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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Reisinger, Markus; Schnitzer, Monika |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing. |
| Keywords: | Deregulation; Free Entry; Price Competition; Product Differentiation; Successive Oligopolies; Two-Part Tariffs; Vertical Restraints |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L40 L50 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6730&r=mic |
| By: | André de Palma; Fay Dunkerley; Stef Proost |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study how trip chaining affects the pricing and equilibrium number of firms. We use a monopolistic competition model where firms offer differentiated products as well as differentiated jobs to households who are all located at some distance from the firms. Trip chaining means that shopping and commuting can be combined in one trip. The symmetric equilibriums with and without the option of trip chaining are compared. We show analytically that introducing the trip chaining option can, in the short run, only decrease the profit margin of the firms and will increase welfare. The welfare gains are however smaller than the transport cost savings. In the long run, with free entry, the number of firms decreases but welfare with trip chaining possible is still higher than when it is excluded. A numerical illustration gives orders of magnitude of the different effects. |
| Keywords: | trip chaining, discrete choice model, general equilibrium model, imperfect competition, wage competition. |
| JEL: | D43 L13 R3 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0607&r=mic |
| By: | Cabral, Luís M B |
| Abstract: | I consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks. Consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate. Firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices (which may be below cost). New consumers have a privately known preference for each network. Upon joining a network, in each period consumers enjoy a benefit which is increasing in network size during that period. Firms receive revenues from new consumers as well as from consumers already belonging to their network. Using a combination of analytical and numerical methods, I discuss various properties of the equilibrium. I show that very small or very large networks tend to price higher than networks of intermediate size. I also show that, around symmetric states, the gap between the large and the small network tends to widen (increasing dominance) whereas the opposite is true (reversion to the mean) around very asymmetric states. |
| Keywords: | dynamic price competition; network effects |
| JEL: | L13 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6687&r=mic |
| By: | Patrick Van Cayseele |
| Abstract: | The results obtained by Cardon and Sasaki (1998) on R&D clustering are derived under the specific assumption that firms only can own one patent. When multiple patents are allowed, R&D clustering will come about more frequently if search costs are substantial. |
| Keywords: | R&D clustering; persistence of monopoly |
| JEL: | L12 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0119&r=mic |
| By: | Chenghuan Sean Chu |
| Abstract: | In vertically differentiated markets, the effects of firm entry are contingent upon whether incumbent firms can respond to entry by adjusting product quality in addition to simply lowering prices. Using market-level data, I estimate a structural model of supply and demand for subscription television that takes into account the endogeneity of quality choice. Using counterfactual analysis, I decompose the effect of satellite entry on existing cable into two components: the conventional price response and the effect of endogenous quality adjustments (measured by changes in programming content). Consistent with the empirical observation that cable prices rose during the 1990s and early 2000s "in spite of" increasing competition, I find that raising both price and quality for the most comprehensive subscription package--i.e., competing "head-to-head"--is the rational response to entry by cable systems in markets with relatively homogeneous consumer types. Elsewhere, incumbents respond less aggressively and relegate themselves to being the low-end provider. When an entrant credibly commits to serving consumers with the highest preferences for quality, competition over both price and quality lowers the welfare gains due to entry, relative to pure price competition. In particular, head-to-head competition results in "crowding" of quality choices toward the high end of the market and inefficiently low product differentiation. In such cases, consumers with weak quality preferences may actually become worse off following entry. The evidence also suggests that the observed degradation of the lowest-quality cable tier in many markets during this time period--while commonly seen as an attempt to evade price regulation--may actually have been welfare-enhancing. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2008-12&r=mic |
| By: | de Frutos, Maria-Angeles; Fabra, Natalia; Von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we study a two-stage game in which firms choose their capacities under demand uncertainty prior to bidding into the spot market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price-caps and (iii) bid duration. We find that, although the discriminatory auction tends to lower prices, this does not imply that investment incentives at the margin are poorer; indeed, under reasonable assumptions on the shape of the demand distribution, the discriminatory auction induces (weakly) stronger investment incentives than the uniform-price format. |
| Keywords: | electricity; investment; market design; regulatory reform; uniform price and discriminatory auctions |
| JEL: | D44 L10 L5 L94 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6626&r=mic |
| By: | Nocke, Volker; Peitz, Martin |
| Abstract: | In an intertemporal setting in which individual uncertainty is resolved over time, advance-purchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between consumers with different expected valuations for the same product. Consumers with a high expected valuation purchase the product before learning their actual valuation at the offered advance-purchase discount; consumers with a low expected valuation will wait and purchase the good at the regular price only in the event where their realized valuation is high. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the monopolist's optimal intertemporal selling policy features such advance-purchase discounts. |
| Keywords: | advance-purchase discount; demand uncertainty; intertemporal pricing; introductory offers; monopoly pricing; price discrimination |
| JEL: | D42 L12 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6664&r=mic |
| By: | Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele; Tyran, Jean-Robert |
| Abstract: | Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbours about their private experiences with different sellers. We find that such information exchange fosters firms' incentives for reputation building and, thus, enhances trust and efficiency in markets. This efficiency-enhancing effect is already achieved with a rather low level of network density. |
| Keywords: | consumer network; information conditions; moral hazard; reputation; trust |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D40 L14 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6624&r=mic |
| By: | de Frutos, Maria-Angeles; Fabra, Natalia |
| Abstract: | Several regulatory authorities worldwide have recently imposed forward contract obligations on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In this paper we investigate how such contractual obligations affect equilibrium bidding in electricity markets, or in any other auction-based market. For this purpose, we introduce forward contracts in a uniform-price multi-unit auction model with complete information. We find that forward contracts are pro-competitive when allocated to relatively large and efficient firms; however, they might be anti-competitive otherwise. We also show that an increase in contract volume need not always be welfare improving. From a methodological point of view, we aim at contributing to the literature on multi-unit auctions with discrete bids. |
| Keywords: | antitrust remedies; discrete bids; electricity; Forward contracts; market power; multi-unit auctions; simulations |
| JEL: | G13 L13 L94 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6756&r=mic |
| By: | O'Gorman, Catherine; Smith, Howard |
| Abstract: | Reducing fixed cost duplication - a common justification for concentrated market structure - motivated the US government to relax the number of radio stations a firm could operate in any local market. After deregulation the number of firms per market decreased. The implied cost saving depends on the per market fixed costs incurred by each firm. Using data from 140 markets we estimate upper and lower bounds to fixed costs using (i) an empirical model of gross profit and (ii) the assumption that the observed post-deregulation market structure is a Nash equilibrium. The estimates suggest that the efficiency savings were significant. |
| Keywords: | moment inequalities |
| JEL: | L10 L40 L82 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6699&r=mic |
| By: | Fay Dunkerley; André de Palma; Stef Proost |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study the problem of a city with access to two subcentres selling a differentiated product. The first subcentre has low free flow transport costs but is easily congested (near city centre, access by road). The second one has higher free flow transport costs but is less prone to congestion (ample public transport capacity, parking etc.). Both subcentres need to attract customers and employees by offering prices and wages that are sufficiently attractive to cover their fixed costs. In the absence of any government regulation, there will be an asymmetric duopoly game that can be solved for a Nash equilibrium in prices and wages offered by the two subcentres. This solution is typically characterised by excessive congestion for the nearby subcentre. We study the welfare effects of a number of stylised policies by setting up a general model and illustrating the model using competition between airports as an example. The first stylised policy is to extend the congested road to subcentre 1. This policy will not necessarily lead to less congestion as more customers will be attracted by the lower transport costs. The second policy option is to add congestion pricing (or parking pricing (etc.) for the congested subcentre. This will decrease its profit margin and attract more customers. The third policy is acceptable for politicians: providing a direct subsidy to the remote subcentre, reducing its marginal costs. This policy will again ease the congestion problem for the nearby subcentre but will do this in a very costly way. |
| Keywords: | duopoly, imperfect competition, congestion, general equilibrium, airport competition |
| JEL: | L13 D43 R41 R13 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0610&r=mic |
| By: | Guido Pepermans; Bert Willems |
| Abstract: | This paper looks at the potential effect of partial ownership on the generation and the transmission sector of electricity markets. Ideally, in liberalized electricity markets, transmission is separated from generation. The transmission sector is a natural monopoly operated by a regulated transmission firm, while the generation sector is open for competition. This paper assumes that the transmission firm is not very well regulated and behaves strategically, that there is oligoplistic competition in generation, and that one of the generators, the incumbent, owns part of the transmission firm. We then study the effect of this partial ownership in a numerical model which is calibrated on the Belgian market. The model captures two kinds of partial ownership interactions: passive ownership, where the generation firm simply cashes its share of the transmission firm’s profit without having a direct impact on its decision process, and active ownership, where the generator has a direct influence on the transmission firm’s decision process. It is shown that ownership of the network operator by the incumbent generator reduces double marginalization (= welfare improving) but also reduces entry in the generation market (= welfare decreasing). |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0503&r=mic |
| By: | Courty, Pascal; Pagliero, Mario |
| Abstract: | Using data from a unique pricing experiment, we investigate Vickrey’s conjecture that responsive pricing can be used to smooth both predictable and unpredictable demand shocks. Our evidence shows that increasing the responsiveness of price to demand conditions reduces the magnitude of deviations in capacity utilization rates from a pre-determined target level. A 10 percent increase in price variability leads to a decrease in the variability of capacity utilization rates between 2 and 6 percent. We discuss implications for the use of demand-side incentives to deal with congestible resources. |
| Keywords: | capacity utilization; Consumer demand; price variability; responsive pricing |
| JEL: | D01 D12 L11 L86 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6662&r=mic |
| By: | INUI Tomohiko; KAWAKAMI Atsushi; MIYAGAWA Tsutomu |
| Abstract: | Going all the way back to Schumpeter (1934), economists have long discussed whether market competition stimulates innovation. To reconcile conflicting earlier empirical evidence, Aghion and Griffith (2005) developed a model showing that competition can have both a positive and a negative effect on innovation, depending on the degree of competition in the market. Following Aghion and Griffith's work, this paper empirically examines the effect of market competition - measured either by the Herfindahl Index or the Lerner Index - on productivity growth and R&D intensity using micro data for Japan's manufacturing sector. We found evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation when we use the Herfindahl Index as a measure of competition in the market. Especially for the period since 2000, the data lend strong support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped curve. In addition, we examined the effect of new entrants on the innovative activity of incumbents. The results of our estimation using a regulation index as our measure of entry barriers suggest that the effect on incumbents' TFP growth depends on their technology level. When incumbents' technology level is close to the technology frontier in their industry, competition from new entrants induces these firms to make efforts to increase their productivity in order to escape from competition. On the other hand, such competition discourages innovation in firms far from the industrial technology frontier. |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:08012&r=mic |
| By: | Bert Willems |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the market power of generators in the electricity market when transmission capacity is scarce. We consider a simple world of two generators providing electricity to their consumers through a single transmission line. In the literature, different Cournot equilibrium concepts have been developed. This paper applies these concepts and explains the implicit assumptions on the behavior of the System Operator made in those papers. We show that these implicit assumptions are not realistic. For an alternative role of the System Operator, we solve the Cournot equilibrium and compare the outcome. Furthermore, we show that the axiomatic equilibrium concept of Smeers and Wei (1997) is linked with the model of Oren (1997) and can also be defined as a Nash Equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0024&r=mic |
| By: | Jozef Konings; Patrick Van Cayseele; Frederic Warzynski |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we estimate markup ratios using firm-level data according to the techniques developed by Hall (1986, 1988) and Domowitz et al. (1988) for the Dutch and Belgian manufacturing industry from 1992 to 1997, to determine whether competition policy affects the pricing behaviour of firms. Competition law was applied less toughly in the Netherlands until January 1998. We find evidence of large markup ratios in the manufacturing industry as a whole and in a lot of 2-digit industries. The markup ratio did not decline in Belgium following the creation of a national competition policy authority. However we show that the markup ratio is higher in the Netherlands than in Belgium in the whole manufacturing industry but also in most smaller subsets. In addition, the import penetration ratio positively influences the markup ratio in the Netherlands, meaning that imports do not discipline the industry. Together these findings support the hypothesis that competition is useful to correct allocative inefficiencies. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces9914&r=mic |
| By: | Bert Willems |
| Abstract: | Allaz and Vila (1993) show that the existence of futures markets increases the efficiency of markets in a Cournot setting. This paper looks at the efficiency effect of financial options in a similar framework. It shows that also the existence of financial options makes markets more efficient; though to a smaller extent than futures. This is particularly relevant for markets with market power and costly storage, like the electricity market. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0414&r=mic |
| By: | Urem, Branka (UNU-MERIT); Alcorta, Ludovico (Maastricht School of Management); An, Tongliang (School of Business, Nanjing University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the relationship between foreign ownership and innovations of high novelty in context of advanced developing countries. We develop hypotheses about a direct relationship in terms of two dimensions, propensity and intensity of innovations of high novelty, and a contingency hypothesis about the moderating impact of R&D internationalisation on the relationship with propensity. The analysis is based on innovation survey data on manufacturing firms from Jiangsu province of China. Hypotheses are tested using non-parametric methods. We find that foreign firms do not have a higher propensity of innovations of high novelty, not even when they engage in formal R&D. However, the evidence suggests that foreign firms have a higher intensity of innovations of high novelty than domestic firms. |
| Keywords: | multinational enterprises, foreign firms, innovation, manufacturing, China |
| JEL: | F23 L60 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2008019&r=mic |
| By: | Oleg Badunenko; Michael Fritsch; Andreas Stephan |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the factors that explain the level and dynamics of manufacturing firm productive efficiency. In our empirical analysis, we use a unique sample of about 39,000 firms in 256 industries from the German Cost Structure Census over the years 1992-2005. We estimate the efficiencies of the firms and relate them to firm-specific and environmental factors. We find that (1) about half the model's explanatory power is due to industry effects, (2) firm size accounts for another 20 percent, and (3) location of headquarters explains approximately 15 percent. Interestingly, most other firm characteristics, such as R&D intensity, outsourcing activities, or the number of owners, have extremely little explanatory power. Surprisingly, our findings suggest that higher R&D intensity is associated with being less efficient, though higher R&D spending increases a firm's efficiency over time. |
| Keywords: | Frontier analysis, determinants of efficiency, firm performance, industry effects, regional effects, firm size |
| JEL: | D24 L10 L25 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp775&r=mic |
| By: | Martínez de Albeniz, Victor (IESE Business School); Vendrell, Josep M. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider the problem of a trader who purchases a commodity in one market and resells it in another. The trader is capacitated: the trading volume is limited by operational constraints, e.g., logistics. The two markets quote different prices, but the spread is reduced when trading takes place. We are interested in finding the optimal trading policy across the markets so as to obtain the maximum profit in the long-term, taking into account that the trading activity influences the price processes, i.e., market power. As in the no-market-power case, we find that the optimal policy is determined by three regions, where 1) move as much as possible from one market to the other; 2) the same in the opposite direction; or 3) do nothing. Finally, we use the model to analyze kerosene price differences between New York and Los Angeles. |
| Keywords: | commodity trading; price processes; inventory management; |
| Date: | 2008–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0728&r=mic |
| By: | de Rassenfosse, Gaétan; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether patent counts can be taken as indicators of macroeconomic innovation performance. The empirical model explicitly accounts for the two components of patenting output: research productivity and patent propensity. The empirical analysis aims at explaining the `correct' number of priority filings in 34 countries. It confirms that the two components play a substantial role as witnessed by the impact of the design of several policies, namely education, intellectual property and science and technology policies. A major policy implication relates to the design of patent systems, which ultimately induces, or allows for, aggressive patenting strategies. |
| Keywords: | education policy; patent policy; propensity to patent; R&D productivity; S&T policy |
| JEL: | O30 O38 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6716&r=mic |
| By: | Griffith, Rachel; Harmgart, Heike |
| Abstract: | We are interested in evaluating the impact of restrictive planning regulation on entry into the UK grocery retail industry. We estimate a model similar to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) where we allow for multiple store formats. We find that more restrictive planning regulation reduces the number of large format supermarkets in equilibrium. However, the impact is overstated if variation in demographic characteristics across markets is not also controlled for. Our estimates suggest that restrictive planning regulation leads to a loss to consumers of up to £10m per annum. This cost must be offset against any benefits that arise, e.g. due to reduced congestion. |
| Keywords: | entry; land use regulation; retail |
| JEL: | L11 L52 L81 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6713&r=mic |
| By: | Eugenio Pinto |
| Abstract: | We propose an explanation for the rapid post-entry growth of surviving firms found in recent studies. At the core of our theory is the interaction between adjustment costs and learning by entering firms about their efficiency. We show that linear adjustment costs, i.e., proportional costs, create incentives for firms to enter smaller and for successful firms to grow faster after entry. Initial uncertainty about profitability makes entering firms prudent since they want to avoid incurring superfluous costs on jobs that prove to be excessive ex post. Because higher adjustment costs imply less pruning of inefficient firms and faster growth of surviving firms, the contribution of survivors to growth in a cohort's average size increases. For the cohort of 1988 entrants in the Portuguese economy, we conclude that survivors' growth is the main factor behind growth in the cohort's average size. However, initial selection is higher and the survivors' contribution to growth is smaller in services than in manufacturing. An estimation of the model shows that the proportional adjustment cost is the key parameter to account for the high empirical survivors' contribution. In addition, firms in manufacturing learn relatively less initially about their efficiency and are subject to larger adjustment costs than firms in services. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2008-14&r=mic |
| By: | Doraszelski, Ulrich; Jaumandreu, Jordi |
| Abstract: | We develop a simple estimator for production functions in the presence of endogenous productivity change that allows us to retrieve productivity and its relationship with R\&D at the firm level. By endogenizing the productivity process we build on the recent literature on structural estimation of production functions. Our dynamic investment model can be viewed as a generalization of the knowledge capital model (Griliches 1979) that has remained a cornerstone of the productivity literature for more than 25 years. We relax the assumptions on the R\&D process and examine the impact of the investment in knowledge on the productivity of firms. We illustrate our approach on an unbalanced panel of more than 1800 Spanish manufacturing firms in nine industries during the 1990s. Our findings indicate that the link between R&D and productivity is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, nonlinearity, and heterogeneity across firms. By accounting for uncertainty and nonlinearity, we extend the knowledge capital model. Moreover, capturing heterogeneity gives us the ability to assess the role of R&D in determining the differences in productivity across firms and the evolution of firm-level productivity over time. |
| Keywords: | production function estimation; productivity; R&D |
| JEL: | D2 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6636&r=mic |
| By: | Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera; Laurent Weill; Franziska Schobert |
| Abstract: | Banking competition is expected to provide welfare gains by reducing monopoly rents and cost inefficiencies, favoring a reduction of loan rates and then investment. These expected gains are a major issue for transition countries, in which bank credit represents the largest source of external finance for companies. With the use of exhaustive quarterly data for Czech banks, this paper aims to provide evidence on the effects of banking competition in the Czech Republic. First, we measure the level and evolution of banking competition between 1994 and 2005. Competition is measured by the Lerner index on the loan market, using data on loan prices. The results do not show a clear-cut trend in the evolution of the Lerner index. Second, we investigate the relationship and causality between competition and efficiency. We perform a Granger-causality-type analysis. This supports the ‘banking specificities’ hypothesis, according to which heightened competition can lead to an increase in monitoring costs through a reduction in the length of the customer relationship and due to the presence of economies of scale in the banking sector, in this way reducing the cost efficiency of banks. Therefore, our results reject the intuitive ‘quiet life’ hypothesis and indicate a negative relationship between competition and efficiency in banking. |
| Keywords: | Banks, competition, efficiency, transition countries. |
| JEL: | G21 L12 P20 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cnb:wpaper:2007/6&r=mic |
| By: | Stefan Dercon; Bjorn Van Campenhout |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an alternative technique to analyze market integration using price data, linking the cointegration version of Ravallion's dynamic model with the recent switching regression approaches as in Baulch's Parity Bounds Model. The Band- Threshold Autogression (Band-TAR) model allows for dynamic analysis of the adjustment process as well as for trade discontinuities and transaction costs, thereby avoiding some of the unrealistic assumptions of both approaches. We apply the model to the same rice price data on the Philippines as Baulch and find that, contrary to Baulch, the efficient arbitrage conditions are often not satisfied and unexploited profits are common, albeit relatively small. At least on one important trade route, we find evidence of substantial inefficiences. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces9909&r=mic |
| By: | Kareen Rozen |
| Date: | 2008–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000002086&r=mic |