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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Fay Dunkerley (CES - KU Leuven - CES - KU Leuven); André De Palma (ENS Cachan - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X); Stef Proost (CES - KU Leuven - CES - KU Leuven) |
| Abstract: | In this paper the problem of a city with access to two firms or facilities (shopping malls, airports, commercial districts) selling a differentiated product (shopping, flights) and/or offering a differentiated workplace is studied. Transport connections to one facility are congested. A model is presented for this asymmetric duopoly game that can be solved for a Nash equilibrium in prices and wages. A comparative statics analysis is used to illustrate the properties of the equilibrium. A numerical model is then applied to the two Brussels airports. Three stylised policies are implemented to address the congestion problem: expansion of transport capacity; congestion pricing; and a direct subsidy to the uncongested facility. Our results indicate that the degree of intrinsic differentiation between the two firms is crucial in determining the difference in profit and market share. Price and wage differences also depend on trip frequency and consumer preferences for diversity. Congestion pricing is the most effective policy tool but all three options are shown to have attractive attributes. |
| Keywords: | duopoly, imperfect competition, congestion, general equilibrium, airport competition |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00348443_v1&r=mic |
| By: | Guido Cozzi |
| Abstract: | It is well known that research and development (R&D) is an important engine for economic growth. Also, initial wealth inequality and subsequent economic growth are well known to be related. This paper links inequality and R&D-driven growth. It shows that in a class of economies where R&D is the main engine for growth, different wealth groups differ in their desire for aggregate innovative efforts: the higher the profit share of the individual's incomes the lower their ideal aggregate R&D and innovation. If rich shareholders were able to pursue their common interest and to discourage too much R&D compared, then a pro-labour government able to impose distortionary progressive taxation, by minimizing the difference between the rich and the poor can maximize growth. Such predicted negative relationship between desired R&D and dynastic wealth is robust to any subsidy rate lower than 100% |
| Keywords: | R&D and Growth; Social Preferences for Innovation; Inequality, Redistribution and Growth. |
| JEL: | O31 O32 O38 P16 P48 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gla:glaewp:2009_14&r=mic |
| By: | Mohamed Ayadi (ISG - Institut supérieur de gestion - Université de Tunis, Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales de Tunis - Université de Tunis, GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines); Mohieddine Rahmouni (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - CNRS : UMR5113 - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV); Murat Yildizoglu (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579) |
| Abstract: | This article is dedicated to the analysis of the first innovation survey of the Tunisian firms. Starting from basic mechanisms of innovation processes, we test a set of conjectures adapted to a developing country like Tunisia. We analyze the motivation of firms to innovate and the determinants of product and process innovations. Our results show that firms must benefit from external knowledge sources in order to exhibit significant innovation propensities. The large size is also a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for innovation. We also notice that the participation of the State plays an harmful role. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; development; absorptive capacity; learning |
| Date: | 2009–03–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00368560_v1&r=mic |
| By: | Thomas Vallée (LEMNA - Université de Nantes); Murat Yildizoglu (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579) |
| Abstract: | Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as a subject of controversy in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics, and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been extensively studied in the literature. Several articles show that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable ESS of the Cournot game. But no general result has been established for the difficult case of simultaneous heterogenous mutations.Authors propose specific selection dynamics to analyze this case. Vriend (2000) proposes using a genetic algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to Cournot equilibrium with individual learning. The resulting convergence has been questioned by Arifovic and Maschek (2006). The aim of this article is to clarify this controversy: it analyzes the mechanisms that are behind these contradictory results and underlines the specific role of the spite effect. We show why social learning gives rise to the Walrasian equilibrium and why, in a general setup, individual learning can effectively yield convergence to the Cournot equilibrium. We also illustrate these general results by systematic computational experiments. |
| Keywords: | Cournot oligopoly; Learning; Evolution; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash equilibrium; Genetic algorithms |
| Date: | 2009–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00368274_v1&r=mic |
| By: | Engel Nielsen, Lars (Department of Informatics, Copenhagen Business School); Mahnke, Volker (Department of Informatics, Copenhagen Business School) |
| Abstract: | Many companies in high technology fields engage with alliance partners to reduce risks, create synergies and learn. While the challenges of managing individual alliances are well documented, little is known on how to manage several R&D alliances simultaneously. Multiple alliance strategies can be observed in several companies engaged in the cross section of telecommunication and mobile technology where increased complexity magnifies managerial challenges. Drawing on modern portfolio theory, this paper offers a model for managing portfolios of R&D alliances. In particular, an analysis of a technology platform leader reveals how companies can reduce several types of risks associated with new technology and gain synergies by engaging in several alliances simultaneously |
| Keywords: | na |
| JEL: | H00 |
| Date: | 2009–03–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cbsinf:2003_010&r=mic |
| By: | Pascal Courty; Mario Pagliero |
| Abstract: | Concert tickets can either be sold at a single price or at multiple prices corresponding to different seating categories. We study the relationship between price discrimination and revenue by examining variations in the number of seating categories across concert, tour, artist, location, and time. Offering multiple seating categories leads to revenues that are approximately 5 percent higher than with single price ticketing. The return to price discrimination is higher in markets with more heterogeneous demand, in smaller venues and in more competitive markets. The return of increasing from three to four categories of seating is about half that of increasing from one to two. |
| Keywords: | Price discrimination, return to price discrimination, second degree price discrimination |
| JEL: | D42 L82 Z11 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:105&r=mic |