nep-mic New Economics Papers
on Microeconomics
Issue of 2005‒08‒28
four papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Networks in labor markets: Wage & employment dynamics & inequality By Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Jackson, Matthew O.
  2. Actions and beliefs: estimating distribution-based preferences using a large scale experiment with probability questions on expectations By Bellamare,Charles; Kroeger,Sabine; Soest,Arthur van
  3. A note on permutationally convex games By Velzen,Bas van; Hamers,Herbert; Norde,Henk
  4. Stable networks and convex payoffs By Gilles,Robert P.; Sarangi,Sudipta

  1. By: Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Jackson, Matthew O.
    Keywords: labor markets, employment, unemployment, wages, wage inequality, drop-out rates
    Date: 2005–03
  2. By: Bellamare,Charles; Kroeger,Sabine; Soest,Arthur van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictator") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty. We use a large and representative sample of subjects drawn from the Dutch population. Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for equity in the population. Changes in preferences have an important impact on decisions of dictators in the dictator game and responders in the ultimatum game, but a smaller impact on decisions of proposer's in the ultimatum game, a result due to proposers subjective expectations about responders' decisions. The model which uses subjective data on expectations has better predictive power and lower noise level than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations.
    Keywords: ultimatum game;inquity aversion;subjective expectations
    JEL: C93 D63 D84
    Date: 2005
  3. By: Velzen,Bas van; Hamers,Herbert; Norde,Henk (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper we generalise marginal vectors and permutational convexity. We show that if a game is generalised permutationally convex, then the corresponding generalised marginal vector is a core element. Furthermore we refine the concept of permutational convexity and show that this refinement yields a sufficient condition for the corresponding marginal vector to be a core element. Finally, we prove that permutational convexity is equivalent to a restricted set of inequalities and that if a game is permutationally convex with respect to an order, then it is permutationally convex with respect to a related order as well.
    Keywords: cooperative game theory;marginal vectors;permutational convexity
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2005
  4. By: Gilles,Robert P.; Sarangi,Sudipta (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures.
    Keywords: social networks;network formation;pairwise stability
    JEL: C72 C79
    Date: 2005

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