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on Microfinance |
| By: | Badola, Shivani (Institute for Studies in Industrial Development); Mukherjee, Sacchidananda (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy) |
| Abstract: | Credit constraints often hinder investment in unincorporated enterprises, limiting innovation and overall performance, including reduced productivity and output, and slower growth. In this paper, we assess credit constraints on unincorporated enterprises using NSSO’s unit-level data from the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Enterprises 2022-23. Identifying the factors and determinants of credit constraints is crucial for informing policy recommendations. Based on sources of outstanding loans and survey responses, we classify enterprises into three categories: fully constrained, partially constrained, and not constrained. We find that manufacturing enterprises face more credit constraints than those engaged in trading and services. Furthermore, the study indicates that female entrepreneurs and those belonging to SC/ST or OBC castes face comparatively greater credit constraints than others. Other factors, such as region (rural vs. urban), size (annual turnover and asset value), GST registration status, price-cost margin, etc., are strong determinants of credit constraints or access to credit. |
| Keywords: | Unincorporated Enterprises ; Credit Constraints ; Manufacturing ; Multinomial logit model ; India |
| JEL: | C35 E51 G20 L60 |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:npf:wpaper:26/449 |
| By: | Juan Carlos Angulo (Department of Economics, Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de Mexico); Monia Gruber (Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Spain) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the relationship between criminality and financial inclusion across 128 countries using data from the Global Findex Database and the Global Organized Crime Index. We assess whether the presence of criminal actors and criminal markets influences individuals' likelihood of owning a financial account. The results indicate that higher levels of criminality are associated with a lower probability of account ownership. This relationship is driven primarily by the presence of criminal actors, particularly state-embedded actors and mafia-style groups, rather than criminal markets. Regional analyses reveal substantial heterogeneity, with the strongest negative effects observed in East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa. The findings contribute to the literature on criminality, financial inclusion, and digital finance by highlighting how criminal governance structures may undermine access to formal financial services. |
| JEL: | G21 G40 O30 |
| Date: | 2026–07–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smx:wpaper:2026008 |
| By: | Ifergane, Tomer; Ray, Walker; van der Beek, Karine; Farbman, Lior |
| Abstract: | Land titling is expected to expand credit by making land pledgeable, but isolating this collateral channel empirically is difficult. We utilize English enclosures from 1750-1830 as a laboratory: privatization of "common waste" created newly mortgageable land, in contrast with "open-field" enclosures which largely reorganized already titled arable land. A stylized model with endogenous default predicts that an influx of newly pledgeable waste land lowers equilibrium collateral requirements, generating a local credit expansion but an increase in bankruptcies. Using a newly digitized universe of personal bankruptcies from the London Gazette, we find that the enclosure of common waste led to higher bankruptcies, particularly in industrial areas and during downturns. Bankruptcies are concentrated among industrial occupations with tight cash-flow cycles. In contrast, enclosures of open-field reduce bankruptcies. The results clarify a key collateral channel through which property reforms can deepen credit while increasing defaults. |
| Keywords: | Enclosures; Bankruptcy |
| JEL: | E44 G21 G33 K11 N13 N23 O11 O16 O43 Q15 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21455 |