nep-lma New Economics Papers
on Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages
Issue of 2012‒03‒28
ten papers chosen by
Erik Jonasson
Lund University

  1. Exports and Within-Plant Wage Distributions: Evidence from Mexico By Frías, Judith A; Kaplan, David; Verhoogen, Eric A
  2. Heterogeneous Returns to Personality - The Role of Occupational Choice By John, Katrin; Thomsen, Stephan L. and
  3. How acid are lemons? Adverse selection and signalling for skilled labour market entrants By Wagner, Robert; Zwick, Thomas
  4. A Rationale For Evidence On Service Offshoring By Tobal, Martin
  5. Do Frictions Matter in the Labor Market? Accessions, Separations, and Minimum Wage Effects By Dube, Arindrajit; Lester, T. William; Reich, Michael
  6. Apprentice pay in Britain, Germany and Switzerland: institutions, market forces, market power By Paul Ryan; Uschi Backes-Gellner; Silvia Teuber; Karin Wagner
  7. Pay Dispersion and Work Performance By Alessandro Bucciol; Marco Piovesan
  8. The Firm as the Locus of Social Comparisons: Internal Labor Markets versus Up-or-out By Auriol, Emmanuelle; Friebel, Guido; Lammers, Frauke
  9. Effects of tourism development on temporality By Yolanda Pena-Boquete; Diana Pérez-Dacal
  10. Gender inequality in the labor market in Serbia By Reva, Anna

  1. By: Frías, Judith A; Kaplan, David; Verhoogen, Eric A
    Abstract: This short paper examines the effect of exporting on within-plant wage distributions in employer-employee data on Mexican manufacturing plants. Using the late-1994 peso devaluation interacted with initial plant size as a source of exogenous variation in exporting and focusing on wages at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles within each plant, we document three patterns: (1) there is no evidence of an effect of exporting on wages at the 10th percentile; (2) the wage effects of exporting are larger at higher percentiles, up to the 75th; and (3) there is no evidence of an increase in dispersion within the top quartile.
    Keywords: exports; wage distribution
    JEL: F16 J31
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8835&r=lma
  2. By: John, Katrin; Thomsen, Stephan L. and
    Abstract: We analyze the role of personality in occupational choice and wages using data from Germany for the years 1992 to 2009. Characterizing personality by use of seven complementary measures, the empirical findings show that it is an important determinant of occupational choice. Associated with that, identical personality traits are differently rewarded across occupations. By evaluating different personality profiles, we estimate the influence of personality as a whole. The estimates establish occupation-specific patterns of significant returns to particular personality profiles. These findings underline the importance to consider the occupational distribution when analyzing returns to personality due to its heterogeneous valuation.
    Keywords: occupational choice, wage differentials, Big Five personality traits, locus of control, measures of reciprocity, SOEP
    JEL: J24 J31 C35
    Date: 2012–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-495&r=lma
  3. By: Wagner, Robert; Zwick, Thomas
    Abstract: This paper jointly analyses the consequences of adverse selection and signalling on entry wages of skilled employees. It uses German linked employer employee panel data (LIAB) and introduces a measure for relative productivity of skilled job applicants based on apprenticeship wages. It shows that post-apprenticeship employer changers are a negative selection from the training firms' point of view. Negative selection leads to lower average wages of employer changersin the first skilled job in comparison to stayers. Entry wages of employer changers are specifically reduced by high occupation and training firm retention rates. Additional training firm signals are high apprenticeship wages that signal a positive selection of apprenticeship applicants, works councils and establishment size. Finally, positive individual signals such as schooling background affect the skilled entry wages of employer changers positively. --
    Keywords: entry wages,employer change,adverse selection,signalling
    JEL: J24 J31 J62 J63 M52 M53
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12014&r=lma
  4. By: Tobal, Martin
    Abstract: On the one hand, empiricists debate on which and how many labor dimensions are relevant for understanding the employment effects of the 1990's service offshoring boom. On the other hand, theorists pursue trade theory's traditional goal: to explain wage-responses to the shock. This paper rationalizes recent evidence on employment and reconciles theory with a current empirical debate. To this purpose, the article derives employment responses that are continous in occupations' off shoring costs and depend on two labor dimensions: skill-intensities and tradeability characteristics. Furthermore, the paper yields intutitive wage-respsonses and addresses theorists' traditional concern. In particular, under the assumption that knowledge is occupation-specific, the article derives wage- responses that are not fully explained by skill-levels. More precisely, service offshoring deteriorates the wage of "many" skilled workers whose tasks have relatively low offshoring costs.
    Keywords: labor; wages, Labor Economics
    Date: 2011–09–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt5s4056z6&r=lma
  5. By: Dube, Arindrajit; Lester, T. William; Reich, Michael
    Abstract: We measure labor market frictions using a strategy that bridges design-based and structural approaches: estimating an equilibrium search model using reduced-form minimum wage elasticities identified from border discontinuities and fitted with Bayesian and LIML methods. We begin by providing the first test of U.S. minimum wage effects on labor market flows and find negative effects on employment flows, but not levels. Separations and accessions fall among restaurants and teens, especially those with low tenure. Our estimated parameters of a search model with wage posting and heterogeneous workers and firms imply that frictions help explain minimum wage effects.
    Keywords: J23, J32, J48, J63, Labor Economics
    Date: 2011–06–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt4t3342nd&r=lma
  6. By: Paul Ryan (University of Cambridge); Uschi Backes-Gellner (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Silvia Teuber (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Karin Wagner (Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin)
    Abstract: Although trainee pay is central to the economics of work-based training, institutionalists have paid it little attention, while economists typically assume that it is set by market clearing. We document large differences in the pay of metalworking apprentices in three countries: relative to the pay of skilled employees, it is high in Britain, middling in Germany, and low in Switzerland. Combining fieldwork evidence with national survey data, we associate apprentice pay with both institutional attributes and market forces: specifically, with trade union presence and goals, employer organisation, the contractual status of apprentices, the supply of eligible and interested young people, and public subsidies. Apprentice pay appears to have fallen in Britain and Germany as bargaining coverage has declined.
    Keywords: Apprenticeship training, pay structure, trade unions, employers’ associations, collective bargaining, training contracts, young workers, public subsidy
    JEL: J24 J31 J41 J42 J51
    Date: 2012–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:educat:0075&r=lma
  7. By: Alessandro Bucciol (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Marco Piovesan (Harvard Business School)
    Date: 2012–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:12/2012&r=lma
  8. By: Auriol, Emmanuelle; Friebel, Guido; Lammers, Frauke
    Abstract: We suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns. A firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker’s status depends on past performance. We investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies: (i) internal labor markets, in which agents have a job guarantee, and (ii) 'up-or-out', in which agents are fired when unsuccessful. We show that up-or-out is optimal if success is difficult to achieve. When success is less hard to achieve, an internal labor market is optimal provided the payoffs associated with success are moderate. Otherwise, up-or-out is, again, optimal. These results are in line with observations from academia, law firms, investment banks and top consulting firms. Here, up-or-out dominates, while internal labor markets dominate where work is less demanding or payoffs are more compressed, for instance, because the environment is less competitive. We present some supporting evidence from academia, comparing US with French economics departments.
    Keywords: Incentives; Promotion hierarchies; Sorting; Status
    JEL: J3 L2 M5
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8831&r=lma
  9. By: Yolanda Pena-Boquete (University of Vigo); Diana Pérez-Dacal (University of Santiago de Compostela)
    Abstract: Spain has the highest percentage of temporary workers in the European Union, and this problem is even more severe in the Tourism sector. In fact, tourism is well-known for being a source of low-skilled jobs, specifically for showing a higher percentage of fixed-term contracts. However, the tourism employment pattern is characterized by remarkable differences between Spanish regions. On the one hand, this could be related with the fact that each characteristic tourism industry provides a different percentage of its output to tourists, as it is shown in the Spanish Tourism Satellite Account. On the other hand, the relevance of tourism is also different for each Spanish region. Given that, the aim of this paper is to analyse what factors can determine the incidence of temporary employment in tourism activities in Spain. We use different measures such as the specialization ratio, tourism density ratio... in order to identify the degree of specialization of each region in tourism. Results show that temporality is not a characteristic of tourism; in fact temporality decreases with specialization in tourism.
    Keywords: Tourism, labour market, tourism specialization, temporary jobs, regional development.
    JEL: J21 L83
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edg:anecon:0047&r=lma
  10. By: Reva, Anna
    Abstract: This paper presents a broad overview of labor market indicators for men and women in Serbia with a focus on employment patterns, entrepreneurship and career advancement as well as earnings differentials. The analysis relies primarily on the results of the Labor Force Surveys conducted in Serbia in April 2008 and October 2009. The findings show that although the overall labor market situation in Serbia is difficult, women are in a much more disadvantageous position than men. Women are much less likely to be employed, start a business or advance in the political arena. Furthermore, there is a significant wage gap between men and women in a number of sectors and occupational groups with low educated women being particularly disadvantaged. The results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition demonstrate that the wage gap is indicative of discrimination of women in the labor market as earnings differentials cannot be explained by differences in observed characteristics of male and female employees. Based on the obtained results, the paper outlines four broad areas that require the attention of policy-makers: employment generation; enhancement of education outcomes; improvement of the regulatory environment and support to women's business and political careers; and promotion of transparent performance setting mechanisms.
    Keywords: Labor Markets,Population Policies,Gender and Development,Population&Development,Gender and Law
    Date: 2012–03–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6008&r=lma

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