| By: |
Andrew Beauchamp (Boston College);
Geoffrey Sanzenbacher (Boston College);
Shannon Seitz (Analysis Group);
Meghan Skira (University of Georgia) |
| Abstract: |
Why do some men father children outside of marriage but not provide support?
Why are some single women willing to have children outside of marriage when
they receive little or no support from unmarried fathers? Why is this behavior
especially common among blacks? To shed light on these questions, we develop
and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility,
and child support. We consider the extent to which low earnings and a shortage
of single men relative to single women among blacks can explain the prevalence
of deadbeat dads and non-marital childbearing. We estimate the model by
indirect inference using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979. We simulate three distinct counterfactual policy environments: perfect
child support enforcement, eliminating the black-white earnings gap, and
equalizing black-white population supplies (and therefore gender ratios). We
nd perfect enforcement reduces non-marital childbearing dramatically,
particularly among blacks; over time it translates into many fewer couples
living with children from past relationships, and therefore less deadbeat
fatherhood. Eliminating the black-white earnings gap reduces the marriage rate
dierence between blacks and whites by 29 to 43 percent; black child poverty
rates fall by nearly 40 percent. Finally equalizing gender ratios has little
effect on racial differences in marriage and fertility. |
| Keywords: |
Marriage, divorce, fertility, single motherhood, non-marital childbearing, employment, dynamic discrete choice, indirect inference |
| JEL: |
C51 C61 D12 D13 J12 J13 J22 |
| Date: |
2014–07–22 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:859&r=ltv |