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on Microeconomics |
| By: | Duarte Brito (Universidade Nova de Lisboa); Pedro Pereira (Autoridade da Concorrência) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we discuss the role of cable television networks and their ownership structure in promoting competition in the local access market. First, we show that the dual ownership of a local telephone network and a cable network, compared with separate ownership, may increase or decrease incentives to invest in upgrading the cable television network. Second, we argue that separate ownership of the two networks is important to promote competition in local access. |
| Keywords: | Cable Networks, Local Access, Competition |
| JEL: | L43 L96 |
| Date: | 2005–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0507002&r=mic |
| By: | Fernando Beltrán; Cesar García |
| Abstract: | Un intermediario forma paquetes de productos (bundles) ejerciendo un tipo de discriminación sobre los consumidores. El tipo de discriminación que consideramos está basada en la calidad de los productos que forman el paquete. Para el efecto proponemos dos modelos de selección adversa: un modelo considera que la decisión de agregación depende de las acciones del comprador mientras que el otro supone que es el intermediario (o el vendedor) el que agrega productos. Los paquetes formados comprenden dos productos de alta y baja calidad y los consumidores son de dos tipos, uno con una disponibilidad alta de pago y otro con disponibilidad baja. Los resultados son ilustrativos de los efectos de la agregación de productos de diferentes calidades sobre el bienestar de un consumidor. |
| Keywords: | agregación de productos |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2003–11–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000138:001059&r=mic |
| By: | Martha Patricia Cruz; Eduardo Uribe; Harold Coronado |
| Abstract: | Este estudio considera el valor de la productividad marginal del agua en la industria manufacturera colombiana. Su estimación se realiza con información proveniente de aquellos establecimientos industriales que reportaron algún consumo de agua como materia prima, agregados a cuatro dígitos CIIU, en la Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM), durante el periodo 1992 - 1999. A través de la estimación de una función de producción Trans Log, donde el agua (W) se incluye como un insumo fundamental, al igual que el trabajo (L), el capital (K) y la energía (E), se deriva el valor privado de la productividad marginal del agua para cada uno de los sectores industriales seleccionados. Los resultados obtenidos demuestran que muchos de los sectores industriales, considerados intensivos en el uso de agua, han logrado reducir notablemente sus costos de acceso el recurso (extracción, tratamiento y distribución) y muestran una baja disponibilidad marginal privada a pagar por el uso de agua como materia prima (DAPMgW). Este es el caso del sector de Alimentos (DAPMgW entre $1,125/m3/mes y $4,177/m3/mes), Bebidas (DAPMgW entre $364/m3/mes y $1,184/m3/mes), Textiles (DAPMgW $1,233 m3/mes y $2,222 m3/mes), Metalurgia (DAPMgW entre $403 m3/mes y $450 m3/mes) y Sustancias Químicas (DAPMgW entre $577 m3/mes y $1,958 m3/mes). Este hecho ha favorecido tanto el incremento en el consumo de agua proveniente de fuentes propias (legales o no), como el pago de un precio muy bajo por el uso del agua que no tiene en cuenta el problema de escasez relativa que enfrenta el recurso. El cobro de una tasa por utilización del agua (TUA), que tenga en cuenta la disponibilidad marginal a pagar privada por el uso de agua como un insumo, puede hacer que este recurso natural de dominio público se distribuya de manera más eficiente entre las diferentes actividades industriales del sector manufacturero, más aún si se tiene en cuenta que este estudio encontró que la elasticidad precio propia del agua como materia prima se encuentra alrededor de -1. |
| Keywords: | productividad marginal |
| JEL: | L60 |
| Date: | 2003–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000138:001067&r=mic |
| By: | Boone,Jan; Goeree,Jacob K. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the use of auctions for privatizing public assets. In our model, a single "insider" bidder (e.g. incumbent management of a government-owned firm) possesses information about the asset's risky value. In addition, bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions with devastating consequences for revenues. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder to ensure truthful information revelation. The optimal mechanism can be implemented via a simple two-stage "qualifying auction." In the first stage of the qualifying auction, non-binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve price. |
| JEL: | D44 D82 L33 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200572&r=mic |
| By: | Fonseca,Miguel A.; Mueller,Wieland; Normann,Hans-Theo (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period. |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D43 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200577&r=mic |
| By: | José M. Labeaga, Xisco Oliver; Xisco Oliver; Amedeo Spadaro |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we demonstrate the potential of behavioural microsimulation models as powerful tools for the ex ante evaluation of public policies. The subject of our analysis is the impact of recent Spanish Income Tax reforms on efficiency and household and social welfare. We also analyze the likely effects of some basic income flat tax and vital minimum flat tax schemes. The analysis is carried out using a microsimulation model in which labour supply is explicitly taken into account. Instead of following the traditional continuous approach (Hausman 1981, 1985a, and 1985b), we estimate the direct utility function using the methodology proposed by Van Soest (1995). Our data come from a sample of Spanish individuals in the 1995 wave of the EC Household Panel. We show that in the Spanish case, the redistribution policies considered have only little impact on the efficiency of the economy. On the contrary, they strongly affect social welfare. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2005-14&r=mic |
| By: | Avenel, E.; Caprice, S. |
| Abstract: | We analyze a model of vertical differentiation in which retailers compete in product lines and may purchase a high qulity good from a monopolist. The low quality good is produced by a competitive fringe. Depending on quality and cost differentials, the product lines chosen by retailers in equilibrium are either identical, completely different or partially overlapping. In the absence of upstream market power, the unique equilibrium is for retailers to offer identical product lines. We provide a detailed analysis of the link between upstream market power and product line differentiation. ...French Abstract : Le papier s'intéresse à la formation des prix et des marges en fonction des gammes de produits offertes par les distributeurs. Les auteurs considèrent un modèle de différenciation verticale avec un bien de qualité haute produit par un fournisseur en monopole et un bien de qualité basse fourni par une frange concurrentielle. Les gammes de produits offertes par les distributeurs sont endogènes. En fonction des structures de coûts et du différentiel de qualité, les gammes de produits choisies par les distributeurs peuvent être identiques, différentes ou partiellement différentes. En l'absence de pouvoir de marché en amont, les gammes offertes sont toujours identiques. Les auteurs fournissent une analyse détaillée du lien entre gammes de produits offertes et pouvoir de marché amont. |
| Keywords: | PRODUCT LINE RIVALRY; VERTICAL CONTRACTING; MARKET POWER; RETAILING ; OLIGOPOLE; MARCHE; POUVOIR; DISTRIBUTION; QUALITE DES PRODUITS; DIFFERENCIATION DES PRODUITS |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L42 L81 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rea:inrawp:200502&r=mic |
| By: | Ponzano, Ferruccio |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to analyse competition between two levels of government that want to maximise their tax revenues facing the problem of re-election. We assume that citizens have incomplete information about central and local public goods. Then, they are not able to choose a single efficient level of these two goods but they are able to choose a set of combinations. This choice represent the constraint faced by the levels of government. We develop a model starting from this assumption and three extensions to analyse the behaviour of two levels of government in different scenarios. We find that in each situation the equal sharing of the tax revenue is not the best solution for the governments. |
| JEL: | D43 D72 H11 H71 H77 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:47&r=mic |
| By: | Juan M.C. Larrosa (CONICET-Universidad Nacional del Sur) |
| Abstract: | Noncooperative network-formation games in oligopolies analyze optimal connection structures that emerge when linking represent the appropriation of cost-reducing one-way externalities. These models reflect situations where one firm access to another firm’s (public or private) information and this last cannot refuse it. What would happen if decisions are sequential? A model of exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantages are observed and commented. |
| Keywords: | non cooperative games, network formation strategies, Stackelberg equilibrium. |
| JEL: | C70 D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2005–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0507003&r=mic |
| By: | E Randon; P Simmons |
| Abstract: | Generally, implementation of Pigovian taxes to correct for market failure requires an enormous set of information. For each commodity-person combination a different tax is required to correct the resulting market inefficiency. In this paper, we analyse interdependent preferences and inefficiency of the market solution with the aim of finding conditions justifying simple rules for such taxes. We examine the utility possibility curve and Scitovsky community indifference curve, allowing for general utility interdependence and agent heterogeneity. In particular we show the equivalence of taxes derived from the Marshallian and compensated demand approaches. We move on to analyse the welfare cost of consumption externalities and show that it decomposes into part due to individuals choosing suboptimal quantities and part due to individuals using valuations that are not socially optimal. We show what forms of externality can justify simple policy corrections. In particular, we analyse the conditions which are required for the market failure to be corrected by: 1) specific indirect ad valorem taxes on commodities, 2) the same proportional tax rate on every commodity, 3) a proportional income tax rate on each individual. The conditions are related to the restrictions necessary to have H synthetic consumers without externalities who replicate behaviour of individuals with externalities. An example with two individuals and three goods concludes the paper. |
| Keywords: | Consumption externalities; Piecemeal policy |
| JEL: | D62 D11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:05/12&r=mic |