution,Diffused Responsibility,Institutional Design,Committee Decisions,Moral Transgression |
| JEL: | D01 D03 D23 D63 D63 D82 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2013305&r=mic |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey; Alois Stutzer |
| Abstract: | In a simple conceptual framework, we organize a multitude of phenomena related to the (mis)prediction of utility. Consequences in terms of distorted choices and lower wellbeing emerge if people have to trade-off between alternatives that are characterized by attributes satisfying extrinsic desires and alternatives serving intrinsic needs. Thereby the neglect of asymmetries in adaptation is proposed as an important driver. The theoretical analysis is consistent with econometric evidence on commuting choice using data on subjective wellbeing. People show substantial adaptation to a higher labor income but not to commuting. This may account for the finding that people are not compensated for the burden of commuting. |
| Keywords: | Adaptation, extrinsic/intrinsic attributes, individual decision-making, misprediction, subjective well-being, time allocation |
| JEL: | A12 D11 D12 D84 I31 J22 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp564&r=mic |