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on Microfinance |
| By: | Christian Ahlin |
| Abstract: | How has the microcredit movement managed to push financial frontiers? In a context in which borrowers vary in unobservable risk, Ghatak (1999, 2000) shows that group-based, joint liability contracts price for risk more accurately than individual contracts, provided that borrowers match homogeneously by risk-type. This more accurate risk-pricing can attract safe borrowers and rouse an otherwise dormant credit market. We extend the theory to include correlated risk, and show that borrowers will anti-diversify risk within groups, in order to lower chances of facing liability for group members. We directly test risk-matching and intra-group diversification of risk using data on Thai microcredit borrowing groups. We propose a non-parametric univariate methodology for assessing homogeneity of matching; structural multivariate analysis is carried out using Fox's (2008) matching maximum score estimator. We find evidence of a) homogeneous sorting by risk and b) risk anti-diversification within groups, though not along occupational lines. Thus there is evidence that group lending improves risk-pricing in this context and is part of the explanation of the rise in financial intermediation among the poor. However, the anti-diversification results reveal a potentially negative aspect of voluntary group formation and point to limitations of microcredit groups as risk-sharing mechanisms.[Working Paper No. 251] |
| Keywords: | microcredit, matching, credit markets, adverse selection, risk-sharing |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2588&r=mfd |
| By: | Dean Karlan; Jonathan Zinman; Margaret McConnell; Sendhil Mullainathan |
| Abstract: | We develop and test a simple model of limited attention in intertemporal choice. The model posits that individuals fully attend to consumption in all periods but fail to attend to some future lumpy expenditure opportunities. This asymmetry generates some predictions that overlap with models of present-bias. Our model also generates the unique predictions that reminders may increase saving, and that reminders will be more effective when they increase the salience of a specific expenditure. We find support for these predictions in three field experiments that randomly assign reminders to new savings account holders.[Working Paper No. 262] |
| Keywords: | IntertemporalConsumerChoice,Savings,Attention |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2587&r=mfd |
| By: | Martín Valdivia (Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE)); Dean Karlan |
| Abstract: | Los debates académicos y de políticas acerca de la actividad microempresarial se centran frecuentemente en las restricciones crediticias, asumiendo que los negocios se manejan de manera óptima dadas esas y otras restricciones. Los microempresarios, sin embargo, raramente tienen capacitación formal en gestión empresarial. Por su parte, un número creciente de instituciones de microfinanzas (IMF), en el Perú y el mundo, procura construir el capital humano de estos microempresarios para mejorar sus niveles de vida, contribuyendo a su misión de reducir la pobreza. Con ayuda de un diseño experimental, en este estudio medimos el impacto marginal de agregar un componente de capacitación en gestión empresarial a un programa de servicios financieros que atiende a mujeres microempresarias peruanas a través de la metodología de bancos comunales. Los grupos de tratamiento recibieron, por un período de entre uno y dos años, sesiones de capacitación de treinta a sesenta minutos de duración durante las reuniones habituales, semanales o mensuales, del banco comunal. Los grupos de control permanecieron como antes, reuniéndose con la misma frecuencia, pero únicamente para hacer pagos de préstamos y depósitos de ahorros. Encontramos evidencia de que el programa mejora el conocimiento de las microempresarias acerca de las buenas prácticas de gestión empresarial, pero los efectos sobre resultados clave como los ingresos, ganancias o nivel de empleo en los negocios son nulos o no del todo robustos. Sin embargo, las tasas de retención de las socias en las IMF sí aumentan significativamente. |
| JEL: | C93 D12 D13 D21 I21 J24 O12 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gad:doctra:dt57&r=mfd |