By: |
Klein, Thilo |
Abstract: |
Microcredit, a financial tool providing uncollateralized loans to low-income
individuals, has seen a shift from joint-liability (JL) to individual liabil-
ity (IL) lending models. This article tests a theory explaining this shift,
focusing on borrowers matching into groups exposed to similar economic shocks
under JL, diminishing its effectiveness. I reconcile conflicting theo- retical
predictions and propose an empirical strategy to distinguish adverse selection
from moral hazard effects. Using data from Thailand, I find that increasing
diversity within borrower groups leads to a 10 percentage point improvement in
timely repayment. These results inform contract design and strategies to
reduce information asymmetries in lending practices |
Keywords: |
microcredit, joint liability, diversification, market design, stable matching, endogeneity, selection model, agriculture, Thailand |
JEL: |
C11 C31 C34 C36 C78 C57 D02 D47 D82 G21 O16 Q14 |
Date: |
2024 |
URL: |
https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:312189 |