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on Law and Economics |
| By: | "María Greiss Sánchez Gonzales " (Universidad Tecnológica del Perú, Escuela de posgrado, Lima, Perú Author-2-Name: Author-2-Workplace-Name: Author-3-Name: Author-3-Workplace-Name: Author-4-Name: Author-4-Workplace-Name: Author-5-Name: Author-5-Workplace-Name: Author-6-Name: Author-6-Workplace-Name: Author-7-Name: Author-7-Workplace-Name: Author-8-Name: Author-8-Workplace-Name:) |
| Abstract: | " Objective - This study aims to conduct a comparative analysis of the anti-money laundering systems in Peru, Colombia, and the United States, focusing on the functional and regulatory effectiveness of their respective financial intelligence units: UIF (Peru), UIAF (Colombia), and FinCEN (USA). Methodology/Technique - The methodology applied a mixed-methods design, integrating qualitative content analysis and quantitative indicator evaluation through an operational matrix, based on the study of six emblematic judicial cases selected by intentional sampling. Findings - The results reveal substantial differences in regulatory frameworks, technological capacity, and institutional responses. While Colombia and the United States demonstrate more robust operational systems and technological adaptation, Peru shows significant limitations in institutional autonomy and inter-agency coordination. Moreover, although the United States has advanced legal instruments, the absence of proportional criminal sanctions in high-profile cases highlights enforcement challenges. Novelty - The study concludes that effective anti-money laundering strategies depend not only on the existence of regulatory frameworks but also on institutional independence, technological investment, and coordinated efforts. The findings offer relevant insights for strengthening global financial crime prevention systems through enhanced governance and international cooperation. Type of Paper - Empirical" |
| Keywords: | Money laundering; financial intelligence; economic crime prevention; international cooperation; financial regulation. |
| JEL: | K42 F36 G28 H26 O38 |
| Date: | 2025–09–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gtr:gatrjs:afr242 |
| By: | Ayres, Ian; Donohue, John J. III |
| Abstract: | In our initial article—Shooting Down the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis—we reached two main conclusions: First, that there was no credible statistical evidence that the adoption of concealed-carry (or "shall-issue") laws reduced crime; and second, that the best, although admittedly quite imperfect, data suggested that the laws increased the costs of crime to the tune of $1 billion per year (which is a relatively small number given the total cost of FBI index crimes of roughly $114 billion per year). In their response to our article, Florenz Plassmann and John Whitley (PW) offer two sets of evidence in support of their view that that concealed-carry laws are beneficial: First, they argue that some of our regression specifications really buttress their position; and second, they analyze some new county data for the period 1977-2000. Their first method of proof fails because it simply overlooks—without even a single word of commentary!—the entire thrust of our paper: that aggregated specifications of the effects of these laws are badly marred by "jurisdiction selection" effects. We did not misread these aggregated estimates, as PW suggest; we simply showed that the PW claims based on these aggregated estimates are inaccurate and misleading. The data at every turn reject the idea that concealed-carry laws passed in different jurisdictions have a uniform impact on crime. Therefore, the results of disaggregated regressions must, counter to PW's claim, be taken as a more authoritative assessment of the overall impact of concealed-carry laws. |
| Date: | 2025–10–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:lawarc:kq3yj_v1 |
| By: | Gutmann, Jerg; Lewczuk-Czerwińska, Anna; Lewkowicz, Jacek; Voigt, Stefan |
| Abstract: | Constitutions as the formal foundation of a country's legal and political system have important economic and political effects. Yet, we still know little about why constitutions set effective constraints on politicians in some societies, while being largely disregarded in others. Here, we ask if national culture matters for constitutional compliance. We study a cross-section of 115 countries, making use of novel indicators of constitutional compliance. We find that societies with a more individualistic population exhibit higher levels of compliance. These results are robust and extend to instrumental variable estimations. They imply a novel transmission channel from cultural traits to long-term economic development: individualistic national culture increases the credibility of constitutional self-commitments. Our analysis also supports the more general idea that the effects of formal institutions depend on the informal institutional environment in which they are embedded. Regarding religion, our results are consistent with past research that attributes the lack of development in the modern Muslim world to deficient institutional quality. |
| Keywords: | Constitutional compliance, culture, individualism, Islam, long-term orientation, moral universalism, power distance, rule of law |
| JEL: | H11 K10 K42 P48 Z10 Z12 Z18 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:85 |
| By: | Jerg Gutmann; Martin Rode |
| Abstract: | Populist governance is fundamentally at odds with constitutionalism. As a political project, populism rejects constraints on “the will of the people, ” including those essential to liberal-democratic constitutions. Yet, the extent to which elected populists actually undermine constitutional order remains contested. This article presents the first empirical analysis of whether constitutional compliance declines following the electoral success of populist parties in parliament and government. Using novel indicators of party populism and constitutional compliance, we find that the entry of populists into government leads to an erosion of constitutional norms, while their mere parliamentary presence has no systematic effect. This negative impact is primarily driven by a weakening of political and civil rights. Our results further show that populist parties — as distinct from individual leaders — are the primary drivers of noncompliance, and that the ideological orientation of these parties predicts the extent of their threat to constitutional order. |
| Keywords: | populism, constitutional compliance, constitutionalism, political ideology, rule of law |
| JEL: | D72 D78 K38 K42 P16 P26 P37 P48 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12191 |
| By: | Benito Arruñada |
| Abstract: | This article suggests that the partial but strong incentives that characterized privately valuable public services in the classical 'liberal' state might be more effective than the comprehensive but weak incentives introduced by the 'internal markets' created when reforming the welfare state. The article compares three organizational forms: (1) the bureaucratic expense center used to provide privately valuable services such as healthcare through the organizations created by the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them; and (3) the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services. This comparison suggests that market forces may play a better role in organizing public services when they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible and, at the same time, reduces the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff. |
| Keywords: | internal markets, competition, public services, bureaucracy, expense centers, welfare, incentives, user fees, user choice |
| JEL: | H11 H42 H51 H52 K23 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1899 |
| By: | Jacopo Gambato; Bernhard Ganglmair; Julia Krämer |
| Abstract: | In a model of asymmetric regulation, a firm can comply with two regulatory targets, and a regulator can audit the firm for compliance. Inspection by the regulator is imperfect, and it assesses the firm’s compliance with the targets with different success probabilities. The firm fully complies only if compliance costs are low. Otherwise, the firm always prioritizes the requirement that is easier to enforce. Expanding regulatory capacity positively affects compliance with the easy-to-enforce target; however, a higher capacity can harm compliance with the hard-to-enforce target. |
| Keywords: | agency resources, asymmetric enforcement, compliance, multi-tasking, regulation |
| JEL: | H32 K20 L51 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_706 |
| By: | Pavithra Manivannan (xKDR Forum) |
| Abstract: | Tribunals were expected to deliver better outcomes than traditional courts on three counts: speed, expertise, and cost. In practice, they have largely morphed into courts with limited subject-matter jurisdiction. Vacancies, lack of expertise, and procedural delays have eroded their supposed advantage. The result is a fragmented adjudicatory landscape that consumes resources without delivering better outcomes. Reform efforts, whether abolition, consolidation, or design tweaks, have lacked evidence and a holistic perspective of the judicial system. This paper highlights the need for systematic evaluation of tribunals as a starting point and makes the case for building institutional capacity to undertake such assessments. It then draws on examples from the United States and the United Kingdom to propose reform pathways that are sensitive to the nature of disputes and the degree of judicial function they require. |
| JEL: | K K41 K49 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anf:wpaper:41 |
| By: | Tin Cheuk Leung (Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA); Shi Qi (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary University, Williamsburg, VA, USA); Koleman Strumpf (Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA) |
| Abstract: | Self-preferencing by dominant digital platforms has become a focal point for antitrust scrutiny, yet little empirical work has examined this behavior in the context of video streaming. This paper provides the first systematic analysis of self-preferencing on a subscription-based streaming platform, focusing on Netflix. We assemble a novel dataset that combines a weekly panel of Netflix’s U.S. catalog from 2016 to 2025, official Top 10 rankings since 2021, Wikipedia page views as an external proxy for popularity, and device-level streaming data from tens of millions of U.S. smart TVs. We begin by showing that the exit of licensed series significantly increases the likelihood of subscriber churn, whereas the effect of movie exits is small and even slightly negative. This underscores the risks of dependence on non-original serialized content and motivates Netflix’s incentives to promote Originals. We then document that Netflix Originals are substantially more likely to appear in the Top 10 rankings than non-originals, conditional on popularity and availability. The magnitude of this self-preferencing effect is comparable to the influence of popularity itself, especially for serialized content. Finally, using a difference-in-differences design with matched titles, we show that Top 10 inclusion has a significant causal impact on subsequent viewer engagement, with stronger effects for Originals. Taken together, our findings suggest that Netflix leverages interface prominence to steer attention toward its proprietary content while insulating itself from the risks associated with expiring licenses, raising important implications for content competition and platform governance in the streaming era. |
| Keywords: | Self-Preferencing; Netflix; Digital Platforms; Platform Bias |
| JEL: | D22 K21 L40 L82 M21 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:2508 |