nep-ltv New Economics Papers
on Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty
Issue of 2018‒10‒08
three papers chosen by



  1. How Common Are Bad Bosses? By Artz, Benjamin; Goodall, Amanda H.; Oswald, Andrew J.
  2. The Ins and Outs of Involuntary Part-time Employment By Borowczyk-Martins, Daniel; Lalé, Etienne
  3. Inheritance Taxation and Wealth Effects on the Labor Supply of Heirs By Fabian Kindermann; Lukas Mayr; Dominik Sachs

  1. By: Artz, Benjamin (University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh); Goodall, Amanda H. (Cass Business School); Oswald, Andrew J. (University of Warwick)
    Abstract: Bosses play an important role in workplaces. Yet little is currently known about a foundational question. Are the right people promoted to be managers, team leaders, and supervisors? Gallup data and the famous Peter Principle both suggest that incompetent bosses are likely to be all around us. This paper's results uncover a different, and more nuanced, conclusion. By taking data on 35 nations, the paper provides the first statistically representative international estimates of the extent to which employees have 'bad bosses'. Using a simple, and arguably natural, measure, the paper calculates that approximately 13% of Europe's workers have a bad boss. These bosses are most common in the Transport sector and large organizations. The paper discusses its methodology, performs validation checks, and reviews other data and implications.
    Keywords: job satisfaction, leadership, bosses, well-being
    JEL: J28 I31 M54
    Date: 2018–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11825&r=ltv
  2. By: Borowczyk-Martins, Daniel (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School); Lalé, Etienne
    Abstract: We develop an adjustment procedure to construct U.S. monthly time series of involuntary part-time employment stocks and flows from 1976 until today. Armed with these new data, we provide a comprehensive account of the dynamics of involuntary part-time work. Transitions from full-time to involuntary part-time employment dominate this dynamics, spiking up at recessions' onsets and persisting well into recovery periods. On the other hand, weaknesses in job creation contribute little to these fluctuations. Our data and findings are relevant to inform a broader assessment of labor market performance and to develop models of cyclical labor adjustment.
    Keywords: Involuntary part-time employment; Unemployment; Labor market flows; Business cycles
    JEL: E24 E32 J21
    Date: 2018–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2018_009&r=ltv
  3. By: Fabian Kindermann (Universität Bonn); Lukas Mayr (University of Essex); Dominik Sachs (University of Munich)
    Abstract: The taxation of bequests can have a positive impact on the labor supply of heirs through wealth effects. This leads to an increase in future labor income tax revenue on top of direct bequest tax revenue. We first show in a theoretical model that a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on existing estimates for the reduction in earnings after wealth transfers, fails: the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income is not a sufficient statistic for the calculation of this effect because (i) heirs anticipate the reduction in net bequests and adjust their labor supply already prior to inheriting, and (ii) when bequest receipt is stochastic, even those who ex post end up not inheriting anything respond ex ante to the implied change in their distribution of net bequests. We quantitatively elaborate the size of the overall revenue effect due to labor supply changes of heirs by using a state of the art life-cycle model that we calibrate to the German economy. Besides the joint distribution of income and inheritances, quasi-experimental evidence regarding the size of wealth effects on labor supply is a key target for this calibration. We find that for each Euro of bequest tax revenue the government mechanically generates, it obtains an additional 9 Cents of labor income tax revenue (in net present value) through higher labor supply of (non-) heirs.
    Keywords: bequests, taxation, life-cycle, Labor Supply, dynamic scoring
    JEL: C68 D91 H22 H31 J22
    Date: 2018–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2018-067&r=ltv

General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.