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on Microfinance |
| By: | Dan Brockington; Nicola Banks |
| Abstract: | Abstract This paper explores the growth of BRAC’s microcredit programme in Tanzania and some of the variety in and patterns of that growth. BRAC’s microfinance programme has grown dramatically and significantly within Tanzania and serves tens of thousands of women across large parts of the country. We examine quantitative data from April 2011 to April 2013, and use observation of groups and client and staff interviews from 2012-2013 to explore that success. We argue that the growth is based upon its effective marketing strategy and the fundamental usefulness of BRAC’s loans to its clients. But the findings also show that members were leaving at the time of the research. This could reflect a number of dissatisfactions that BRAC’s clients have with some aspects of BRAC’s microfinance products and the performance of its staff. The staff problems are confirmed by the staff themselves, both senior and junior. They are consistent with failings, across all of Tanzania, with respect to training and capacity in the finance and microfinance sectors generally. They also reflect the difficulties of cross-cultural adaptation, and learning to work in Tanzanian contexts (for Bangladeshi staff), and learning to work in a Bangladeshi organisation (for Tanzanian staff) that were current at the moment we conducted our observations. The interesting development, which has happened rapidly after this research concluded, is that BRAC’s staffing has changed significantly, with many more senior Tanzanian appointments. This may have considerable implications for the continued development of the organisation. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwp:bwppap:20214&r=all |
| By: | Arun G. Chandrasekhar; Cynthia Kinnan; Horacio Larreguy |
| Abstract: | Absence of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social ties may aid cooperation, but agents vary in network centrality, and this hierarchy may hinder cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects' partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners’ relative network position differentially matters across contracting environments. Socially close pairs cooperate even without enforcement; distant pairs do not. Pairs with unequal importance behave less cooperatively without enforcement. Thus capacity for cooperation depends on the underlying network. |
| JEL: | D03 D14 O16 Z13 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20259&r=all |
| By: | Michel Lelart (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - CNRS : UMR7322 - Université d'Orléans) |
| Abstract: | En matière de finance, la référence à l'éthique devient plus populaire que jamais. Cela tient naturellement aux crises financières qui se suivent en s'amplifiant. La finance est en effet de moins en moins éthique, mais certaines pratiques financières le sont restées davantage. C'est le cas de la finance qui se veut éthique et de la finance islamique. C'est aussi, mais à un moindre degré, de la finance solidaire et de la microfinance. Ce papier est aussi l'occasion de montrer ce que ces différentes variétés de pratiques financières ont de particulier et de les comparer. |
| Keywords: | éthique ; finance éthique ; finance islamique ; finance solidaire ; microfinance ; finance informelle |
| Date: | 2014–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01015484&r=all |
| By: | Yawo Agbényégan Noglo (MOSAIQUES-LAVUE - Université Paris X - Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense) |
| Abstract: | L'objet de cet article est d'étudier les déterminants économétriques de la performance de remboursement de groupes de crédit bénéficiant du financement auprès de deux institutions de micro-finance (WAGES et FUCEC) au Togo. Les résultats probit et négatif binomial issus des données de notre enquête de terrain effectué en 2008 dans les zones rurales et semi-urbaines de la région Maritime (hors Lomé) ont révélé que le monitoring (visites des pairs, activités similaires), le capital social (même sexe, même ethnie), les sources informelles de crédit (les banquiers ambulants, les tontines et les usuriers) et l'âge du groupe ont contribué à la bonne performance de remboursement des groupes avec un taux de 75%. |
| Keywords: | Micro-finance; prêt de groupe; performance de remboursement; déterminants; probit; binomial négatif; Togo |
| Date: | 2013–07–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01016185&r=all |