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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Gutmann, Jerg; Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna |
| Abstract: | Populism is frequently described as a threat to constitutionalism, although some researchers emphasize that populists, too, draft, enforce, and derive legitimacy from constitutions. This chapter explains the theoretical foundations of these concerns and provides an overview of empirical evidence regarding the relationship between populism and constitutionalism. |
| Keywords: | Populism, Constitutional change, Constitutional compliance, Constitutionalism, Judicial independence, Rule of law |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K11 K38 K42 P48 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:92 |
| By: | Mark Glick (University of Utah); Gabriel A. Lozada (University of Utah); Darren Bush (University of Houston Law School) |
| Abstract: | We compare the Consumer Welfare Standard (CWS) and the Protect Competition Standard (PCS) in antitrust. While the two standards are often viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives, there is a larger overlap between the two standards than is usually acknowledged. We first delineate each, recount their respective origins and identify the main supporters of each view. We then compare the two standards across several dimensions: we analyze the practical differences between the two standards in merger and monopolization cases; analyze their fidelity to Congressional intent and to Supreme Court precedent; and discuss how the two standards are connected to normative economic theory. Finally, we discuss the social welfare implications of the differing goals of the two standards. It is our hope that this piece may assist policy makers, courts, and antitrust practitioners better understand the two standards and how they can be more effectively and conscientiously applied. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust Standards, Consumer Welfare Standard, Protect Competition Standard, New Brandeis School, Chicago Antitrust. |
| JEL: | K21 L41 |
| Date: | 2026–04–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:thk:wpaper:inetwp248 |
| By: | Christine Desan (Harvard Law School) |
| Abstract: | The surge of executive power unleashed by the Supreme Court has reached the Federal Reserve, provoking a crisis that the justices seem suddenly anxious to avoid. But the drama is long overdue. The central bank has a constitutional stature that poses a direct challenge to unitary executive theory, the principle animating the Court's recent case law. Congress established the Federal Reserve System to carry out a critical legislative prerogative, making the sovereign money supply. Congress used an institutional form, national banking, innovated precisely to secure sovereign money-making from executive (originally monarchical) interference. Congress in turn assigned a vital responsibility, the capacity to make money out of debt in the people's name, to the Fed. The constitutional conclusion follows: Congress's prerogative over money-making clearly secures the Fed's independence from presidential interference. That conclusion is lost in current scholarship that treats the Fed as fundamentally like other independent agencies. The Court has assumed, similarly, that the unitary executive presides over a relatively homogeneous regulatory field. The case of the Fed exposes the separation of powers as a more complicated project. Legislatures built democratic sovereignty by struggling for prerogatives that, like money-making, protected their lawmaking authority. The prerogatives claimed by Congress inform the work of each agency and official, including within the executive branch. The Court dismantles democratic sovereignty when it denies the reach of those prerogatives. |
| Keywords: | Federal Reserve; central bank independence; money creation; democratic sovereignty; legislative prerogative; Congress; unitary executive theory; separation of powers; constitutional political economy; monetary architecture |
| JEL: | E42 E58 K23 P16 |
| Date: | 2026–03–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:thk:wpaper:inetwp247 |
| By: | Abraha, Halefom, |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how existing data protection laws often fail to safeguard workers in increasingly digitalized workplaces. It highlights regulatory gaps across jurisdictions and proposes worker-centric data governance solutions to ensure fairer, more effective protection in the digital age. |
| Keywords: | employee monitoring, algorithmic management, data protection, workers privacy, workers rights., institutional framework |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:ilowps:995666248702676 |