New Economics Papers
on Microfinance
Issue of 2009‒11‒21
four papers chosen by
Aastha Pudasainee and Olivier Dagnelie


  1. Female-owned firms in Latin America : characteristics, performance, and obstacles to growth By Bruhn, Miriam
  2. Women in Self Help Groups and Panchayti Raj Institutions: Suggesting Synergistic Linkages By Joy Deshmukh Ranadive
  3. Track Record of Financial Institutions in Assisting the Poor in Asia By Richard L Meyer
  4. Mutual Loan-Guarantee Societies in Monopolistic Credit Markets with Adverse Selection By Giovanni Busetta; Alberto Zazzaro

  1. By: Bruhn, Miriam
    Abstract: This paper examines the characteristics and performance of female-owned firms in Latin America. Data from firm surveys show that female-owned firms tend to be smaller than male-owned firms in terms of employees, sales, costs, and physical capital. Female-owned firms also have lower profits than male-owned firms, but for larger firms this difference disappears after controlling for labor and capital inputs. Medium-size and large female-owned firms are as productive as male-owned firms of the same size, although micro and small female-owned firms are less productive than male-owned firms. There is no evidence that the differences between female and male-owned firms are due to differences in access to finance or regulatory burdens. However, this paper finds a negative correlation between child care and household obligations and female-owned firm size and performance.
    Keywords: Access to Finance,Microfinance,Gender and Health,Gender and Law,E-Business
    Date: 2009–11–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5122&r=mfd
  2. By: Joy Deshmukh Ranadive
    Abstract: Questions about the processes of empowerment generated under each of these interventions and also suggests synergistic linkages between the two are raised.
    Keywords: women, Institutions, financially, families, Panchayati Raj, rural development, village, education, Empowerment, decision making, synergistic linkages, interventions, Self Help Groups, woman, child marriage, SHGs, micro finance
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2286&r=mfd
  3. By: Richard L Meyer
    Abstract: A variety of institutional forms of microfinance are being introduced in Asia including by the ADB-and financial institutions pursue different objectives, so it is difficult to assess how well microfinance is actually contributing to poverty alleviation. There is little systematic data available on which to make global or regional generalizations. The objective of this paper is to provide some insights into how well the industry is performing by summarizing and evaluating key studies and data for the region.
    Keywords: asia, microfinance, poverty alleviation, industry, financial institutions, global, regional, ADBI, Financial Sustainability, Vulnerability, drop outs, Policy Makers, Self-sustainability,
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2284&r=mfd
  4. By: Giovanni Busetta (Universit… di Messina, Department of Economics, Statistics, Mathematics, and Sociology V. Pareto); Alberto Zazzaro (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Department of Economics, MoFiR)
    Abstract: In many countries, Mutual Loan-Guarantee Societies (MLGSs) are assuming ever-increasing importance for small business lending. In this paper we provide a theory to rationalise the raison d'^etre of MLGSs. The basic intuition is that the foundation for MLGSs lies in the inefficiencies created by adverse selection, when borrowers do not have enough collateralisable wealth to satisfy collateral requirements and induce self-selecting contracts. In this setting, we view MLGSs as a wealth-pooling mechanism that allows otherwise inefficiently rationed borrowers to obtain credit. We focus on the case of large, complex urban economies where potential entrepreneurs are numerous and possess no more information about each other than do banks. Despite our extreme assumption on information availability, we show that MLGSs can be characterized by assortative matching in which only safe borrowers have an incentive to join the mutual society.
    Keywords: Collateral, Group formation, Mutual Loan Guarantee Society, Small business lending
    JEL: D82 G21
    Date: 2009–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wmofir:33&r=mfd

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