By: |
Pushkar Maitra;
Sandip Mitra (Sampling and Official Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute);
Dilip Mookherjee;
Sujata Visaria (HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies (IEMS); Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) |
Abstract: |
We examine the distributive impacts of two alternative approaches to deliver
agricultural credit to smallholders: TRAIL (or trader-agent intermediated
lending), where local traders recommend village residents for individual
liability micro-leans, and GBL (or group-based lending), where households
self-select into groups and receive joint liability loans. We use data from a
field experiment in eastern India to estimate how the effects of these schemes
differ by economic (proxied by landownership) and social (proxied by caste and
religion) status of households. Our method accounts for endogenous selection
frequencies in each group and the treatment effects on farm income conditional
on selection, to estimate the impacts of each scheme on Atkinson-based
measures of welfare and inequality. We find that TRAIL loans increased farm
incomes for all land groups, but particularly for landless households. As a
result, across land groups, the TRAIL scheme generated significantly greater
welfare than the GBL scheme, irrespective of inequality aversion. The GBL
scheme generated larger effects among the socially disadvantaged minority
groups. This suggests that the efficiency and equity implications of the two
schemes might be different depending on how we partition households. |
Keywords: |
agricultural finance, agent based lending, group lending, distributive impacts |
Date: |
2017–03 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hku:wpaper:201741&r=mfd |