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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Daeyoung Jeong (Yonsei University); Jeong Yeol Kim (KDI School of Public Policy and Management) |
| Abstract: | We study cartel detection when two public authorities operate separate leniency programs within the same jurisdiction, as in Korea. We develop a simple repeated-game model to compare single-agency enforcement with dual-agency enforcement, to distinguish independent operation from cooperation, and to examine how the structure of leniency relief affects reporting incentives. When the two programs operate independently and do not recognize each other's leniency status, firms may have weaker incentives to self-report, and reporting can become concentrated in only one program. Cooperation that recognizes leniency rank across authorities restores a race to report and can make self-reporting attractive under a broader range of enforcement environments. The analysis also shows that cooperation is most reliable when early applicants receive comparable treatment across authorities: when second-in-line relief is available only in the administrative program, stronger criminal exposure can reduce the effectiveness of cooperation by raising the residual risk borne by non-first applicants. The policy implication is that effective dual-agency leniency can be achieved through a narrow form of coordination that verifies marker status and aligns the relief structure across authorities while preserving confidentiality. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust, Cartel Detection, Collusion, Dual-agency Enforcement, Leniency Program |
| JEL: | K21 K42 L41 L44 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2026rwp-276 |
| By: | Berkowitz, Daniel M.; Lezama, Guillermo; Nackle, Claire |
| Abstract: | Can government agencies in sanctioning countries deter their companies from violating laws that limit business transactions with sanctioned countries? To understand this issue, we study the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which is the primary enforcer of sanctions in the United States. OFAC announces a company's violations and penalty only after it has successfully completed its investigation. We document that OFAC's announcements were unanticipated and imposed reputational losses that could deter non-compliance throughout the industry when the penalties were large enough and when announcements were made at times when OFAC was being searched intensely on the internet. This suggests that a broader market sentiment sympathetic to OFAC's mission of stopping financial crimes was necessary. |
| Keywords: | Sanctions, reputational losses, salience, announcement, compliance, deterrence |
| JEL: | K42 G18 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:336767 |
| By: | Renuka M. Diwan; Paul J. Eliason; Riley League; Jetson Leder-Luis; Ryan C. McDevitt; James W. Roberts |
| Abstract: | Governments rely on private firms to provide public goods and services. Although competition among these firms reduces prices and the costs of procurement, it has an ambiguous effect on fraud: competition can both dissipate the rents that attracted fraudulent firms to the market while at the same time reducing margins to the point where legitimate firms no longer remain viable. We study this tradeoff in the government’s procurement of durable medical equipment. Following Medicare’s switch from regulated prices to competitive bidding, we find that fraudulent firms’ cost advantage allowed them to gain market share as legitimate firms exited the market. |
| JEL: | D22 D73 H41 I18 K42 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34802 |
| By: | Graham, Amanda (Georgia Southern University); Jonson, Cheryl Lero |
| Abstract: | In the United States, our rights, as provided by the Constitution and its Amendments, are sacred. Over the years, the courts have provided rulings helping clarify and contour the instances in which the public has certain rights in police encounters. However, there is reason to question whether the public knows their rights in police encounters. And are there certain groups of individuals who know more or less about their rights? This study explores the depth of working knowledge about rights in police encounters using two national-level surveys of American adults. Furthermore, it examines the cleavages in this knowledge. In one sample, respondents correctly identified an average of 5.90 of 8 statements, whereas in the other, 5.17 of 8 statements were correctly identified. Furthermore, multivariable analyses from both samples provide evidence of heterogeneity in the working knowledge of rights, which has implications for police-community encounters and the criminal justice system. |
| Date: | 2026–02–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:nwug9_v1 |
| By: | Xinming Du; Benjamin Hansen; Shan Zhang; Eric Zou |
| Abstract: | Colombian coca cultivation fell dramatically between 2000 and 2015, a period that saw intense U.S.-backed eradication and interdiction efforts. That progress reversed in 2015, when peace talks and legal rulings in Colombia opened enforcement gaps. Coca plantation has since increased to record levels, which coincided with a sharp rise in cocaine-related overdose deaths in the U.S. We estimate how much of that rise can be causally attributed to Colombia’s new coca boom. Leveraging the unforeseen coca supply shock and cross-county differences in pre-shock cocaine exposure, we find that the surge in supply caused an immediate rise in overdose mortality in the U.S. Our analysis estimates on the order of 1, 000–1, 500 additional U.S. deaths per year in the late 2010s can be attributed to Colombia’s cocaine boom. Implicit annual loss in American statistical life values about $48, 000 per hectare of cultivation in Colombia. If left untamed, the current level of coca cultivation (over 230, 000 ha in 2022) may impose on the order of $10 billion per year in costs via overdose fatalities. |
| JEL: | D62 F14 F35 H87 I18 K42 O19 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34788 |
| By: | Wu, Victor Y. |
| Abstract: | Mehmood et al. (2023) estimate the effect of Ramadan fasting hours on judicial decisions using case-level data from Pakistan and India. Using exogenous variation in fasting intensity due to the Islamic lunar calendar and latitude, the authors find that Muslim judges are significantly more likely to issue acquittals with longer fasting hours. Their main result, reported in Table 1, shows that each additional hour of fasting beyond the baseline minimum increases acquittal rates by about 10%. I successfully computationally reproduced this main result using the original authors' data and code: I found no coding errors or discrepancies in the replication package, and the point estimates and p-values in my reproduction match those reported in the published article. I then evaluated robustness for the Pakistan sample of judges using three alternative specifications. First, the result is robust to alternative inclusion of control variables: It remains stable and statistically significant whether controlling for case-level covariates, judge-level covariates, both, or none. Second, the effect persists across a different fixed effects specification that includes only district fixed effects. Finally, the result is robust to clustering standard errors at the judge level, although clustering at the month level increases the standard error and renders the estimate statistically insignificant. Overall, the authors' main finding is both computationally reproducible and robust. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:279 |
| By: | Anne Epaulard; Chloé Zapha |
| Abstract: | In France, the 2009 reform of the judicial map profoundly reshaped the territorial distribution of commercial courts. Despite initial fears, court mergers have not undermined the commercial justice system; on the contrary, we show that they have improved the quality of decisions by reducing certain errors of judgment in the handling of insolvencies for companies with fewer than 10 employees. <p> En France, la réforme de la carte judiciaire de 2009 a profondément réorganisé la répartition territoriale des tribunaux de commerce. Malgré les craintes initiales, les fusions de tribunaux n’ont pas dégradé la justice commerciale ; au contraire, nous montrons qu’elles ont amélioré la qualité des décisions en réduisant certaines erreurs de jugement dans le traitement des défaillances pour les entreprises de moins de 10 salariés. |
| Date: | 2026–01–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:econot:428 |
| By: | Braithwaite, Jo |
| Abstract: | The law’s allocation of responsibility for disputed bank payments is important not only for banks and customers, but also, given the volume and value of payments, for the economy more broadly. This article examines loss allocation under common law, EU–UK regulation and the UK’s ‘world-first’ scheme for ‘authorised push payment’ frauds, showing that the gross negligence standard of customer conduct is a common feature. Indeed, this ‘slippery concept’ sits at critical junctures, providing, in practice, the most relevant limitation to a bank’s liability to refund payments. The article analyses what this standard means in English common law and in its regulatory contexts, and highlights the important connection between the two. It then draws upon decisions by the UK’s Financial Ombudsman Service, amongst other sources, to explore how evaluating bank customer conduct works in practice, concluding that it is time for regulators to rethink the status quo. |
| Keywords: | banks; payment; gross negligence; payment services; fraud; Financial Ombudsman Service |
| JEL: | K23 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2026–02–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:130757 |
| By: | Estephane, Pauline Fady; Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim |
| Abstract: | Using data from 50 economies, we re-examine the role of legal origins in shaping labor regulations and explore the consequences of these regulations on labor market outcomes. We find that civil law countries tend to adopt more protective labor regulations while common law countries emphasize flexible employment regulations. We document that de jure protective labor regulations create barriers to labor market entry while de facto flexible employment regulations have adverse informal employment and labor productivity consequences. Our results suggest that flexible employment regulations without adequate labor protection laws can encourage labor exploitation, reduce labor productivity, and are insufficient to draw firms and workers into the formal sector. |
| Keywords: | legal origins; labor regulations; labor market outcomes; informal economy; productivity; B-READY |
| JEL: | E24 E26 J41 J46 J52 J83 K1 K10 K3 |
| Date: | 2025–11–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127377 |
| By: | Candeias, Teresa De Jesus |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the legal challenges and potentialities arising from the implementation of smart contracts and blockchain technology in the oil industry. The research analyzes how these instruments may contribute to enhancing transparency, efficiency, and promptness in access to commercial data, as well as to simplifying regulatory compliance processes. Nevertheless, the study also examines the inherent limitations and risks of their adoption, including difficulties in contractual interpretation, the rigidity of pre-programmed rules, incompatibility with open-ended clauses, and the challenge of adapting to unforeseen circumstances. |
| Keywords: | Smartcontracts; Blockchain; Oil Industry; Petroleum Contracts; Upstream |
| JEL: | K12 K22 K23 K3 L71 |
| Date: | 2026–01–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127802 |