nep-mac New Economics Papers
on Macroeconomics
Issue of 2006‒03‒05
100 papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management
  1. Inflation Inertia and Monetary Policy Shocks By Julia Lendvai
  2. Inflation-Target Expectations and Optimal Monetary Policy By Sujit Kapadia
  3. Inflation Persistence, Fiscal Constraints and Non-cooperative Authorities Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union By Titiana Kirsanova; David Vines; Mathan Satchi; Simon Wren-Lewis
  4. Money Demand and Inflation in Madagascar By Koffie Ben Nassar
  5. Suppressed Inflation and Money Demand in Zimbabwe By Sònia Muñoz
  6. Fiscal Dominance and Inflation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo By Jean-Claude Nachega
  7. Macroeconomic Shocks and Central Bank Disclosure Policy: Is increased Transparency Necessarily Beneficial? By Phillip Lawler; Jonathan James
  8. Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles in an Oil-Producing Economy: The Case of Venezuela By Alfredo Baldini
  9. Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior By Micco, Alejandro; Panizza, Ugo
  10. Inflation and labor market flexibility: The squeaky wheel gets the grease By Loboguerrero, Ana Maria; Panizza, Ugo
  11. Monetary Policy Rules and Inflation Targets in Emerging Economies Evidence for Mexico and Israel By Rebeca I Muñoz Torres
  12. Multiple breaks in lending rate pass-through A cross country study for the euro area By Gianluca Di Lorenzo; Giuseppe Marotta
  13. Endettement public et redistribution en France de 1980 à 2004. By Jean-Marie Monnier; Bruno Tinel
  14. The Perils of Tax Smoothing: Sustainable Fiscal Policy with Random Shocks to Permanent Output By Kevin Joseph Carey; Evan Tanner
  15. Credit Frictions, Housing Prices and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules By Andrea Pescatori; Caterino Mendicino
  16. Harmonization of Domestic Consumption Taxes in Central and Western African Countries By Lubin Kobla Doe
  17. Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union By Tatiana Kirsanova; David Vines; Mathan Satchi; Simon Wren-Lewis
  18. On the Optimality of Delay in 'Monetary Policy as a Process of Search' By Doyle, Matthew
  19. Oil Price Shocks: Can They Account for the Stagflation in the 1970s? By Ben Hunt
  20. Procyclical Fiscal Policy: Shocks, Rules, and Institutions - A View From MARS By Paolo Manasse
  21. The Net Worth Approach to Fiscal Analysis: Dynamics and Rules By Mercedes da Costa; V. Hugo Juan-Ramon
  22. Declining Output Volatility in Germany: Impulses, Propagation, and the Role of the Monetary Policy By Ulrich Fritsche; Vladimir Kuzin
  23. Does Inflation in China Affect the United States and Japan? By Luke Willard; Tarhan Feyzioglu
  24. The Impact of Foreign Interest Rates on the Economy: The Role of the Exchange Rate Regime By Julian di Giovanni; Jay C. Shambaugh
  25. La crise monétaire turque de 2000/2001 : analyse de l'échec du plan de stabilisation par le change du FMI. By Jérôme Héricourt; Julien Reynaud
  26. Central Banking at the Periphery of the British Empire: Colonial Burma, 1886-1937 By Sean Turnell
  27. Inequality over the Business Cycle: Estimating Income Risk Using Micro-Data on Consumption By Giorgio Primiceri; Thijs van Rens
  28. Measuring inflation persistence: A structural time series approach By Maarten Dossche; Gerdie Everaert
  29. Inflation Persistence Revisited By Marika Karanassou; Dennis J Snower
  30. Towards a Measure of Financial Fragility By Oriol Aspachs; Charles A.E. Goodhart; Dimitrios P. Tsomocos; Lea Zicchino
  31. Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System By Bernd Hayo; Stefan Voigt
  32. Long-Run Productivity Shifts and Cyclical Fluctuations: Evidence for Italy By Silvia Sgherri
  33. Modeling Time and Macroeconomic Dynamics By Chryssi Giannitsarou; Alexia Anagnostopoulos
  34. Understanding the Evolution of World Business Cycles By M. Ayhan Kose; Christopher Otrok; Charles H. Whiteman
  35. The information content of the term structure of interest rates about future inflation – an illustration of the importance of accounting for a time-varying real interest rate and inflation risk premium By Christian Mose Nielsen
  36. Do Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences Help Explain Observed Inflation Outcomes? By Doyle, Matthew; Falk, Barry L.
  37. "The Fed and the New Monetary Consensus: The Case for Rate Hikes, Part Two" By L. Randall Wray
  38. Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How? By Alan Blinder
  39. Inflation Targets as Focal Points By Maria Demertzis; Nicola Viegi
  40. Effects of a Labor Market Reform on the Effectiveness of the Monetary Policy By Ana Paula Ribeiro; Alvaro Aguiar
  41. Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence By Athanasios Papadopoulos; Giuseppe Diana; Moise Sidiropoulos
  42. Financial Dollarization in Latin America By Robert Rennhack; Masahiro Nozaki
  43. "Breaking out of the Deficit Trap: The Case Against the Fiscal Hawks " By James K. Galbraith
  44. Trinidad and Tobago: The Energy Boom and Proposals for a Sustainable Fiscal Policy By Saqib Rizavi; Delia Velculescu
  45. Inflation prediction from the term structure: the Fisher equation in a multivariate SDF framework By Chiona Balfoussia; Mike Wickens
  46. Organizational Capital and Employment Fluctuations By Thijs van Rens
  47. Non-discretionary and automatic fiscal policy in the EU and the OECD By Jacques Mélitz
  48. Fiscal Policy and Financial Development By David Hauner
  49. Macroeconomic Effects of Social Security and Tax Reform in the United States By Dennis P. J. Botman; Tamim A. Bayoumi; Manmohan S. Kumar
  50. Testing for Asymmetries in the Preferences of the Euro-Area Monetary Policymaker By Manuel M F Martins; Alvaro Aguiar
  51. Pressure on Monetary Policy: the Italian Evidence By Chiara Dalle Nogare; Matilde Vassalli
  52. Aggregate Implications of Wealth Redistribution: The Case of Inflation* By Matthias Doepke; Martin Schneider
  53. Fiscal Policy and Financial Markets By Thomas Stratmann; Bernardin Akitoby
  54. "The Case for Rate Hikes: Did the Fed Prematurely Raise Rates?" By L. Randall Wray
  55. Providing Official Statistics for the Common Market and Monetary Union in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries: A Case for "Gulfstat" By Abdulrahman Al-Mansouri; Claudia Helene Dziobek
  56. The Global Impact of Demographic Change By Nicoletta Batini; Tim Callen; Warwick J. McKibbin
  57. Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes By Farhan Hameed
  58. Assessing Debt Sustainability in Emerging Market Economies Using Stochastic Simulation Methods By Philippe D Karam; Doug Hostland
  59. Are US Output Expectations Unbiased? A Cointegrated VAR Analysis in Real Time By Dimitrios Papaikonomou; Jacinta Pires
  60. Do ECB's statements steer short-term and long-term interest rates in the euro zone? By Marie Musard-Gies
  61. Testing the New Keynesian Phillips curve: a frequency domain approach By Luca Bindelli
  62. Long Run Behavior of Macroeconomy with Several Types of Agents: Non-self averaging phenomena in Macroeconomics By Masanao Aoki
  63. Measuring the Performance of Fiscal Policy in Russia By Antonio Spilimbergo
  64. Stylized Facts on Bilateral Trade and Currency Unions: Implications for Africa By Charalambos G. Tsangarides; Pierre Ewenczyk; Michal Hulej
  65. Inflation and Financial Depth By Bruce D. Smith; Mohsin S. Khan; A. Senhadji Semlali
  66. A model of bank capital, lending and the macro economy: Basel I versus Basel II By Lea Zicchino
  67. Incentives for public investment under fiscal rules By Smart, Michael; Mintz, Jack M.
  68. The Domestic and Global Impact of Japan's Policies for Growth By Nicoletta Batini; Papa M'B. P. N'Diaye; Alessandro Rebucci
  69. Financial Globalization and Fiscal Perfomance in Emerging Markets By David Hauner; Manmohan S. Kumar
  70. Boom-Bust Cycles in Housing: The Changing Role of Financial Structure By Calvin Schnure
  71. Credit Market Development, Asset Prices and Business Cycle By Caterina Mendicino
  72. Sectoral Balance Sheet Mismatches and Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities in Colombia, 1996-2003 By Johannes Wiegand; Juan Manuel Lima; Enrique Montes; Carlos Varela
  73. Beyond Purchasing Power Parity: Nominal exchange rates, output shocks and non linear/asymmetric equilibrium adjustment in Central Europe By Michael Arghyrou; Virginie Boinet; Christopher Martin
  74. Implications of Quasi-Fiscal Activities in Ghana By Mali Chivakul; Robert C. York
  75. Predictable Life-Cycle Shocks, Income Risk and Consumption Inequality By Giorgio E. Primiceri; Thijs van Rens
  76. Households' Response to Wealth Changes: Do Gains or Losses make a Difference? By Robert Paul Berben; Kerstin Bernoth; Mauro Mastrogiacomo
  77. Saving and Growth with Habit Formation: A Comment By Patrick Toche
  78. Persistence and Nominal Inertia in a Generalised Taylor Economy: How Loner Contracts Dominate Shorter Contracts By Engin Kara; Huw Dixon
  79. Can the Standard International Business Cycle Model Explain the Relation Between Trade and Comovement? By M. Ayhan Kose; Kei-Mu Yi
  80. Cycles And Banking Crisis By Ioannis Lazopoulos
  81. Inflation Differentials and Different Labor Market Institutions in the EMU By Ester Faia; Alessia Campolmi
  82. Central Banking by Committee By Anne Sibert
  83. New Keynesian Models and the test of Kydland and Prescott By Juan Paez-Farrell
  84. The Persistence and Rigidity of wages and prices By Boris Hofmann; Matthias Paustian
  85. Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances: Evidence from India By Poonam Gupta
  86. The Macroeconomics of Remittances: the Case of Tajikistan By Alexei Kireyev
  87. Chief Executives' Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Choices: International Evidence By Chiara Dalla Nogare; Roberto Ricciuti
  88. No More Free Beer Tomorrow? Economic policy and outcomes in Australia and New Zealand 1984-2003 By Tim Hazledine; John Quiggin
  89. Examining Ricardian Equivalence by estimating and bootstrapping a nonlinear dynamic panel model By Griet Malengier; Lorenzo Pozzi
  90. Time Consistent Policy in Markov Switching Models By Fabrizio Zampolli; Andrew Blake
  91. Real time Representations of the Output Gap By Kevin Lee; Emi Mise; Kalvinder Shields; Tony Garratt
  92. Macroeconomics volatility and human capital formation - an empirical analysis By Joost Vandewege; Freddy Heylen
  93. The Foregone Gains of Incomplete Portfolios By Monica Paiella
  94. Macroeconomics Uncertainty and Firm Leverage By Oleksandra Talavera; Christopher Baum; Andreas Stephan
  95. How Does Trade Openness Influence Budget Deficits in Developing Countries? By Tahsin Saadi-Sedik; Jean-Louis Combes
  96. Real-time output gaps in the estimation of Taylor rules: A red herring? By David Cobham; Christopher Adam
  97. On the order of integration of monthly US ex-ante and ex-post real interest rates new evidence from over a century of data By Menelaos Karananos; S.H Sekioua; N Zeng
  98. The asymmetric effect of the business cycle on the relation between stock market returns and their volatility By Peter N Smith; S Sorensen; M R Wickens
  99. Evidence and implications of zipf’s law for integrated economies By Bowen, H.; Munandar, H.; Viaene, J.M.
  100. Education, Growth and Income Inequality By Coen Teuling; Thijs van Rens
  1. By: Julia Lendvai (University of Namur)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:51&r=mac
  2. By: Sujit Kapadia (Balliol College University of Oxford)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:81&r=mac
  3. By: Titiana Kirsanova (University of Exeter); David Vines (Balliol College University of Oxford); Mathan Satchi (University of Kent); Simon Wren-Lewis (University of Exeter)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:17&r=mac
  4. By: Koffie Ben Nassar
    Keywords: Demand for money , Madagascar , Inflation , Prices , Money markets , Exchange rates , Interest rates , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–12–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/236&r=mac
  5. By: Sònia Muñoz
    Keywords: Inflation , Zimbabwe , Demand for money , Price controls , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–01–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/15&r=mac
  6. By: Jean-Claude Nachega
    Keywords: Inflation , Congo, Democratic Republic of the , Fiscal policy , Economic stabilization ,
    Date: 2005–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/221&r=mac
  7. By: Phillip Lawler (University of Wales, Swansea); Jonathan James (University of Wales, Swansea)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:27&r=mac
  8. By: Alfredo Baldini
    Keywords: Business cycles , Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de , Fiscal policy , Oil sector ,
    Date: 2005–12–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/237&r=mac
  9. By: Micco, Alejandro; Panizza, Ugo
    Abstract: This paper checks whether state-ownership of banks is correlated with lending behavior over the business cycle and finds that their lending is less responsive to macroeconomic shocks than the lending of private banks.
    Keywords: State-owned banks; Credit Cycle
    JEL: G21 H11 E44
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:61&r=mac
  10. By: Loboguerrero, Ana Maria; Panizza, Ugo
    Abstract: Inflation can “grease” the wheels of the labor market by relaxing downward wage rigidity but it can also increase uncertainty and have a negative “sand” effect. This paper studies the grease effect of inflation by looking at whether the interaction between inflation and labor market regulations affects how employment responds to changes in output. The results show that in industrial countries with highly regulated labor markets, the grease effect of inflation dominates the sand effect. In the case of developing countries, we rarely find a significant effect of inflation or labor market regulations and provide evidence indicating that this could be due to the presence of a large informal sector and limited enforcement of de jure labor market regulations.
    Keywords: Employment; Unemployment; Flexibility; Inflation; Deflation; Job Security
    JEL: E24 E31 E52
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:63&r=mac
  11. By: Rebeca I Muñoz Torres (University of Leicester)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:3&r=mac
  12. By: Gianluca Di Lorenzo; Giuseppe Marotta
    Abstract: A new approach to search for structural breaks in the retail lending rA new approach is proposed for searching multiple unknown breaks, possibly associated with EMU, in the short term business lending rate pass-through. Multiple breaks are detected in five out of nine countries of the euro area. The last break occurs much before the start of EMU for France, several months after that event for Austria, Italy and Germany. Long run pass-throughs decrease (except for France) sizably below one (except for the Netherlands); heterogeneity in the monetary transmission increases across countries. These results raise doubts on claims of a more effective monetary policy under EMU.
    Keywords: Interest rates; Monetary policy; Economic and Monetary Union; Cointegration analysis; Structural breaks
    JEL: E43 E52 E58 F36
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:modena:0602&r=mac
  13. By: Jean-Marie Monnier (CES-MATISSE); Bruno Tinel (CES-MATISSE)
    Abstract: This article deals with public debt dynamics in France. It also analyses several contemporary debates such as Ricardian equivalence, sustainability and budget balance decomposition. Public deficit is not necessarily the result of a Keynesian type of expansionary fiscal policy. It can also stem from insufficient tax resources creating a reversal bottom-up redistribution. The deficit would be then recessionary. In the latter case, expenditures' reduction can only worsen the macroeconomic environment.
    Keywords: Public debt, redistribution, sustainability, structural balance, fiscal policy, recessionary deficit.
    JEL: E62 H11 H63 I00
    Date: 2006–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r06006&r=mac
  14. By: Kevin Joseph Carey; Evan Tanner
    Keywords: Taxes , Economic forecasting , Fiscal policy , Production ,
    Date: 2005–11–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/207&r=mac
  15. By: Andrea Pescatori (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Caterino Mendicino (Stockholm School of Economics)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:67&r=mac
  16. By: Lubin Kobla Doe
    Keywords: Tax policy , Central African Economic and Monetary Community , West African Economic and Monetary Union , Africa , Consumption taxes , Value added tax , Excise taxes ,
    Date: 2006–01–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/8&r=mac
  17. By: Tatiana Kirsanova (University of Exeter); David Vines (Baliol College, University of Oxford); Mathan Satchi (University of Kent); Simon Wren-Lewis (University of Exeter)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:40&r=mac
  18. By: Doyle, Matthew
    Abstract: Caplin and Leahy (1996) show that, when central bankers learn about the economy by observing its response to policy shock, cautious monetary policy may be ineffectual as private agents correctly anticipate that today's interest rate cuts are likely to be followed by future cuts. The central banker has to account for this strategic response of private agents to small interest rate cuts by acting more aggressively than would otherwise be the case. Caplin and Leahy, however, do not examine whether or not this strategic behavior on the part of private agents represents a constraint on the ability of monetary policy to implement optimal investment outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to show that the kinds of strategic interactions between investors and the central banker highlighted by Caplin and Leahy affect only the policy rule and do not influence the investment outcome in equilibrium.
    Keywords: Monetary Policy, Strategic Delay
    JEL: E5
    Date: 2006–02–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12503&r=mac
  19. By: Ben Hunt
    Keywords: Oil prices , Monetary policy , Oil crisis , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–12–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/215&r=mac
  20. By: Paolo Manasse
    Date: 2006–02–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/27&r=mac
  21. By: Mercedes da Costa; V. Hugo Juan-Ramon
    Keywords: Fiscal policy , Fiscal management , Debt , Stabilization funds , Oil , Public debt , Asset ratio , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–01–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/17&r=mac
  22. By: Ulrich Fritsche (German Institute of Economic Research); Vladimir Kuzin (Goethe-University Frankfurt)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:70&r=mac
  23. By: Luke Willard; Tarhan Feyzioglu
    Keywords: Inflation , China , United States , Japan , Deflation , Trade , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–02–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/36&r=mac
  24. By: Julian di Giovanni; Jay C. Shambaugh
    Keywords: Exchange rate regimes , Interest rates , Economic growth , Monetary policy , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–02–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/37&r=mac
  25. By: Jérôme Héricourt (CES-TEAM); Julien Reynaud (CES-TEAM)
    Abstract: This article empirically investigates the failure of the Exchange Rate-Based Stabilisation Program started in Turkey in January 2000, under the IMF supervision. For that purpose, a Vectorial Error Correction Model integrating an uncovered interest rate parity modeling short term deviations is estimated. We use an unusual daily database to take into account the everyday commitment of monetary authorities for the crawling exchange rate. The results show the inability of the central bank to sustain the program, despite its seeming flexibility. Indeed, the monetary instrument apparently left to the central bank, namely the monetary base, was actually mainly market-determined.
    Keywords: Exchange rate crisis, monetary policy, exchange rate-based stabilization program, Turkey, VECM.
    JEL: E42 E52 F31
    Date: 2006–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla06009&r=mac
  26. By: Sean Turnell (Department of Economics, Macquarie University)
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to bring to light the efforts to fashion a central bank in Burma during the years in which the country was a province of British India. Throughout this period, which lasted from 1886 to 1937, questions of money and finance in Burma were mostly the preserve of the Raj in Calcutta and New Delhi. And, yet, it is a little-known fact that plans to establish a central bank for Burma were promoted throughout the colonial years by a succession of imperial officials. These plans, which reached their apogee in the 'monetary reform' advocacy that followed the Great Depression, were never realised in the colonial era. They were, however, indicative of a political economy discourse in colonial Burma that was more vigorous, and theoretically sophisticated, than is commonly supposed.
    Keywords: Monetary institutions, British Empire, Burma, Indian monetary reform
    JEL: N25 E42 E58
    Date: 2005–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mac:wpaper:0511&r=mac
  27. By: Giorgio Primiceri; Thijs van Rens
    Abstract: We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income, to evaluate the nature of increased income inequality in the 1980s and 90s. We decompose unexpected changes in family income into transitory and permanent, and idiosyncratic and aggregate components, and estimate the contribution of each component to total inequality. The model we use is a linearized incomplete markets model, enriched to incorporate risk-sharing while maintaining tractability. Our estimates suggest that taking risk sharing into account is important for the model fit; that the increase in inequality in the 1980s was mainly permanent; and that inequality is driven almost entirely by idiosyncratic income risk. In addition we find no evidence for cyclical behavior of consumption risk, casting doubt on Constantinides and Duffie’s (1995) explanation for the equity premium puzzle.
    Keywords: Consumption, inequality, risk, incomplete markets, business cycle
    JEL: D12 D31 D52 D91 E21 E32 G10
    Date: 2002–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:943&r=mac
  28. By: Maarten Dossche (National Bank of Belgium); Gerdie Everaert (Ghent University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:85&r=mac
  29. By: Marika Karanassou (Queen Mary - University of London and IZA); Dennis J Snower (Institute of World Economics IZA and CEPR)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:50&r=mac
  30. By: Oriol Aspachs; Charles A.E. Goodhart; Dimitrios P. Tsomocos; Lea Zicchino
    Abstract: This paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilbrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors and how the response of the economy to shocks relates to our measure of financial fragility. Finally we use panel VAR techniques to investigate the relationships between the factors that characterise financial fragility in our model, i.e. banks' probabilities of default and banks' profits - to a proxy of welfare.
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2006fe04&r=mac
  31. By: Bernd Hayo (Philipps University Marburg); Stefan Voigt (University of Kasel and ICER)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:57&r=mac
  32. By: Silvia Sgherri
    Keywords: Productivity , Italy , Business cycles , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–12–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/228&r=mac
  33. By: Chryssi Giannitsarou (University of Cambridge); Alexia Anagnostopoulos (London Business School)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:60&r=mac
  34. By: M. Ayhan Kose; Christopher Otrok; Charles H. Whiteman
    Keywords: Business cycles , Globalization , Group of Seven , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–11–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/211&r=mac
  35. By: Christian Mose Nielsen (Aalborg University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:86&r=mac
  36. By: Doyle, Matthew; Falk, Barry L.
    Abstract: Recent theoretical work shows that volatility in inflation and/or unemployment can generate time consistency problems when the central banker's loss function is asymmetric. Empirical work to date has been inconclusive. We show that previous evidence offered in support of the proposition that the volatility of unemployment helps explain inflation outcomes suffers from a spurious regression problem. Once this problem is controlled for, the evidence suggests that the volatility of unemployment does not help explain inflation outcomes. Inflation volatility can help explain inflation outcomes, but for this relationship to be due to asymmetries in central bank preferences it would require that central bankers dislike low inflation more than they dislike high inflation.
    JEL: E5
    Date: 2006–02–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12501&r=mac
  37. By: L. Randall Wray
    Abstract: From this paper's Preface, by Dr. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President: In Public Policy Brief No. 79, L. Randall Wray wrote about the Federal Reserve’s recent interest rate hikes that "the most charitable interpretation of the Fed’s policy change is that it appears to be premature."Wray marshaled a convincing array of data on payrolls, employment-to-population ratios, and other labor market indicators to show "that the current recovery has not yet attained the degree of labor market tightness that was common in previous recoveries," and therefore that the threat of inflation was minimal. Hence, the Fed, in raising rates, was unnecessarily jeopardizing the economy’s weak recovery. In this new brief, we learn about the flaws in the Fed’s thinking that have led to its frequent policy mistakes.Wray traces several strands of current central bank thinking back to their roots in the Fed’s internal discussions in the mid-1990s. Transcripts of these discussions have recently been released, a development that has yielded some disturbing and telling insights about the way in which monetary policy is formed. The situation of 1994 closely parallels that of current times. Unemployment was clearly above its lowest sustainable level, and inflation was low. Still, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and its chairman, Alan Greenspan, believed that interest rates had to be raised to keep prices in check. As it turned out, inflation stayed low, even as unemployment sank to levels previously believed to be inflationary. The Fed’s interest rate hikes proved to be unnecessary at best and counterproductive at worst. Not only is the current economic environment reminiscent of 1994, but so are contemporary justifications for recessionary policies.Wray lists six tenets of policy making common to both periods: transparency, gradualism, activism, low inflation as the only official goal, surreptitious targeting of distributional variables, and the neutral rate as the policy instrument to achieve these goals. The Fed would not be eager to espouse some of these principles publicly, but they were all discussed in committee meetings, as the recently released transcripts make clear—and there is no reason to think the Fed has changed its philosophy. Wray shows that this philosophy is convoluted. Fed officials claim that they are attempting to reach a neutral interest rate that neither provokes inflation nor causes recession. But they also say that they will not know the level of the neutral rate until they reach it. Little can be gained by pursuing such a chimerical goal. Moreover, even when the interest rate was far below its supposedly neutral level, the economy seemed to be free of inflation. Finally, the Fed seems to have painted itself into a corner by promising in advance a gradual series of interest rate increases. It is small wonder that the press finds the Fed’s public statements to be somewhat confusing and cryptic. The Fed transcripts shed light on the events of 1994 and those of the present day. I think that it is time for a new approach to monetary policy; this brief shows why.
    Date: 2004–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb80&r=mac
  38. By: Alan Blinder
    Abstract: Among the most notable, but least discussed, hallmarks of what I have called the "quiet revolution" in central banking practice (Blinder, 2004a) has been the movement toward making monetary policy decisions by committee. Until about a decade ago, most central banks had a single governor, who might or might not have been independent of the rest of the government. But since then, the United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Brazil, to name just a few, have opted to establish monetary policy committees (MPCs). In addition, the committee-based ECB replaced 12 central banks, most of which had previously been run by individual governors. Thus the existence of a pronounced worldwide trend is clear. In this paper, I discuss two questions. The first question is why. Why have so many central banks switched from individual to group decisionmaking? The second question is how. How should central banks make decisions and how should they communicate with the public, the government, and the markets?
    Keywords: central banks; committees; voting; communication.
    JEL: E58 D71 D78
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:092&r=mac
  39. By: Maria Demertzis (De Nederlandsche Bank and University of Amsterdam); Nicola Viegi (University of KwaZulu-Natal)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:52&r=mac
  40. By: Ana Paula Ribeiro (Universidade do Porto); Alvaro Aguiar (Universidade do Porto)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:25&r=mac
  41. By: Athanasios Papadopoulos (University of Crete); Giuseppe Diana (University Robert Schuman); Moise Sidiropoulos (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:58&r=mac
  42. By: Robert Rennhack; Masahiro Nozaki
    Keywords: Dollarization , Latin America , Monetary policy , Credit , Flexible exchange rates , Exchange rate depreciation ,
    Date: 2006–01–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/7&r=mac
  43. By: James K. Galbraith
    Abstract: From this paper's Preface, by Dr. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President: For some time, Levy Institute scholars have been engaged with issues related to the current account, government, and private sector balances. We have argued that the existing imbalances in these accounts are unsustainable and will ultimately present a serious challenge to the performance of the U.S. economy. Other scholars are also concerned, but for reasons that we do not share. They argue that the interest rate is determined by the supply and demand of saving.When the government reduces its saving, the total supply of saving falls, and the interest rate inevitably rises. The result, they say, is that interest-sensitive spending, and investment in particular, falls. Finally, these scholars say, less investment now necessarily implies less output in the future. In this new brief, Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith evaluates a recent article by William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag, two economists who regard this view of deficits as plausible. He forwards an alternative, Keynesian view. This alternative suggests that deficits can increase overall output, possibly enabling the government to spend more money without increasing the ratio of the debt to GDP. He casts doubt on the notion that the interest rate is determined by the supply and demand of saving, arguing that monetary policy plays a much larger role than Gale and Orszag allow for. Moreover, he writes, strong demand for goods and services is more important than the supply of capital in determining the pace of technological advance and the rate of growth of output per worker. Though he is skeptical about Gale and OrszagÕs theoretical framework, Galbraith calls attention to some important econometric findings in their paper. Gale and Orszag calculate the effects of deficits on the interest rate. Consistent with GalbraithÕs view, monetary policy turns out to be a major determinant of long-term interest rates. When interest rates are measured as the current cost of funds, Gale and Orszag find that deficits have no significant impact on interest rates. GalbraithÕs theoretical view of interest rate determination, together with Gale and OrszagÕs empirical findings, constitutes a powerful rebuttal of the reflexively antideficit view. Recent economic history suggests that this rebuttal is plausible. The recent increase in the U.S. federal deficit has not yet resulted in high interest rates. Interest rates in Japan, where deficits have been very large, remain at rock-bottom levels. The Levy Institute continues to believe that, together, unsustainable economic imbalances amount to one of the nationÕs most pressing issues, as we believe our Strategic Analysis series has documented. As Galbraith demonstrates, however, some observers are placing an undue emphasis on government deficit reduction, as if the government were the source of all that ails the economy. A more balanced approach would take into account the pernicious effects of excessive private debt and the need to devalue the dollar. We believe that our readers, especially those who follow the Strategic Analysis series, will find this brief to be a helpful look at another facet of the complex and knotty deficits problem.
    Date: 2005–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb81&r=mac
  44. By: Saqib Rizavi; Delia Velculescu
    Keywords: Oil revenues , Trinidad and Tobago , Fiscal policy ,
    Date: 2005–10–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/197&r=mac
  45. By: Chiona Balfoussia (University of York); Mike Wickens (University of York and CEPR)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:16&r=mac
  46. By: Thijs van Rens
    Abstract: In this paper I present a model in which production requires two types of labor inputs: regular productive tasks and organizational capital, which is accumulated by workers performing organizational tasks. By allocating more workers from organizational to productive tasks, firms can temporarily increase production without hiring. The availability of this intensive margin of labor adjustment, in combination with adjustment costs along the extensive margin (search frictions, firing costs, training costs), makes it optimal to delay employment adjustments. Simulations indicate that this mechanism is quantitatively important even if only a small fraction of workers perform organizational tasks, and explains why the hiring rate is persistent and why employment is slow to recover after the end of a recession.
    Keywords: Business cycles, labor market, organizational capital, jobless recoveries
    JEL: D92 E24 J41 J64
    Date: 2004–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:944&r=mac
  47. By: Jacques Mélitz (University of Strathclyde)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:78&r=mac
  48. By: David Hauner
    Date: 2006–02–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/26&r=mac
  49. By: Dennis P. J. Botman; Tamim A. Bayoumi; Manmohan S. Kumar
    Keywords: Fiscal management , United States , Social security , Tax reforms , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–11–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/208&r=mac
  50. By: Manuel M F Martins (Universidade do Porto); Alvaro Aguiar (Universidade do Porto)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:41&r=mac
  51. By: Chiara Dalle Nogare; Matilde Vassalli
    Abstract: Following Havrilesky’s seminal work (1995) and its extension by Maier, Sturm and de Haan (2002) we construct a monthly index of external influences on Bank of Italy’s conduct for the period 1984-1998. This paper aims at describing the index of overall pressure on Italian monetary policy and the five sub-indexes of which it is composed, namely the index of political pressure, the index of pressure coming from the economic sectors, the index of pressure coming from trade unions, the index of pressure coming from the financial sector and the index of pressure coming from other sources.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0407&r=mac
  52. By: Matthias Doepke (UCLA); Martin Schneider (NYU and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)
    Date: 2006–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:uclawp:846&r=mac
  53. By: Thomas Stratmann; Bernardin Akitoby
    Keywords: Fiscal policy , Risk premium , Bond markets , Emerging markets , Financial systems , Government expenditures , Revenues ,
    Date: 2006–01–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/16&r=mac
  54. By: L. Randall Wray
    Abstract: From this paper's Preface, by Dr. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President: For a time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) seemed to have learned from the mistakes of the past. Instead of taking good economic performance as a sign of incipient inflation, Chairman Alan Greenspan kept interest rates relatively low in the late 1990s, even as unemployment plummeted.Many commentators worried that the FOMC's unusually easy stance would usher in a period of runaway inflation, but inflation stayed in the 2 to 3 percent range. Now, with scant evidence of an inflationary threat, Greenspan and his committee seem intent on raising interest rates. Greenspan argues that the current anemic expansion is "self-sustaining" and no longer needs the support of low interest rates. In this new brief, Levy Institute Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray evaluates the Fed's concern about a coming inflation and its decision to begin raising interest rates. He begins with an examination of key market developments that might signal inflation.Most economists worry about inflation when labor markets begin to tighten and employees gain the bargaining power necessary to demand pay raises.Wray marshals an array of evidence demonstrating that workers can only wish for such conditions. The economy has created no net new jobs since the beginning of the current presidential term. To match the 64.4 percent proportion of adults who held jobs during the Clinton era, the economy would have to generate four million new positions. It is clear that the job market will not be a source of inflation any more than it was during the Clinton boom.
    Date: 2004–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb79&r=mac
  55. By: Abdulrahman Al-Mansouri; Claudia Helene Dziobek
    Keywords: Statistics , Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf , Bahrain , Kuwait , Oman , Qatar , Saudi Arabia , United Arab Emirates , Data collection , Data analysis , Monetary unions ,
    Date: 2006–02–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/38&r=mac
  56. By: Nicoletta Batini; Tim Callen; Warwick J. McKibbin
    Keywords: Capital flows , Japan , United States , Aging , Population , Savings , Investment , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–01–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/9&r=mac
  57. By: Farhan Hameed
    Keywords: Fiscal transparency , Credit , Fiscal management , Corruption , Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes ,
    Date: 2005–12–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/225&r=mac
  58. By: Philippe D Karam; Doug Hostland
    Keywords: Debt , Emerging markets , Risk premium , Fiscal policy , Fiscal management , Capital flows , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–12–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/226&r=mac
  59. By: Dimitrios Papaikonomou (Ministry of Finance Greece); Jacinta Pires (University of Oxford)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:59&r=mac
  60. By: Marie Musard-Gies (University of Orleans)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:56&r=mac
  61. By: Luca Bindelli (University of Lausanne)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:69&r=mac
  62. By: Masanao Aoki
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:uclaol:375&r=mac
  63. By: Antonio Spilimbergo
    Date: 2006–01–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/241&r=mac
  64. By: Charalambos G. Tsangarides; Pierre Ewenczyk; Michal Hulej
    Keywords: Bilateral trade , Africa , Monetary unions , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–02–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/31&r=mac
  65. By: Bruce D. Smith; Mohsin S. Khan; A. Senhadji Semlali
    Abstract: Prepayment required for individual copies. An annual subscription is $375.00 a year. It includes 12 monthly shipments and priority mail delivery. The Stock No. for the subscription is WPEA.
    Keywords: Inflation , Markets , Economic models ,
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/44&r=mac
  66. By: Lea Zicchino (Bank of England)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:88&r=mac
  67. By: Smart, Michael; Mintz, Jack M.
    Abstract: The authors explore the relationship between fiscal rules and capital budgeting. The current budgetary approach to limit deficits to a fixed portion of GDP or to balance budgets could undermine incentives to invest in public capital with long-run returns since politicians concerned about electoral prospects would favor expenditures providing immediate benefits to their voters. An alternative budgetary approach is to separate capital from current revenues and expenditures and relax fiscal constraints by allowing governments to finance capital expenditures with debt, as suggested by the golden rule approach to capital funding. But the effect of capital budgeting would be to provide opportunities to politicians to escape the fiscal rule constraints by shifting current expenditures into capital accounts that are difficult to measure properly, thereby leading to increased borrowing. As an alternative, the authors propose a modified golden rule limiting debt finance to a proportion of the government ' s investment in self-liquidating assets.
    Keywords: Public Sector Economics & Finance,Investment and Investment Climate,Economic Theory & Research,Public & Municipal Finance,Urban Economics
    Date: 2006–03–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3860&r=mac
  68. By: Nicoletta Batini; Papa M'B. P. N'Diaye; Alessandro Rebucci
    Keywords: Economic Growth , Japan , Economic policy , External debt , Fiscal management , Productivity , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–11–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/209&r=mac
  69. By: David Hauner; Manmohan S. Kumar
    Keywords: Emerging markets , Fiscal reforms , Fiscal management , Globalization , Interest rate differential , Financial stability ,
    Date: 2005–11–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/212&r=mac
  70. By: Calvin Schnure
    Keywords: Financial sector , Financial stability ,
    Date: 2005–10–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/200&r=mac
  71. By: Caterina Mendicino (Stockholm School of Economics)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:74&r=mac
  72. By: Johannes Wiegand; Juan Manuel Lima; Enrique Montes; Carlos Varela
    Keywords: Risk premium , Colombia , Data analysis , Financial systems , Public debt ,
    Date: 2006–01–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/5&r=mac
  73. By: Michael Arghyrou (Cardiff Business School); Virginie Boinet (Brunel Business School); Christopher Martin (Brunel Business School)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:35&r=mac
  74. By: Mali Chivakul; Robert C. York
    Keywords: Fiscal policy , Ghana , Fiscal management , Fiscal reforms , Energy , Public sector , Private sector ,
    Date: 2006–02–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/24&r=mac
  75. By: Giorgio E. Primiceri; Thijs van Rens
    Abstract: Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results. First, we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 90s. Second, we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent with models of heterogeneous income profiles.
    Keywords: Consumption, inequality, risk, incomplete markets, heterogeneous income profiles
    JEL: D12 D31 D52 D91 E21
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:945&r=mac
  76. By: Robert Paul Berben; Kerstin Bernoth; Mauro Mastrogiacomo
    Abstract: We estimate the excess impact of financial asset capital losses relative to gains on household active savings and durable goods consumption in the Netherlands. The sample period covers both the stock market boom during the 90’s, and the bear period afterwards. The results suggest that households react more to capital losses than to capital gains. Failing to take into account this asymmetry may seriously bias the estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
    Keywords: Household savings; wealth effect; capital gains
    JEL: D12 E21
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:090&r=mac
  77. By: Patrick Toche (University of Macao)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:11&r=mac
  78. By: Engin Kara (University of York); Huw Dixon (University of York)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:82&r=mac
  79. By: M. Ayhan Kose; Kei-Mu Yi
    Date: 2005–11–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/204&r=mac
  80. By: Ioannis Lazopoulos (Keele University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:15&r=mac
  81. By: Ester Faia (Department of Economics); Alessia Campolmi (Department of Economics)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:80&r=mac
  82. By: Anne Sibert
    Abstract: There is a small, but growing, economics literature on the importance and effects of having monetary policy made by a committee, rather than by an individual. Complimenting this is an older and larger body of literature on groups in the other social sciences, particular in social psychology. This paper provides a review of some of this work, focusing on two important features of committees: the effect of their size on performance and whether or not they are more moderate than the members who make them up. Individual members of a committee acquire idiosyncratic information which the committee uses to make a decision. A result of the famous Condorcet Jury Theorem is that larger committees have more resources, in the form of more information, and are thus better than smaller ones. This result depends on individuals being willing to work as hard at gathering information when they are members of a committee as they would be willing to work if they were acting alone. The economics literature suggests that this may not hold; that individual members may have an incentive to shirk. This phenomenon of a member withholding effort is called social loading in the social pyschology literature. Studies stretching over 125 years document its existence and suggest that it becomes more important as committee size increases and that it disappears when individual members contributions can be identified and evaluated. The Condorcet Jury Theorem also depends on the committee being able to aggregate members information and on members being willing to truthfully reveal their information. An excessively formal meeting structure may cause the former to fail to hold; committee members with different objectives may cause the latter not to be true. As a result of shirking and coordination problems, smaller committees may be better than larger ones and the optimal size for a committee is an empirical issue. Committees pool members information and views, thus it seems that monetary policy made by a committee should be more moderate than monetary policy made by a single individual. However, several hundred studies demonstrate that belonging to a committee polarizes its members and, hence, committees may be more extreme than individuals. A particularly harmful form of group polarization occurs when committee members striving for consensus causes them to stop paying suffcient attention to alternative courses of action. In this case the committee may make terrible decisions that none of its members would have made on their own. The results of the literature on committee size and committee polarization suggest that the ideal monetary policy committee may not have many more than five members. It should have a well defined objective and it should publish the votes of its members. It should be structured so that members do not act as part of a group, perhaps by having short terms in office and members from outside the central bank. External scrutiny of the decision-making process should be encouraged.
    Keywords: committees; monetary policy.
    JEL: E58 C92 D71
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:091&r=mac
  83. By: Juan Paez-Farrell (Cardiff University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:83&r=mac
  84. By: Boris Hofmann (Deutsche Bundesbank); Matthias Paustian (Germany and Bonn Graduate School)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:71&r=mac
  85. By: Poonam Gupta
    Keywords: Workers remittances , India , Balance of payments ,
    Date: 2005–12–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/224&r=mac
  86. By: Alexei Kireyev
    Date: 2006–01–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/2&r=mac
  87. By: Chiara Dalla Nogare; Roberto Ricciuti
    Abstract: According to reputational models of Political Economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 59 countries over the period 1975-1997, using government spending, revenue, surplus and social and welfare spending as policy choice variables. We use both cluster analysis and panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term limited chief executives with respect to those who are not. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results on US states and international data.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0411&r=mac
  88. By: Tim Hazledine (Auckland University); John Quiggin (Department of Economics, University of Queensland)
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsm:pubpol:p05_4&r=mac
  89. By: Griet Malengier (Ghent University); Lorenzo Pozzi (Ghent University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:61&r=mac
  90. By: Fabrizio Zampolli (Bank of England); Andrew Blake (Bank of England)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:2&r=mac
  91. By: Kevin Lee (University of Leicester); Emi Mise (University of Leicester); Kalvinder Shields (Melbourne); Tony Garratt (Birkbeck College)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:26&r=mac
  92. By: Joost Vandewege (Ghent University); Freddy Heylen (Ghent University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:84&r=mac
  93. By: Monica Paiella (Bank of Italy, Research Department)
    Abstract: This paper estimates a lower bound to the foregone gains of incomplete portfolios, which are in turn a lower bound to the (unobserved) entry costs that could rationalize non-participation to financial markets. My estimates provide a heuristic test for the cost-based explanation of limited financial market participation: high estimates would imply implausibly high participation costs. Using the CEX and assuming isoelastic utility and a relative risk aversion of 3 or less, for the stock market I estimate an average lower bound ranging between 0.7 and 3.3 percent of consumption. Since annual total (observable plus unobservable) participation costs are likely to exceed these bounds, the cost-based explanation is not rejected by this test.
    Keywords: intertemporal consumption model, financial market participation, household portfolio allocation, non-proportional cost of participation, near-rationality
    JEL: G11 D12 E21
    Date: 2006–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:156&r=mac
  94. By: Oleksandra Talavera (DIW Berlin); Christopher Baum (Boston College); Andreas Stephan (European University Viadrina DIW Berlin)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:72&r=mac
  95. By: Tahsin Saadi-Sedik; Jean-Louis Combes
    Keywords: Trade policy , Budget deficits , Terms of trade , Developing countries ,
    Date: 2006–01–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/3&r=mac
  96. By: David Cobham (Heriot-Watt University); Christopher Adam (University of Oxford)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:42&r=mac
  97. By: Menelaos Karananos (University of Newcastle); S.H Sekioua (University of Newcastle); N Zeng (University of Newcastle)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:21&r=mac
  98. By: Peter N Smith (University of York); S Sorensen (University of York); M R Wickens (University of York)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:47&r=mac
  99. By: Bowen, H.; Munandar, H.; Viaene, J.M.
    Abstract: This paper considers the distribution of output and productive factors among members of a fully integrated economy (FIE) in which there is free mobility of goods and factors among members and whose members share the same technology. We first demonstrate that, within an FIE, each member’s share of total FIE output and its shares of total FIE stocks of productive factors will be equal. If economic policies are largely harmonized across FIE members then this “equal-share” property implies that the growth in any member’s shares of FIE output and factor stocks can be taken to be a random outcome. Building on Gabaix’s (1999) result for the distribution of city sizes we argue that, if output and factor shares among FIE members evolve as geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound, then the limiting distribution of these shares will exhibit Zipf’s law. We empirically examine for Zipf’s law for the distribution of output and factor shares across two (presumably) integrated economies: the 51 U.S. states and 14 European Union (E.U.) countries. Our empirical findings strongly support Zipf’s law with respect to the distribution of output, physical capital and human capital among U.S. states and among E.U. countries. These findings imply that models used to characterize the growth of members within an FIE should embody a key assumption: that the underlying growth process of shares is random and homogeneous across FIE members.
    Keywords: growth, economic integration, Zipf’s law
    JEL: E13 F15 F21 F22 O57
    Date: 2006–02–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vlg:vlgwps:2006-03&r=mac
  100. By: Coen Teuling; Thijs van Rens
    Abstract: Estimates of the e¤ect of education on GDP (the social return to education)have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return. We present a simple explanation that combines two ideas: imperfect substitution between worker types and endogenous skill biased technological progress. When types of workers are imperfect substitutes, the supply of human capital is negatively related to its return, and a higher education level compresses wage di¤erentials. We use cross-country panel data on income inequality to estimate the private return and GDP data to estimate the social return. The results show that the private return falls by 2 percentage points when the average education level increases by a year, which is consistent with Katz and Murphy's [1992] estimate of the elasticity of substitution between worker types. We find no evidence for dynamics in the private return, and certainly not for a reversal of the negative e¤ect as described in Acemoglu [2002]. The short run social return equals the private return.
    Keywords: Growth, inequality, education, private and social return to schooling, compression effect
    JEL: E20 J24 O10 O15
    Date: 2001–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:942&r=mac
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