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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Florian Ballier (CREOGN - Centre de recherche de l'École des officiers de la gendarmerie nationale) |
| Abstract: | "Financial crimes, complex and transnational, don't just threaten the economy—they also make people lose trust in the system and impact financial stability. In 2012, these crimes cost France an estimated €20 billion1. This growing and constantly evolving threat has led France to strengthen its law enforcement arsenal, providing its investigative services with the necessary resources and skills. However, experts such as economist Jean-François Gayraud argue that capitalism has created an environment conducive to large-scale fraud. Money made from illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, infiltrates and corrupts the legitimate economy, blurring the lines between white-collar and organized crime. In other words, these two forms of crime, which were once perceived as distinct, are more connected than ever. (...)" |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05453372 |
| By: | Jarosław Bełdowski; Łukasz Dąbroś; Wiktor Wojciechowski |
| Abstract: | In this study, we use data on Polish civil and commercial courts of first instance to examine the determinants of the court output measured by the number of cases they adjudicate. Besides taking into account a caseload, number of serving judges and auxiliary court staff members, the novelty of the research is that it pays particular attention to the problem of the heterogeneity of cases on the docket which both types of courts are dealing with. Using a set of fixed effects panel data models and addressing potential endogeneity, we test whether this variation promotes court performance or, on the contrary, reduces it. The results confirm that judges play a significant role in resolving cases albeit it considerably varies between distinguished type of adjudications. The auxiliary court staff members also turned out to affect court output in a different way, depending mainly on the type of cases under examination. The results indicate that there can be both synergy and competition in resolving certain types of cases. This synergy can be explained by either judicial backlash or an increase in experience in judges and support staff that makes the judicial process more time-efficient. The competition between certain types of cases may be indicative of opportunistic behaviour in some courts. |
| Keywords: | judicial efficiency, court performance, panel models, case heterogeneity |
| JEL: | C23 K41 K15 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2024103 |
| By: | Prashant Narang (TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation); Renuka Sane (TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 works in practice. The provision sets a time limit for making arbitral awards and allows courts to extend time after the limit expires. Using a dataset of 202 reported orders of the Delhi High Court between 2015 and 2024, the paper examines how extension petitions are decided and whether courts use their powers to impose sanctions for delay. The findings show a clear pattern. Courts grant extensions in almost all cases, often within a few days and usually in a single hearing. By contrast, sanctions are rare. There are no instances of fee reduction, and only a small number of cases involve costs or replacement of arbitrators. Even repeat extension requests are routinely allowed without penalties. The paper argues that this pattern reflects the structure of Section 29A. Granting an extension is simple, especially when parties agree. Imposing sanctions requires courts to identify responsibility for delay and follow procedural safeguards, which takes more time and effort. As a result, the provision operates mainly as a mechanism to regularise delay rather than deter it. The study suggests that deadlines are effective only when consequences are predictable and easy to apply. Where sanctions depend on detailed judicial findings, they are used sparingly. This raises questions about whether court-based enforcement is the right tool for ensuring timely arbitration. |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bjd:wpaper:17 |
| By: | Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | Innovation and the diffusion of new technologies are central to consumer welfare in dynamic markets. On the one hand, mergers may harm innovation by removing independent innovation paths, restricting access to key inputs for innovation, or weakening incentives to adopt and diffuse new technologies. On the other hand, mergers may generate innovation efficiencies when they combine complementary tangible and intangible assets. This article discusses how the revised EU Merger Guidelines should evaluate these opposing forces and proposes a structured approach to assessing innovation harms and efficiencies while ensuring that merger control remains focused on effective competition and consumer welfare. |
| Keywords: | EU merger control, innovation theories of harm, innovation efficiencies, start-up acquisitions, EU Merger Guidelines |
| JEL: | K21 L40 L41 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_741 |
| By: | Gianmarco Daniele; Adam Soliman; Juan Vargas |
| Abstract: | We study how a sharp expansion in Colombian cocaine production propagated internationally through global trade networks, generating substantial social costs. In Colombia, the production surge increased homicide rates by 41% in port areas and by 26% in cocaine producing municipalities. Violence then spilled across the border into Ecuador, a transit hub with negligible cocaine production but dense maritime trade links, contributing to a nearly five-fold increase in homicide rates. The shock travelled through criminal supply chains that exploit legitimate perishable export routes, notably bananas, concentrating activity at maritime chokepoints. In Europe, countries with stronger pre-shock trade ties to Colombia and Ecuador experienced sharp increases in cocaine seizures linked to these origins, lower retail prices, a 60% rise in cocaine consumption in port cities, and 7% higher violent crime in port provinces. Together, these results show that shocks in illicit markets propagate internationally through the same trade networks as legal trade shocks, concentrating violence at contested logistical bottlenecks and expanding downstream drug markets. |
| Keywords: | illicit trade, international spillovers, violence, trade networks, crime |
| Date: | 2026–03–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp2167 |
| By: | Yoonseok Lee (Syracuse University); Peter C. B. Phillips (Yale University, University of Auckland, and Singapore Management University); Suyong Song (University of Iowa); Donggyu Sul (University of Texas at Dallas) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a novel method for identifying observable determinants of latent common trends in nonstationary panel data, which are typically removed or controlled in two-way fixed effects regressions. By examining cross sectional dispersion processes, we assess whether panel series exhibit distributional convergence toward specific observed time series, revealing them as long run determinants of the underlying latent trend. The approach also offers a new perspective on cointegration between time series and panel data, focusing on the relative variation of the panel data with respect to the cointegration error. Applying this method to U.S. state-level crime rates demonstrates that the percentage of young adults is a key determinant of violent crime trends, while the incarceration rate drives property crime trends. These findings, which differ from standard two-way fixed effects analysis results, provide a compelling explanation for the sharp decline in U.S. crime rates since the early 1990s. |
| Date: | 2026–03–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2504 |