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on Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty |
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Issue of 2019‒09‒02
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Subhasish M. Chowdhury (Department of Economics, University of Bath); Philip J. Grossman (Department of Economics, Monash University); Joo Young Jeon (Department of Economics, University of Reading) |
| Abstract: | Research on altruistic payoffs and the related payoff anticipation and related gender differences is limited. Using data from Chowdhury & Jeon (2014) who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to anticipate the amount given in a dictator game, we find that the show-up fee has a positive effect on dictator giving for both genders. While female dictators are more generous than males, male recipients anticipate higher amounts than the amount male dictators give. The show-up fee affects the social-type of female dictators, and the anticipation about dictator social-type by the male recipients. |
| Keywords: | dictator-game; altruism; anticipatory-belief; gender |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D84 J16 |
| Date: | 2019–08–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2019-13&r=all |
| By: | Joao Guerreiro; Sergio Rebelo; Pedro Teles |
| Abstract: | We study the immigration policy that maximizes the welfare of the native population in an economy where the government designs an optimal redistributive welfare system and supplies public goods. We show that when immigrants can be excluded from the welfare system, free immigration is optimal. It is also optimal to use the tax system to encourage the immigration of high-skill workers and discourage that of low-skill workers. When immigrants and natives must be treated alike, it is optimal to ban low-skill immigration and have free immigration for high-skill workers. However, high-skill workers may choose not to immigrate when there are heavy taxes levied on all high-skill workers, natives and immigrants alike. We use a calibrated version of the model to study how the optimal immigration policy responds to changes in the skill premia in the U.S. and abroad. |
| JEL: | F22 H21 |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26154&r=all |
| By: | Alberto Chong (Department of Economics, Georgia State University, USA); Paul Haslam (University of Ottawa, Canada) |
| Abstract: | Using firm-level data for five countries in Latin America, we find a negative and statistically significant link between social conflict in rural areas and ownership of mines. We apply an instrumental variables approach and find that this link may be causal. The instrument employed is altitude of the mine location—which we claim is uncorrelated with the dependent variable, firm ownership—but is correlated with social conflict. This variable serves as an ideal instrument, as it complies with the exclusion restriction. Our results hold to a formal test of changes in specification. |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1909&r=all |
| By: | Mark R. Rosenzweig; Junsen Zhang |
| Abstract: | Obesity is an important global health problem. Although obesity is not directly related to access to health care or constrained by resource deprivation, overweight status is predominantly found in poor, less-educated populations. This paper seeks to identify the causal role of schooling in affecting obesity among children and adolescents, using new estimation methods that exploit unique panel data on young twins in China. The estimates indicate that higher levels of schooling negatively affect being overweight and positively affect healthy behavior, with a large component of the causal effects due to increased information on the benefits of maintaining a healthy weight. There is also evidence that the higher-income associated with increased schooling increases incentives to invest in health. |
| JEL: | I12 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26089&r=all |