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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Haucap, Justus; Karacuka, Mehmet; Inke, Hakan |
| Abstract: | Utilizing Connor's International Cartel Database and employing difference-in-differences methodology, we find that market concentration, the number of buyers and cartel duration have significant impacts on cartel overcharges. We also find that the European Commission's 2006 guidelines on the method of setting fines for cartel infringements seems to have decreased cartel overcharges in the EU. In addition, the EU's cartel damages directive of 2014 (2014/104/EU) appear to have increased private damage payments. Overall, we find support that these two changes in EU competition policy have a reversing impact on the otherwise increasing trend of cartel overcharges, as making the infringement more costly at least in the EU. |
| Keywords: | Cartel fines, cartel damages, EU guidelines, competition law, antitrust |
| JEL: | L41 K21 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:331876 |
| By: | La Viña, Enrico Antonio B; Ravanilla, Nico |
| Abstract: | Why does public support for mano dura policies, once implemented, either sustain or erode? This study examines the Philippine war on drugs. Using municipal-level vote shares from the 2019 elections—three years into Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency—we measure support for mano dura by analyzing votes for senatorial candidates who backed or opposed the drug war. Pairing this data with municipal-level crime and violence reports from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED) and police blotters, we construct a panel of candidate-municipality observations and employ fixed effects for candidates and municipalities to identify the effects of targeted crimes and state violence on public support. We find that increases in targeted crimes, particularly drug-related offenses, bolster public support for mano dura, while state violence, especially by police, erodes it. These findings reveal a fragile balance between public safety concerns and the costs of repressive governance. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, Elections, crime, repression, justice, law, public safety, state violence, human rights |
| Date: | 2025–08–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:globco:qt3644639k |
| By: | Brunela Kullolli (Faculty of Political Sciences and Law, ?Aleksander Moisiu? University of Durres) |
| Abstract: | This article explores the standards of evidence in civil proceedings from a comparative perspective between the civil law system (with a focus on Albania) and the common law system (with a focus on the United Kingdom). Combining theoretical and practical approaches, the study examines the core principles governing the administration and evaluation of evidence, the role of the judge and the parties, and the rules on admissibility and exclusion of evidence. The analysis is grounded in relevant national legislation, leading jurisprudence, and key judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The article concludes by identifying structural weaknesses in the Albanian system and offers concrete recommendations for aligning it with European standards and ensuring a fair and effective civil trial. |
| Keywords: | Standard of proof, Civil procedure, ECHR, Comparative law, Germany, France, Italy, Albania, Balance of probabilities, Comfortable satisfaction |
| JEL: | K49 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:15616937 |
| By: | Nuno Garoupa; Virginia Rosales; Rok Spruk |
| Abstract: | We investigate how government-orchestrated assaults on the judiciary, disguised as modernization efforts, undermine judicial independence. Our study focuses on Venezuela's constitutional overhaul in the early 2000s, initiated by Hugo Ch\'avez and implemented through a judicial emergency committee. We employ a hybrid synthetic control and difference-in-differences approach to estimate the impact of populist attacks on judicial independence trajectories. By comparing Venezuela to a stable pool of countries without radical constitutional changes, our identification strategy isolates the effect of populist assaults from unobservable confounders and common time trends. Our findings reveal that authoritarian interventions lead to an immediate and lasting breakdown of judicial independence. The deterioration in judicial independence vis-\'a-vis the estimated counterfactual is robust to variations in the donor pool composition. It does not appear to be driven by pre-existing judicial changes and withstands numerous temporal and spatial placebo checks across over nine million randomly sequenced donor samples. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.10681 |