nep-ltv New Economics Papers
on Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty
Issue of 2006‒03‒05
four papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. A Study on Linear Inequality Representation of Social Welfare Functions By Keisuke Sato; Yoshitsugu Yamamoto
  2. Theory and evidence on the glass ceiling effect using matched worker-firm data By Mohamed Jellal; Christophe Nordman; François-Charles Wolff
  3. Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment By Lindbeck, Assar; Palme, Mårten; Persson, Mats
  4. Religion and education gender gap: Are Muslims different? By Mandana, Hajj; Panizza, Ugo

  1. By: Keisuke Sato (University of Tsukuba, Japan); Yoshitsugu Yamamoto (University of Tsukuba, Japan)
    Abstract: This paper presents a study on the recently proposed linear inequality representation of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions (ASWFs). We first give an alternative proof of the ASWF integer linear inequality representation theorem, and then show several sufficient conditions on preference domains for the linear inequalities of the representation to form integral polytopes. We also show that a given probabilistic ASWF induces a real vector satisfying the inequalities.
    Keywords: Social welfare function; Linear inequality representation; Extreme points; Probabilistic social welfare function; Integral polytope
    JEL: D71
    Date: 2006–02–21
  2. By: Mohamed Jellal (Université Mohammed V, Rabat, Conseils-Eco, Toulouse); Christophe Nordman (DIAL, IRD, Paris); François-Charles Wolff (
    Abstract: (english) In this paper, we investigate the glass ceiling hypothesis according to which there exists larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution. We demonstrate that in some circumstances, more qualified women may be offered lower wages than men at the equilibrium. This occurs for instance in a competitive model of wage determination where employers face gender-specific probabilities concerning the stability of their employees in their firms. Then, we focus on the relevance and the magnitude of the glass ceiling effect in France using a representative matched worker-firm data set in 1992 of about 130,000 employees and 14,000 employers. We estimate quantile regressions and use a principal component analysis to summarize information specific to the firms. Our different results show that accounting for firm-related characteristics, in particular firm-specific wage policies, reduces the gender earnings gap at the top of the distribution, but the latter still remains much higher at the top than at the bottom. _________________________________ (français) Nous analysons l’existence du phénomène de “plafond de verre” selon lequel il existerait des écarts salariaux selon le genre plus importants dans le haut de la distribution des revenus. Nous montrons dans un modèle compétitif de détermination des salaires que, sous certaines hypothèses et à l’équilibre, les femmes les plus qualifiées reçoivent des salaires plus faibles que ceux des hommes de même niveau de qualification. Cela se produit si les employeurs apprécient différemment selon le sexe des employés la stabilité des travailleurs dans leur entreprise. Nous examinons ensuite la pertinence de cette hypothèse et l’étendue de l’effet de plafond de verre à l’aide de données représentatives de l’industrie privée française en 1992 liant quelque 130.000 employés à plus de 14.000 établissements. Nous estimons des régressions de quantiles et utilisons une analyse factorielle pour résumer les informations spécifiques à chaque établissement. Nos différents résultats montrent que prendre en compte les caractéristiques des établissements, en particulier leur politique salariale spécifique, réduit l’estimation de l’écart de revenus entre sexes en haut de la distribution, mais celui-ci n’en demeure pas moins beaucoup plus important en haut qu’en bas de cette distribution des revenus.
    Keywords: Gender wage gap; Glass ceiling; Quantile regressions; Matched worker-firm data, Écart salarial selon le genre; Plafond de verre; Régressions de quantiles; Données appariées employeurs-employés.
    JEL: J16 J31 D80
    Date: 2006–01
  3. By: Lindbeck, Assar (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University); Palme, Mårten (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University); Persson, Mats (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.
    Keywords: Seniority rules; sick pay insurance; firing costs; moral hazard
    JEL: H53 I38 J22 J50 M51
    Date: 2006–02–24
  4. By: Mandana, Hajj; Panizza, Ugo
    Abstract: This paper uses individual-level data and a differences in differences estimation strategy to test whether the education gender gap of Muslims is different from that of Christians. In particular, the paper uses data for young Lebanese and shows that, other things equal, girls (both Muslim and Christian) tend to receive more education than boys and that there is no difference between the education gender gap of Muslims and Christians. Therefore, the paper finds no support for the hypothesis that Muslims discriminate against female education.
    Keywords: Religion, Islam, Education, Gender Gap
    JEL: Z12 I20 O53
    Date: 2006–02

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