nep-mfd New Economics Papers
on Microfinance
Issue of 2017‒04‒16
four papers chosen by
Aastha Pudasainee and Olivier Dagnelie


  1. Social Finance and the Commons By Camille Meyer
  2. Multidimensional Sales Incentives in CRM Settings: Customer Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Abstract: In many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about their customers are responsible for customer relationship management (CRM). Private information can help the firm by increasing sales efficiency, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to maximize own compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative outcomes due to private information — ex-ante customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post customer moral hazard after acquisition. This paper investigates potential positive and negative responses of a salesforce to managerial levers — multidimensional incentives for acquisition and retention performance and job transfers that affect the level of private information. Salespeople are responsible for managing customer relationships and compensated through multidimensional performance incentives for customer acquisition and maintenance at many firms. This paper investigates how a salesperson’s private information on customers affect their response to multiple dimensions of incentives. Using unique matched panel data that links individual salesperson performance metrics with customer level loans and repayments from a microfinance bank, we find that sales people indeed possess private information that is not available to the firm. Salespeople use the private information to engage in adverse selection of customers in response to acquisition incentives. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual purpose; they not only reduce loan defaults, but also moderate adverse selection in customer acquisition. Transfers that eliminate private information reduces the adverse selection effects of acquisition incentives, but increase loan defaults — customer moral hazard. Despite the potential negative adverse selection effects due to private information, the effort increasing effect of each of the three dimensions of sales management we investigate — acquisition incentive, maintenance incentive and transfers all have a net positive effect on firm value. Methodologically, the paper introduces an identification strategy to separate customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (loan repayment), by leveraging the multidimensional incentives of an intermediary (salesperson) responsible for both customer selection and repayment with private information about customers. By Minkyung Kim; K. Sudhir; Kosuke Uetake; Rodrigo Canales
  3. Addressing Financial Exclusion in France and India By Tara Nair
  4. SELF-HELP GROUPS AND THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN HOUSEHOLD DECISION MAKING: CASES OF SC, OBC AND MIXED GROUPS’ By Shashi Pandey

  1. By: Camille Meyer
    Abstract: The commons is a concept increasingly used by practitioners and social activists with the promise of creating new collective wealth (Bollier & Helfrich, 2014; De Angelis, 2003; Hardt & Negri, 2009; Klein, 2001). In recent years, a variety of scholarly research explained the different ways of organizing commons (Van Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007). To that end, many streams of inquiry have emerged in various areas: organization theory (Ansari et al. 2013; Fournier, 2013; Tedmanson et al. 2015), institutional economics (Hess, C. & Ostrom, 2011; Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2010), political philosophy and legal studies (Dardot & Laval, 2014; Holder and Flessas, 2008; Hardt & Negri, 2009), nonprofit studies (Aligica, 2016; Bushouse et al. 2016; Lohmann, 2014, 2016) and business ethics (Argandoña, 1998; Melé, 2009, 2012; O’Brien, 2009; Sison & Fontrodona, 2012; Solomon, 2004). However, these different theories are usually conceived and used separately. Empirical research on commons has mainly focused on natural resources at local and global levels (Ansari et al. 2013; Cody et al. 2015; Cox & Ross, 2011; Galaz et al. 2012; Ostrom, 1990, 2010; Poteete et al. 2010), and also on digital and scientific resources (Benkler, 2006; Boyle, 2008; Cook‐Deegan & Dedeurwaerdere, 2006; Coriat, 2015; Hess & Ostrom, 2011). Despite a long research tradition in local community organizations, there is little empirical scientific knowledge that uses the lens of the commons to study shared resources that are neither natural nor informational in nature. This dissertation aims to fill these gaps by analyzing social finance services and organizations from an interdisciplinary perspective. The aim is to understand whether communities can create financial commons. By analyzing the processes involved, the dissertation sheds light on the social and institutional components enabling the creation of human-made commons. We focus on community organizations linked to the solidarity economy movement in Brazil. Such movement aims to promote socio-economic alternative organizations, especially for poverty alleviation and inequality reduction.More specifically, the dissertation identifies the nature of two kinds of shared financial resources––microcredit services and complementary currencies––and looks at the functioning of community arrangements that provide them, the community components mobilized for creating commons organizations, and the institutional work strategies developed by intermediary organizations to adjust the scale of these social finance services.The dissertation is structured in four chapters, each of which addresses different research questions and uses different methods and units of analysis. The first chapter is conceptual and based on a literature review on complementary currencies in order to identify the commons dimensions of seven complementary currency systems. The second chapter is an in-depth single case study of Banco Palmas, a Brazilian community bank. This chapter analyzes the transformative power of governance on private goods when managed by self-governed grassroots organizations. Chapter three is a comparative case study of five community banks that focuses on the community components involved in creating commons as a grassroots response to contested market and state institutions. The final chapter focuses on the diffusion and institutionalization of social finance in Brazil and the role played by five intermediary organizations in this process.Starting from the observation that there is no definition of financial commons, Chapter 1 – Money and the Commons: Lessons from Complementary Currencies – proposes to assess the commons dimensions of monetary systems created and managed by local organizations. Specifically, we investigate the organizational features of seven complementary currency systems by making use of two main theoretical frameworks that are usually separate: the new commons in organization studies and the common good in business ethics. The findings show that these alternative monetary systems and organizations promote the common interest through the creation of new communities and can therefore be considered as commons according to the common good framework. Nevertheless, only systems relying on collective action and self-management fulfill the new commons framework. This allows us to suggest two new categories of commons: “social commons”, which fulfills both the new commons and the common good frameworks, and the “commercial commons”, which that fulfill the common good but not the new commons framework. Building on this, we define an ethos of the commons as a principle that consists in organizing commons practices through both collective organization and ethical concern for human flourishing.Chapter 2 - A Case Study of Microfinance and Community Development Banks (CDBs) in Brazil: Private or Common Goods? - looks at how governance mechanisms of self-managed community organizations affect the characteristics of microcredit services. Based on field research in Brazil, this chapter uses Elinor Ostrom’s design principles of successful self-governing common-pool resource organizations to analyze community banks’ microcredit systems. Our results suggest that private goods could be altered when governed by community self-managed enterprises. They become hybrid goods because they mix the characteristics of private and common goods. This change is facilitated by specific organizational arrangements, such as self-governance, that emerge from grassroots dynamics and the creation of collective-choice arenas. These arrangements help strengthen the inclusion properties of nonprofit microcredit services.In order to identify what components enable commons creation, we conduct a comparative case study of five Brazilian community banks in Chapter 3 – Building Commons in Community Enterprise: The Case of Self-Managed Microfinance Organizations. We analyze how community enterprises create commons whereas market and state institutions reproduce exclusion and inequalities. Our results suggest that four components are required to establish a new organization of commons: collective decision-making, community social control, servant leadership, and desire for social change. Building on this, we develop a model of commons organization and explain why these organizations are substitutes for existing marginalizing institutions. This study contributes to the literature by examining new elements for commons creation and shedding light on the emergence of new institutional arrangements for social change. Finally, after looking at commons institutional arrangements at local level in communities, we examine how commons organizations diffuse, institutionalize and organize in networks for consolidating their activities. Chapter 4 - Institutional Change and Diffusion in Institutional Plurality: The Case of Brazil’s Solidarity Finance Sector – explains how intermediary organizations help in this process. More precisely, we analyze the institutional work strategies deployed by five intermediary organizations in the Brazilian plural institutional context, where autonomous local state agencies and banks influence community banks' activities. We show how intermediary organizations support the institutionalization of community development banks (CDBs) through diffusing these organizations in different communities, performing external institutional work with governments and public banks at national and local levels, and accomplishing internal institutional work through structuring CDBs and CDB networks.
    Keywords: Social finance, Commons, Common good, Community enterprise, Organization theory, Institutional theory, Business ethics, Qualitative methods
    Date: 2017–04–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/249622&r=mfd
  2. Multidimensional Sales Incentives in CRM Settings: Customer Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Abstract: In many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about their customers are responsible for customer relationship management (CRM). Private information can help the firm by increasing sales efficiency, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to maximize own compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative outcomes due to private information — ex-ante customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post customer moral hazard after acquisition. This paper investigates potential positive and negative responses of a salesforce to managerial levers — multidimensional incentives for acquisition and retention performance and job transfers that affect the level of private information. Salespeople are responsible for managing customer relationships and compensated through multidimensional performance incentives for customer acquisition and maintenance at many firms. This paper investigates how a salesperson’s private information on customers affect their response to multiple dimensions of incentives. Using unique matched panel data that links individual salesperson performance metrics with customer level loans and repayments from a microfinance bank, we find that sales people indeed possess private information that is not available to the firm. Salespeople use the private information to engage in adverse selection of customers in response to acquisition incentives. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual purpose; they not only reduce loan defaults, but also moderate adverse selection in customer acquisition. Transfers that eliminate private information reduces the adverse selection effects of acquisition incentives, but increase loan defaults — customer moral hazard. Despite the potential negative adverse selection effects due to private information, the effort increasing effect of each of the three dimensions of sales management we investigate — acquisition incentive, maintenance incentive and transfers all have a net positive effect on firm value. Methodologically, the paper introduces an identification strategy to separate customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (loan repayment), by leveraging the multidimensional incentives of an intermediary (salesperson) responsible for both customer selection and repayment with private information about customers.
    By: Minkyung Kim (School of Management, Yale University); K. Sudhir (Cowles Foundation & School of Management, Yale University); Kosuke Uetake (School of Management, Yale University); Rodrigo Canales (School of Management, Yale University)
    Date: 2016–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2085&r=mfd
  3. By: Tara Nair (Gujarat Institute of Development Research - Gujarat University)
    Abstract: Malgré les différences importantes quant à la couverture des comptes bancaires, l’Inde et la France ont été victimes de l’exclusion de larges segments de la population des services bancaires et financiers. Alors que l’Inde tente d’accélérer le rythme de couverture des comptes bancaires par le biais de plusieurs initiatives, la France s’efforce de combler le fossé entre la couverture étendue des comptes bancaires et l’accès limité aux services bancaires grâce à des arrangements institutionnels au sein et en dehors du secteur bancaire. En Inde, les politiques récentes ont ouvert des voies aux acteurs de la microfinance et aux entreprises axées sur la technologie pour faire partie de la campagne d’intégration financière. La tendance à une plus grande participation du secteur privé aux activités financières est également visible en France, en dépit de la riche histoire des approches solidaires de l’inclusion sociale et du droit constitutionnel accordé à ses citoyens de détenir des comptes bancaires. L’expérience de la France montre clairement qu’assurer le droit d’avoir des comptes bancaires personnels ne conduira pas à un système bancaire inclusif ou à une capacité financière accrue des individus, en particulier des personnes économiquement vulnérables.
    Keywords: India,financial exclusion,banks,indebtedness,Inde,France,exclusion financière,banques,microcrédit,endettement
    Date: 2017–02–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01451918&r=mfd
  4. By: Shashi Pandey
    Abstract: The paper attempts to understand the role of women of self help groups (SHGS) of OBC, SC and Mixed membership in the household decision -making before joining the groups and ten years of after joining the groups. A sample of six self help groups belonging to OBC, SC and mixed group membership has been selected from three villages of Allahabad district of Uttar Pradesh. Data are collected through focus group discussions and interviews of members of SHGs. Analysis of data reveals that the role of women in making decisions like schooling of children specially for girls, family planning, casting votes, and decisions on moving alone to places located far from the village has increased after joining the group. It was also found that the SC women are participating more in household decision making in comparison to other groups. A trend of taking consensus decision making is emerging and domination of men in such decisions is slowly declining. Key Words: Self-Help Groups, Family Decision-Making and Women Empowerment. Policy
    Date: 2017–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vor:issues:2017-03-11&r=mfd

This nep-mfd issue is ©2017 by Aastha Pudasainee and Olivier Dagnelie. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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