nep-law New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2025–10–20
ten papers chosen by
Yves Oytana, Université de Franche-Comté


  1. Improving Judicial Protection in Intimate Partner Violence Cases: The Role of Specialized Courts and Judges By Carolina Arteaga; Gustavo J. Bobonis; Paola Salardi; Dario Toman
  2. Prosecutorial Reform and Local Crime Rates By Amanda Y. Agan; Jennifer L. Doleac; Anna Harvey; Anna Kyriazis; Lauren R. Schechter
  3. Impact of Leniency Programs and Follow-on Damages on Cartel Deterrence By Karine Brisset; Emmanuel Peterlé
  4. Gender-Based Violence and Judge Responses By Xiqian Cai; Shuai Chen; Zhengquan Cheng; Emily E. Nix
  5. Reversing the School to Prison Pipeline: The Impact of an Adult High School Program By Merola, Emily; Phillips, David; Turner, Patrick S
  6. AI, Antitrust and Privacy By Maurice E. Stucke
  7. Publicity Rights and Integrated IP Strategy By Alexander Cuntz; Alessio Muscarnera; Julio Raffo
  8. What is the Best Response? Examining the Impact of Police and Their Alternatives By Bocar A. Ba; Patton Chen; Tony Cheng; Martha C. Eies; Justin E. Holz
  9. The Impacts of Restrictions to Individual Rights on Indigenous Lands By Jordán, Felipe; Jaimovich, Dany; Heilmayr, Robert
  10. Private Law Frameworks for Tokenized Assets: Implications from Legal Developments in Switzerland, Germany, France, and the United States By Taiga Okuyama; Kazutoshi Sugimura

  1. By: Carolina Arteaga; Gustavo J. Bobonis; Paola Salardi; Dario Toman
    Abstract: We study the large-scale implementation of a system of specialized domestic violence courts (SDVCs), an innovation in access to justice programs for potential victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) and offenders. Using individual-level administrative data from the universe of civil domestic violence cases in Puerto Rico during the period 2014-2020, we leverage the staggered opening of SDVCs across judicial regions to examine the consequences for victims’ judicial protection and offender recidivism. Access to SDVCs leads to a considerable 8 percentage points increase in the probability that judges issue a protection order and a 1.7 percentage point (15 percent) decrease in victim and offender reappearance rates within one year of the start of the case. Effects are more pronounced for cases in which parties have children in common and in which access to SDVCs is more limited. Linking the case data to administrative and survey data on judges, we show that the priorities of judges assigned to SDVCs play a prominent role in explaining these outcomes.
    Keywords: intimate partner violence; judicial protection; specialized courts
    JEL: K4 K36 K42
    Date: 2025–09–17
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-803
  2. By: Amanda Y. Agan; Jennifer L. Doleac; Anna Harvey; Anna Kyriazis; Lauren R. Schechter
    Abstract: Many communities across the United States have elected reform-minded prosecutors who seek to safely reduce the reach and burden of the criminal justice system. In this paper, we use variation in the timing of when these prosecutors took office across jurisdictions to empirically characterize their policy changes and estimate downstream effects on prison incarceration rates, local reported crime rates, and drug mortality rates. We find that after a reform prosecutor takes office there are consistent and often statistically significant decreases in charging and conviction rates for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses, particularly misdemeanor drug offenses, but not for violent or felony offenses. We find little to no downstream effects on prison incarceration rates and no effects on local reported crime rates or drug mortality rates. These findings suggest that the types of policies being implemented by reform prosecutors appear to be decreasing the footprint of the criminal justice system without adverse effects on public safety.
    JEL: K14 K4
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34364
  3. By: Karine Brisset (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Emmanuel Peterlé (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France)
    Abstract: Leniency programs encourage corporate cooperation with antitrust authorities by offering immunity or fine reductions for reporting illegal cartels. While prior studies suggest these programs discourage collusion and destabilize existing cartels, experimental evidence in environments with unrestricted communication indicates that the effectiveness of leniency is not clear-cut. We conduct a laboratory experiment in such an environment to examine the interaction between leniency programs and follow-on private damages, proposing the use of Fair Funds to maintain victim compensation and preserve incentives for leniency application. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the prospect of private damages can increase cartel formation, though this effect is mitigated when our Fair Funds compensation scheme is introduced. In addition, leniency applications decline when private damages are introduced, but this decline is partially offset by the presence of Fair Funds.
    Keywords: Antitrust, Illegal Cartels, Leniency Programs, Private Damages
    JEL: C92 D03 K21 K42 L41
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2025-12
  4. By: Xiqian Cai; Shuai Chen; Zhengquan Cheng; Emily E. Nix
    Abstract: In China, only 37% of divorce petitions citing domestic violence are granted, with evidence suggesting that judges often prioritize preserving marriages even in cases of abuse. We investigate whether judicial decision-making can shift in response to broader social change. Exploiting the rise of the #MeToo movement, which reshaped societal perceptions of gender-based violence, we find that female judges in China became 8 percentage points more likely to grant divorces in domestic violence cases. These results suggest that judicial attitudes and actions on gender-based violence cases are malleable.
    JEL: J12 K36 K38
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34345
  5. By: Merola, Emily (Princeton University); Phillips, David (University of Notre Dame); Turner, Patrick S (University of Notre Dame)
    Abstract: The criminal justice system primarily arrests and incarcerates people without high school diplomas. We estimate the causal effect of a high school diploma on criminal justice system contact for a set of people who previously exited high school but then attended The Excel Center (TEC), a network of high schools for adults. Compared to those who apply but do not enroll, students who enroll but exit without a diploma do not experience a decline in criminal charges. Criminal charges for students who complete a diploma, on the other hand, decline by 49% the year following application, an effect which largely persists for at least five years. These effects are sufficiently large to increase the cost-effectiveness of the program by 2-5 times. The pattern of effects also suggests that, beyond simple incapacitation, getting an adult high school diploma itself leads to lower contact with the criminal justice system.
    Keywords: human capital, returns to education, high school diploma, GED, crime
    JEL: K42 I24 I26
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18168
  6. By: Maurice E. Stucke (University of Tennessee Winston College of Law)
    Abstract: Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping how companies profile individuals, create and target ads, and influence behavior—often in ways that undermine privacy, autonomy, and democracy. This article explores a critical but overlooked question: how AI affects the relationship between competition and privacy. Increased competition in the AI supply chain may seem like a solution to Big Tech's dominance, but when firms are rewarded for surveillance and manipulation, more competition can actually make things worse. Drawing on recent market trends and twenty state privacy laws, the Article shows how the existing legal frameworks-even those designed to protect privacy—fall short and may unintentionally entrench the power of few data-opolies. It argues that privacy and competition must be addressed together, not in silos, and offers specific legislative reforms to help align business incentives with public interests. Without stronger guardrails, AI risks accelerating a race to the bottom—fueled not only by powerful technologies, but by well-intentioned, but flawed policies.
    Keywords: Antitrust, privacy, monopolies, data, artificial intelligence
    JEL: K21 K24 L40 L41 L50 O33
    Date: 2025–06–25
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:thk:wpaper:inetwp236
  7. By: Alexander Cuntz; Alessio Muscarnera; Julio Raffo
    Abstract: "Rights of publicity†provide a degree of control over one's name, image, and likeness (NILs), and can have significant commercial value, especially with the advent of artificial intelligence and digital replicas. Although publicity rights have recently received substantial media and legislative attention, they have so far escaped the attention of economists. This article remedies that with the first empirical examination of publicity rights, using asynchronous changes in U.S. state laws to explore potentially welfare-improving economic incentives and the interaction of NIL protections with other intellectual property rights, thus laying the foundation for a new line of economic inquiry.
    Keywords: Publicity right, Likeness, Copyright, Trademark, Empirical, Difference-in-differences
    JEL: O34 O33 K42 L82 Z10
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wip:wpaper:89
  8. By: Bocar A. Ba; Patton Chen; Tony Cheng; Martha C. Eies; Justin E. Holz
    Abstract: Cities across America are adopting civilian crisis response programs as alternatives to traditional policing, yet causal evidence on their impact and cost-effectiveness is scarce. This paper evaluates Durham, North Carolina’s HEART program, which diverts nonviolent 911 calls from police. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that HEART reduces crime reports, arrests, and response times—primarily through civilian phone and in-person responses, rather than police-civilian co-responses. The program increases future 911 calls, which suggests it fosters public trust. Based on an original contingent valuation survey and applying the marginal value of public funds framework, we conclude that HEART is a fiscally self-sustainable intervention.
    JEL: H10 H4
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34344
  9. By: Jordán, Felipe; Jaimovich, Dany; Heilmayr, Robert
    Abstract: Many countries in the Americas impose restrictions on Indigenous land transactions to preserve Indigenous ownership, but these policies may inhibit economic growth. This paper evaluates the impact of Chiles 1993 Indigenous Law, which restricts the transfer, lease, and mortgaging of land in Mapuche territories. Using property records, we find that the law has slowed Mapuche territorial loss. However, its effectiveness has declined over time, coinciding with a reduction in properties registered in the Public Registry of Indigenous Territories (PRIT), a key enforcement tool. Analysis of property sales following owner deaths underscores the PRITs critical role, with listed properties experiencing lower sales rates and smaller reductions in Indigenous ownership compared to unlisted properties. Using remotely sensed data and two complementary identification strategies, we reject meaningfully large impacts of PRIT on land use. The results highlight that transfer restrictions on individual property rights can serve as an effective tool to protect Indigenous ownership without imposing significant economic burdens, although special attention should be given to the design of enforcement mechanisms to ensure their effective implementation.
    JEL: D23 K11 J15 O17 Q15
    Date: 2025–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:14292
  10. By: Taiga Okuyama (Bank of Japan); Kazutoshi Sugimura (Bank of Japan)
    Abstract: In recent years, "asset tokenization" has attracted attention, with proof-of-concept experiments and actual transactions progressing worldwide. These initiatives can be understood as efforts to introduce new technologies to payment and settlement systems and extend their functionality in such a way that is only possible with digital technologies. As a prerequisite for that, legal stability concerning rights is essential. Various approaches exist among jurisdictions regarding how to determine private rights concerning the holding and transfer of tokenized assets. In this paper, we (i) extract the private law elements required for asset holding and transfer, (ii) analyze the legal developments carried out in Switzerland, Germany, France, and the United States while focusing on how these elements can be satisfied during tokenization, and (iii) provide an overview of proof-of-concept experiments and actual transactions conducted based on these developments. As a result of the analysis, a difference was confirmed between cryptoassets such as Bitcoin and tokenized assets: the former is designed to take on the characteristics of transferable assets by placing emphasis on the exclusivity of the power to dispose of tokens held by the managers of private keys rather than the principle of consensual transfer of rights, while the latter is premised on the structure that "rights in personam" (typically, claims) are recorded by tokens. Similarly, in Japan, considering these characteristics of tokenized assets, it would seem to be an option to proceed with further clarification of private rights through refinement of legal interpretation while considering legislative solutions that reference precedents from the above countries.
    Keywords: tokenization; control; principle of consensual transfer of rights; requirements for perfection; transactional security
    JEL: G18 G38 K11 K22
    Date: 2025–10–17
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boj:bojwps:wp25e12

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