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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Leander Andres; Stefan Bauernschuster; Gordon B. Dahl; Helmut Rainer; Simone Schüller |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of birthright citizenship on youth crime. We leverage a German reform which automatically granted birthright citizenship to eligible immigrant children born in Germany after January 1, 2000 and administrative crime data from three federal states. We find that immigrant youth who acquired citizenship at birth are substantially less likely to engage in criminal activity, with estimates indicating a 70% reduction in crime. These results are particularly relevant in light of ongoing debates in the U.S. about abolishing birthright citizenship. Our findings suggest that inclusive citizenship policies can reduce crime and its associated costs, which in turn could strengthen social cohesion. |
| JEL: | J15 K42 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35070 |
| By: | Giommoni, T.; Guiso, L.; Michelacci, C.; Morelli, M. |
| Abstract: | Poorly drafted laws are ambiguous, create legal uncertainty, and hinder economic activity. By processing the full corpus of Italian legislation, we show that legal uncertainty—measured by the probability that lower courts and the Supreme Court of Cassation disagree—is higher in cases involving poorly drafted laws and varies systematically across courts. To quantify the economic costs of this legal uncertainty, we exploit a court consolidation reform that exogenously reassigned firms to courts. Firms facing greater legal uncertainty invest less and experience slower growth. Italy’s GDP would be about 5% higher if laws were drafted as clearly as the Constitution (at the top-quartile threshold of the drafting quality distribution). |
| Date: | 2026–03–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2623 |
| By: | Hashimoto, Barry; Gray, Kevin W.; Kalyalya, Kafumu |
| Abstract: | We present an original interpretation of the justice cascade theory developed by Kathryn Sikkink and her coauthors as it pertains to the icc’s engagements with African states since 2004. In doing so, we challenge a prominent and acclaimed critique of this theory: Oumar Ba’s States of Justice. Ba presents four qualitative case studies informed by fieldwork, focused on the admissibility challenges, selective cooperation, and obstructionism involving Uganda, Libya, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire. We closely examine the key publications in which the justice cascade theory is introduced, refined, and critiqued, identifying misinterpretations of this theory in Ba’s work and elucidating its empirical implications. Furthermore, we perform a citation analysis of States of Justice, demonstrating that the book, by virtually omitting primary sources of any type, misimplements its own empirical strategy. We introduce fresh legal analyses of compliance with the Rome Statute of the icc in the four relevant cases, revealing the dearth of evidence of noncompliance in all but the Kenyan case. Finally, we discuss legal analysis as a means of testing theories of international law and courts, and we illustrate the relevance of the justice cascade theory to current debates on the establishment of new international tribunals. |
| Date: | 2024–06–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:mtyhq_v1 |
| By: | Johnson, Neil F. |
| Abstract: | The adoption of generative AI across commercial and legal professions offers dramatic efficiency gains -- yet for law in particular, it introduces a perilous failure mode in which the AI fabricates fictitious case law, statutes, and judicial holdings that appear entirely authentic. Attorneys who unknowingly file such fabrications face professional sanctions, malpractice exposure, and reputational harm, while courts confront a novel threat to the integrity of the adversarial process. This failure mode is commonly dismissed as random `hallucination', but recent physics-based analysis of the Transformer's core mechanism reveals a deterministic component: the AI's internal state can cross a calculable threshold, causing its output to flip from reliable legal reasoning to authoritative-sounding fabrication. Here we present this science in a legal-industry setting, walking through a simulated brief-drafting scenario. Our analysis suggests that fabrication risk is not an anomalous glitch but a foreseeable consequence of the technology's design, with direct implications for the evolving duty of technological competence. We propose that legal professionals, courts, and regulators replace the outdated `black box' mental model with verification protocols based on how these systems actually fail. |
| Date: | 2026–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:lawarc:z8md5_v1 |
| By: | Daniel L. Chen (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse); Vardges Levonyan (UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich); Susan Yeh (Charles River Associates Inc, Washington) |
| Abstract: | Turning to the courts to vindicate rights has often led to resistance and subsequent acceptance. This paper investigates the effects of randomly assigned judges on abortion cases on subsequent legislative actions and shifts in public attitudes in the United States from 1971 to 2004. By examining comprehensive data from appellate and district abortion cases, our analysis reveals three primary findings. First, verdicts in abortion cases are significantly influenced by the judges' biographies. Second, precedents that oppose abortion tend to stimulate legislative actions aimed at restricting access to abortion services. Third, public opinion exhibits a temporary shift against legalized abortion following pro-abortion rulings, particularly in the context of elective abortions. These shifts suggest a pattern of initial resistance followed by gradual acceptance. In general terms, these results contribute towards identifying the origin of norms as a function of judicial decisions. |
| Keywords: | Norms, Abortion, Expressive law, Backlash |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05582254 |
| By: | de Souza Melo, Edervaldo José |
| Abstract: | This article examines how Brazilian law may frame, protect, and discipline personal cognitive systems based on artificial intelligence that store persistent memories, recurrent instructions, decision-making patterns, interaction records, and personal assistance functions. It starts from the premise that, when such systems are structured as a functional extension of the holder’s memory, practical identity, and decision-making organization, they cannot be fully reduced either to the generic category of digital assets or to the ordinary framework of personal data protection. The legal problem becomes especially acute in cases of supervening civil incapacity and death of the holder, where patrimonial, existential, succession-related, and informational interests converge. The article adopts a doctrinal and civil-constitutional approach grounded in normative analysis, systematic interpretation, and examination of relevant institutional and judicial materials under Brazilian law. It argues that the Brazilian legal order already contains partial normative bases for the protection of such systems, but in a fragmented and insufficient manner, thus requiring a coordinated reinterpretation of succession law, personality rights, digital law, preventive representation mechanisms, and informational self-determination. As a theoretical contribution, the article proposes that these systems should be internally distinguished into at least three legally relevant layers: transmissible patrimonial elements, existentially protected elements, and persistent instructional elements capable of sustaining practical continuity in situations of incapacity or death. The conclusion defends interpretive criteria for custody, access, transmission, restriction, and termination of such systems, with a view to protecting the holder’s will, privacy, and the legitimate interests of third parties |
| Date: | 2026–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:lawarc:arqb7_v1 |
| By: | Godefroy de Boiscuillé (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France) |
| Abstract: | This article examines the reform of the European Product Liability Directive in the age of AI. The reform succeeds in bringing AI within the reach of product liability law. However, the proposed regime remains only partially adapted to the evidentiary and economic realities of the digital age. The modernisation effort is significant but ultimately incomplete. What emerges is not a new liability regime but an updated version of an old one, broader in scope yet still limited in its ability to ensure effective compensation for victims. The reform thus reflects a form of conservative modernisation: innovative, but restrained in spirit. It extends the reach of product liability to the digital environment while preserving the traditional architecture of the regime. By examining this ambivalence, the article aims to show both the strength and the fragility of the new framework. |
| Keywords: | product liability, artificial intelligence, AI, defective products, European Union law, digital economy |
| JEL: | K13 K15 K24 O33 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2026-12 |
| By: | Bellodi, L.; Morelli, M.; Spenkuch, J. L.; Teso, E.; Vannoni, M.; Xu, G. |
| Abstract: | We combine comprehensive data on the rulemaking activities of the U.S. federal government with individual-level personnel and voter registration records to study delegation and principal-agent frictions in the development of new regulations. We present three main results. First, even important pieces of new regulation are frequently delegated to career bureaucrats who are politically misaligned with the president. Second, rules that are overseen by misaligned regulators take systematically longer to complete, are more verbose, generate more negative feedback from the public, and are more likely to be challenged in court. Third, in assigning regulators to rules, agency leaders of-ten face a sharp trade-off between political alignment and expertise. Agency frictions notwithstanding, they tend to resolve this trade-off in favor of expertise. |
| Date: | 2026–02–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2622 |
| By: | Doan-Pham, Phil; Mavisakalyan, Astghik; True, Jacqui |
| Abstract: | Can legal reforms shift social norms around intimate partner violence (IPV)? We examine Vietnam's 2007 Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control using a difference-in-differences strategy that leverages the greater relevance of legal protections for married and cohabiting women relative to single women, generating differential exposure to the reform. Using nationally representative data from the Vietnam Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, we find significant reductions in women's acceptance of IPV following the law's introduction. The effects are particularly pronounced among disadvantaged groups, including women with lower education, ethnic minority women, and rural residents. These findings indicate that legal reforms can meaningfully reshape social norms surrounding gender-based violence, with particularly strong impacts among marginalized populations that may face higher barriers to change. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1743 |
| By: | Torres, Ana Paula Gonzalez |
| Abstract: | We studied the regulation of emerging technologies through the European Union’s General-Purpose AI Code of Practice drafting process, asking when and why do actors prefer greater legal certainty or greater legal uncertainty. Consistent with economic theories of regulation, we found that smaller firms preferred legal certainty, whereas larger and influential AI developers often preferred greater legal uncertainty. Information asymmetry also explained differences in preferences. However, economic theories assume the availability of information, whereas emerging technologies entail Knightian factual uncertainty. To account for this, we put forward a complementary sociological explanation for actors’ regulatory preferences, which we term asymmetric legal uncertainty: a situation in which all actors are equally ill-informed, but some, due to a perceived expertise, are given a de facto degree of control over the factual narrative on which legal consequences hinge. We argue that, in such a situation, legal uncertainty allows actors to speculate about future legal outcomes. |
| Date: | 2026–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:tykag_v1 |
| By: | Nicola Fontana (Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin); Tommaso Nannicini (School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute); James M. Snyder, Jr. (Department of Government, Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race. |
| Keywords: | Judicial Elections; Partisan Alignment; Regression Discontinuity |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K40 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep0626 |
| By: | Hashimoto, Barry; Gray, Kevin W.; Duggal, Kabir |
| Abstract: | The meaning of the fair and equitable treatment standard in international investment law remains unsettled. One interpretation ties it to the customary minimum standard of treatment, familiar from the Neer case; another treats it as a more demanding standard deriving from autonomous treaty or customary obligations. State practice, scholarly commentary, and arbitral decisions can be marshaled for both views. In recent decades, however, tribunals have gravitated toward the autonomous interpretation, over the objections of certain writers and the sustained resistance of many states—most notably the U.S., a principal architect of international investment law and a major capital exporter. This article asks why. It surveys and synthesizes leading theories from international political economy, sociology, and law, identifying the contributions and limits of the resulting accounts. It then advances a new theory of jurisprudential drift as coordinated equilibrium maintenance, drawing on insider accounts of arbitration practice and game-theoretic models of cooperation. Senior arbitrators and elite counsel use general principles of arbitration and treaty interpretation to entrench broader interpretations of investment treaties. This equilibrium is sustained by reputational discipline within networks of specialists and practitioners, coupled with interrelated mechanisms of secrecy, judicial economy, and peer review. The article then traces the minimum standard’s doctrinal development, the rise of the modern investment treaty regime, and the evolution of fair and equitable treatment in arbitral practice, state practice, and academic commentary. It argues that prevailing legal explanations cannot account for the observed trajectory of arbitral decisions and that the proposed theory better explains the shift toward broader interpretations of the fair and equitable treatment standard in the case law. |
| Date: | 2026–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:9564y_v1 |
| By: | Marc Deschamps (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur); Dongshuang Hou (Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University); Aymeric Lardon (Université Jean Monnet Saint-Étienne, CNRS, Université Lyon 2, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne); Christian Trudeau (Department of Economics, University of Windsor) |
| Abstract: | We consider a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly where the inverse demand function is obtained by the utility maximization of a representative consumer, and firms may operate at different marginal costs. Assuming that some firms make a cartel while others remain independent, we introduce three new classes of TU-games, referred to as welfare TU-games, each corresponding to consumer surplus, total profit, and total welfare, respectively. Our results show that the games associated with consumer surplus and total welfare are monotonically decreasing and concave, highlighting a snowball effect of cartel formation on these two welfare measures. In contrast, the game associated with total profit is never superadditive, but it is monotonically increasing and concave when the number of firms is sufficiently small. Furthermore, we apply allocation methods, including the Shapley value and the serial method, to determine ex ante fair fines that firms must pay for participating in the cartel, allowing to differentiate fines both on the order of arrival in the cartel and on the technologies of the firms. For instance, in certain scenarios, some inefficient firms may receive lower fines for joining the cartel due to cost synergies. |
| Keywords: | Cournot competition; Cartel; Welfare; Shapley value; Antitrust. |
| JEL: | C71 D43 K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wis:wpaper:2601 |