nep-law 2026-04-27 papers

on Law and Economics

Issue of 2026–04–27
six papers chosen by
Yves Oytana, Université de Franche-Comté

Community Engagement and Public Safety: Evidence From Crime Enforcement Targeting Immigrants By Felipe Goncalves; Elisa Jacome; Emily Weisburst
Learning About Police Bias: Prosecutors and Police Before and After Body-Worn Cameras By Harrington, Emma; Shaffer, Hannah
International Sanctions and Corruption By Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias
Data Challenges and Innovations in Measuring Domestic Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Traditional Sources and Online Search Patterns By Inés Berniell; Gabriel Facchini; Santiago M. Perez-Vincent
Criminal Investigation and the Incidence of AI in the Collection and Management of Digital Evidence By Carmen Silvia Paraschiv
We characterize the optimal contract within the class of stationary mechanisms in a repeated buyer-seller relationship with persistent adverse selection and one-sided limited enforcement. A prepaid seller may breach after receiving the current transfer and terminate the relationship upon paying an enforceable penalty. In this stationary benchmark, the enforcement problem collapses to a bound on the transfer targeted to the most efficient type. This yields a three-regime characterization. With strong enforcement, the repeated static second-best contract is feasible. With weak (intermediate) enforcement, the top transfer is capped, inducing bunching among efficient types and additional downward distortions. With very weak enforcement, public penalties alone cannot sustain compliance, and the principal must leave strictly positive continuation rents, including for the least efficient type. We interpret the associated distortion as a virtual enforcement cost. By David Martimort; Aggey Simons

Community Engagement and Public Safety: Evidence From Crime Enforcement Targeting Immigrants

By:	Felipe Goncalves; Elisa Jacome; Emily Weisburst
Abstract:	We study the role of victim reporting in the production of public safety. We examine the Secure Communities program, a crime-reduction policy that involved police in detecting unauthorized immigrants and increased deportation fears in immigrant communities. We find that the policy reduced the likelihood that Hispanic victims report crimes to police and increased offending against Hispanics. The number of reported crimes is unchanged, masking these opposing effects. We show that reduced reporting drives the offending increase and provide the first elasticity of offending to victim reporting in the literature, calculating that a 10% decline in reporting increases offending by 7.9%.
Keywords:	Public Safety, Community Engagement, Victim Reporting, Secure Communities
JEL:	J15 K37 K42
Date:	2026–04
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:26-23

Learning About Police Bias: Prosecutors and Police Before and After Body-Worn Cameras

By:	Harrington, Emma (University of Virginia); Shaffer, Hannah (Harvard Law School)
Abstract:	Decision-makers often rely on earlier actors but fail to correct for their biases. We model and measure two mechanisms: underestimating upstream bias and treating subjective information as ground truth. We link an original survey of 203 North Carolina prosecutors to their 505, 787 cases. Exploiting the rollout of police body-worn cameras (BWC), we show monitoring reduces incarceration disparities by 14 percent, little of which is driven by arrests. About one quarter of this effect reflects learning: prosecutors with greater BWC exposure view police as more biased and unreliable. Monitoring reduces disparities most for prosecutors who treat police reports as ground truth.
Keywords:	systemic discrimination, biased beliefs, monitoring, bodyworn cameras, prosecutorial discretion, racial disparities, criminal justice system
JEL:	J15 K14 K42 D82 D83
Date:	2026–04
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18528

International Sanctions and Corruption

By:	Gutmann, Jerg; Langer, Pascal; Neuenkirch, Matthias
Abstract:	A major concern about the imposition of international sanctions is that they may permanently deteriorate the quality of institutions in target countries, potentially causing an increase in corruption. While case studies suggest that this is frequently the case, systematic evidence is so far missing. We provide the first cross-country statistical analysis of the impact of sanctions on public-sector corruption. Using a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach, we analyze sanctions against 125 countries from 1971 to 2019. Our results show that Western (and UN) sanctions cause a significant decline of corruption in democracies, while non-Western sanctions and those targeting autocracies have no systematic impact. Event study estimates time the reductions in corruption at about three to four years into the sanctions episode. They persist throughout the sanctions period, but once sanctions are lifted, corruption levels revert to their pre-treatment baseline, indicating that the corruption-reducing effect is limited to the duration of the sanctions episode. Further analysis reveals that the effect is stronger when sanctions explicitly target democratization or human rights improvements.
Keywords:	International sanctions, Corruption, Governance
JEL:	D73 F51 K33 K42
Date:	2026
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:91

Data Challenges and Innovations in Measuring Domestic Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Traditional Sources and Online Search Patterns

By:	Inés Berniell (CEDLAS-IIE-FCE-UNLP); Gabriel Facchini (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London.); Santiago M. Perez-Vincent (Inter-American Development Bank)
Abstract:	This study examines the challenges of analyzing domestic violence (DV) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and seeks to improve measurement through two main contributions. First, we collect and describe traditional DV data sources (house- hold surveys and administrative records) across 19 countries. The analysis reveals substantial gaps in data availability, with infrequent and outdated survey efforts in most countries. Nevertheless, surveys confirm high DV prevalence, with at least one in five women reporting victimization in all countries examined, and highlight perva- sive underreporting that limits the reliability of administrative crime data. Second, we examine the properties of a novel, high-frequency indicator based on online search behavior: the Google Domestic Violence Index. Using administrative data from eight LAC countries, we find that the index is strongly correlated with calls to DV helplines but shows weaker association with police reports or emergency calls. The evidence suggests that the index captures early-stage, information-seeking behavior and may provide a real-time signal of latent victimization not reflected in official statistics. Our findings underscore the potential of digital data to complement traditional sources and to support more timely, responsive approaches to tracking DV.
JEL:	J12 J16 J18 I18
Date:	2026–04
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dls:wpaper:0371

Criminal Investigation and the Incidence of AI in the Collection and Management of Digital Evidence

By:	Carmen Silvia Paraschiv (Titu Maiorescu University of Bucharest, Romania)
Abstract:	This research paper analyzes the optimization of criminal investigations by integrating artificial intelligence into digital evidence, highlighting the significant impact of emerging technologies on law enforcement processes. In an era characterized by fast digitalization, the contemporary criminal phenomenon has diversified, and the complexity and volume of computer data require an efficient adaptation of investigative tools. This paper analyzes the mechanisms through which artificial intelligence can facilitate the discernment and analysis of digital evidence, thus contributing to the efficiency of criminal investigation activities. Relevant case studies and examples of good practices extracted from different jurisdictions are presented here, highlighting both the functional advantages and the ethical and legal challenges arising from the use of AI technologies in crime-fighting activities. The analysis also includes a discussion of the rigor of evidence standards and procedural guarantees, emphasizing the need for a responsible and transparent application of artificial intelligence in the context of crime investigation. The conclusions suggest that integrating AI into criminal trials can be a viable solution for increasing the efficiency and accuracy of investigations while ensuring compliance with the fundamental principles of law. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discourse on technological innovations in criminal law and the reconfiguration of investigative paradigms in line with the demands of a modern society.
Keywords:	Artificial Intelligence, Technological Innovations, Criminal Process, Digital Samples Investigations, Efficiency
Date:	2026–03
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smo:raiswp:0648

We characterize the optimal contract within the class of stationary mechanisms in a repeated buyer-seller relationship with persistent adverse selection and one-sided limited enforcement. A prepaid seller may breach after receiving the current transfer and terminate the relationship upon paying an enforceable penalty. In this stationary benchmark, the enforcement problem collapses to a bound on the transfer targeted to the most efficient type. This yields a three-regime characterization. With strong enforcement, the repeated static second-best contract is feasible. With weak (intermediate) enforcement, the top transfer is capped, inducing bunching among efficient types and additional downward distortions. With very weak enforcement, public penalties alone cannot sustain compliance, and the principal must leave strictly positive continuation rents, including for the least efficient type. We interpret the associated distortion as a virtual enforcement cost.

By:	David Martimort (Toulouse School of Economics, France); Aggey Simons (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Canada)
Keywords:	Adverse selection, Limited enforcement, Relational contracts, Contract breach.
JEL:	D82 D86 K12 C61
Date:	2026
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ott:wpaper:2603e

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