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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Tom Kirchmaier; Daniel Matter; Miriam Schirmer |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes criminal career trajectories using a unique administrative dataset of 230, 578 offenders and over 620, 000 criminal offenses recorded by Greater Manchester Police between 2008 and 2019. Moving beyond static co-offending networks, we model individual offense sequences as transitions within a multilayer directed crime network. This allows us to capture temporal dependence and structural progression across crime types and provides an approach that can be used as a scalable method to analyze criminal trajectories at the population level. We find that the majority of offenders (almost 60%) commit only a single recorded offense. Among repeat offenders, specialization deepens over time: the likelihood of committing the same type of crime again rises steadily across consecutive offenses, most strongly for shoplifting, burglary, and fraud. Only 9.14% of persistent offenders remain within a single crime category throughout their recorded career, making diversification the norm rather than the exception among high-frequency offenders. Within these cross-category transitions, public order offenses and weapon possession consistently precede violent crime at every career stage, suggesting structured pathways that may serve as early intervention points. |
| Keywords: | crime networks, crime trajectories, network analysis |
| Date: | 2026–04–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp2168 |
| By: | Ginger Zhe Jin; D. Daniel Sokol; Liad Wagman |
| Abstract: | We study a novel dynamic inspection game in which a regulator commits to a detection technology, and a regulated firm chooses whether to engage in harmful conduct and, if detected and sanctioned, whether to incur a redesign cost that generates a modified violation requiring renewed detection. In this adaptive environment, bounded sanctions give rise to three Markov perfect equilibria: full compliance, harm until recognition, and persistent redesign. We show that AI-augmented monitoring can shift the equilibrium from persistent redesign to harm until recognition, but only when regulatory investment crosses a regime-shifting threshold. Below this threshold, greater monitoring intensity may increase enforcement workload without reducing aggregate harm, as the regulator repeatedly detects adaptive violations while the firm continues to redesign. Thus, partial investments in AI monitoring can generate congestion rather than deterrence. When the firm can also adopt AI to reduce its redesign cost, the regulator’s deterrence threshold rises, reinforcing the strategic interaction between enforcement and evasion technologies. Moreover, congestion becomes particularly salient when AI-flagged violations require human review and regulatory review capacity is binding. In this case, the precision of AI triage—especially its false positive rate—matters as much as detection intensity. Enforcement effectiveness therefore depends not only on expanding detection, but also on allocating scarce human review resources efficiently. |
| JEL: | D82 K21 K42 L40 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35010 |
| By: | Boamah, Collins |
| Abstract: | The acceleration of digital financial services in Ghana has transformed the country's banking landscape while simultaneously reshaping its financial crime risk profile. Drawing on insights from the Bank of Ghana (BoG) Annual Fraud Reports, Ghana Association of Banks (GAB) Quarterly Fraud Reports, Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) data, and law enforcement sources including the Ghana Police Service, EOCO, and OSP, this paper examines evolving fraud typologies, systemic vulnerabilities, and regulatory expectations within Ghana's banking sector. The findings reveal a structural shift from traditional branch-based fraud to digitally enabled, identitydriven, and cross-border financial crime. The paper argues that regulatory compliance alone is insufficient; instead, a resilience-based, intelligenceled, ecosystem-wide response is required to safeguard financial stability in the digital era. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gabpbs:339595 |
| By: | Paolo Pellizzari (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice); Francesca Parpinel (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice) |
| Abstract: | In light of the Madoff case, we present an Agent-Based Model of a Ponzi scheme. Agents are initially inclined to invest in the scam because they believe the wealth will increase, even if the fraudster dissipates it without any investment. We stress that the main characteristic of such schemes is the growing discrepancy between the perceived wealth and the actual total amount of money in the impostor's possession. The tendency gradually reverses and more agents withdraw their wealth (and made-up profits) if trust is lost as a result of hearing negative news about the economy. We look at how long it takes to expose the fraud and file for bankruptcy in relation to the volume of news that enters the market. We also look into the impact of a special agent dubbed Markopolos (inspired by a genuine personage) on the time to bankruptcy because of his capacity to quickly "convince" the agents he encounters to disinvest. Although the Markopolos effect seems to be statistically significant, it is not very strong when it comes to the results of a news flow and the subsequent widespread loss of faith and redemptions. |
| Keywords: | Agent-Based Model, Ponzi Schemes, NetLogo |
| JEL: | C63 C88 D83 K42 G11 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2026:10 |
| By: | Daria Denti; Alessandra Faggian; Marco Modica; Ilan Noy |
| Abstract: | Do earthquakes strengthen social cohesion or undermine it? While some theories suggest they strengthen social bonds, others suggest they lead to social disintegration. We add to the limited causal evidence on this phenomenon using the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake, and exploit a unique dataset that captures different earthquake characteristics and multiple dimensions of social cohesion through behavioral measures. Difference-in-differences and event-study estimates show that the earthquake shifted behavior toward individualism and out-group hostility, and that short-run increases in linking social capital were followed by later erosion. Critically, dwelling damage had stronger and more persistent effects than the physical shaking, suggesting that visible, measurable destruction has a more profound impact on social cohesion. These findings further advance our understanding by demonstrating that different dimensions of social cohesion respond differently to earthquakes, with varying recovery patterns depending on earthquake characteristics. |
| Keywords: | disasters, earthquake, social norms, social cohesion, individualism |
| JEL: | Q54 J12 J15 K42 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12585 |
| By: | Bindseil, Ulrich; Gulati, Mitu |
| Abstract: | Once a famous tale of conquest, law and foreign bond markets, the saga of the Silesian Bonds of 1734-37 is missing from the literature on sovereign debt. The Silesian Bonds were among the earliest foreign currency sovereign bonds issued. They go into the market 84 years prior to the 1818 Prussian issue by the Rothschilds sometimes described as the first Eurobond. The bonds were issued by Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor of the House of Habsburg, to investors in London and Amsterdam. They were tradable, denominated in foreign currency, and secured by a pledge of revenues from the estates of Silesia. Although bondholders seemed well-protected by a variety of covenants promising that the sovereign would refrain from raising defenses, there was reluctance to pay, delay, and ultimately partial repudiation. The story we tell centers around what happened to the debts after Frederick II of Prussia seized much of Silesia in 1740-42, agreed in the 1742 Peace of Berlin to take over from Austria the liability of the Silesian bonds, but then decided that he did not wish to pay. From the story, we draw clues about the state of international law, contracting practices, and the operation of the sovereign debt market in the mid 18th and early 19th centuries in Europe. |
| Keywords: | International Capital Markets, Evolution of Capital Markets, Sovereign Default, Repudiation, Austrian War of Succession |
| JEL: | N23 F34 K12 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ibfpps:339649 |
| By: | Sutirtha Bagchi (Department of Economics, Villanova School of Business, Villanova University) |
| Abstract: | The 2018 Supreme Court decision in Janus v. AFSCME eliminated mandatory union fees for public-sector workers, overturning four decades of legal precedent. Using administrative payroll data from 400 jurisdictions across 21 states, I find that dues-paying membership declined by 8.9 to 13.4 percent by 2021, a drop substantially smaller than anticipated. At least three-quarters of this decline reflects the automatic termination of agency fees rather than voluntary exits by union members. Teachers, police, and firefighters maintained relatively stable membership, while support staff experienced declines of 13 to 18 percent. Despite these membership losses, I find no impact on overall earnings. |
| Keywords: | Public-sector unions; Union membership; Collective bargaining; Agency fees; Janus; Freeriding |
| JEL: | J45 H75 K31 J51 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vil:papers:63 |