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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Daniel Montolio (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Pere A. Taberner (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB & KSNET) |
| Abstract: | Student performance at university significantly influences individual decisions and future opportunities, especially in labour markets. This paper analyses the impact of local crime on student performance during higher education, with a focus on potential gender differences. Following students over their bachelor’s years, the identification strategy exploits granular local crime variation – violent and non-violent crimes – near students’ residences before sitting a final exam. We consider both spatial and temporal patterns of crime exposure by estimating a panel data model with student, exam and district-month fixed-effects to provide causal estimates. Our findings suggest that violent crimes have a negative impact on student performance, while non-violent have no significant effect. Notably, the results are mainly driven by high-ability female students, with suggestive evidence that male students in the bottom or middle parts of the grade distribution are also affected. |
| Keywords: | Local violent crime, academic performance, higher education, gender differences |
| JEL: | A22 I23 J16 K42 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2025-07 |
| By: | Thomas Barbiero (Department of Economics, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, Canada); Daniele Bertolini (Law and Business, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, Canada) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the determinants of environmental liability insurance (ELI) market penetration in Italy. The uptake of (ELI) in Italy shows significant regional disparities, with the North and Centre having a higher level of coverage compared to the South. Only 0.45% of Italian companies had comprehensive (ELI) in 2021, and 0.64% in 2022, the year for which the most recent data are available. We show that the low uptake of ELI and the large North-South divide, lies in the uneven regulatory landscape and enforcement intensity across regions. To bridge this gap and enhance ELI adoption, comprehensive policy interventions are necessary, including uniform national enforcement of environmental regulations, expansion of mandatory insurance requirements, financial and market-based incentives for firms, educational programs to address awareness and behavioral biases, and initiatives to reduce information asymmetries. Our results for Italy, may be applicable to other countries with similar national environmental laws, market maturity of the insurance sector, and the behavioral profile of firms. |
| Keywords: | Insurance Law and Economics, Insurance Demand, Under Purchased Insurance, Regulatory Pressure, Environmental Liability Insurance, Environmental Liability Directive, Behavioral Anomalies, Pollution Coverage Equilibrium |
| JEL: | K22 K32 G22 Q5 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp095 |
| By: | Jan van Ours (Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute) |
| Abstract: | Around 50 years ago, the Netherlands decriminalized cannabis for recreational use. This paper uses retrospective data on the ages at which individuals began and ceased cannabis use to reconstruct its prevalence in Amsterdam during the period surrounding the policy change. This approach enables a detailed analysis of the policy’s effects. The main conclusion is that the introduction of this policy did not lead to an increase in the prevalence of cannabis use. |
| JEL: | I12 I18 K42 |
| Date: | 2025–02–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250009 |
| By: | L A Esposito (UNITO - Università degli studi di Torino = University of Turin); A. Melcarne (CNRS, EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre, 92001 Nanterre); Giovanni Battista Ramello (UNITO - Università degli studi di Torino = University of Turin); R. Zanola (Università del Piemonte Orientale) |
| Abstract: | Abstract Despite extensive literature focusing on the concept of supply-induced demand, there remains a notable dearth of contributions in law and economics. This paper seeks to address this gap by investigating the role of tax advisors in stimulating the demand for litigation in a specific case. To this aim, the paper analyses data from Italy concerning advisors who can push the client to litigate an allegation of the tax authority that could otherwise be solved. The information imbalance between advisors and taxpayers can determine an incentive for the former group to promote litigation to gain from these legal causes. We observe that this phenomenon may be mainly observed in regions in which there is low economic activity, and then not only the opportunity cost for accountants to devote themselves to more lucrative activities is lower, but indeed, litigation can represent an additional source of income, thus representing a profit-maximizing strategy. The results suggest that SID does not depend on the specific field but on the agency relationship, coupling a fiduciary duty with with a mandatory decision to be taken in a short time span. |
| Keywords: | Supplier induced demand · Best interest of client · Fiduciary duty · Accounting · Tax advisors · Tax litigation |
| Date: | 2025–03–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05093600 |
| By: | Evan K. Rose; Yotam Shem-Tov |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the earnings and employment penalties associated with a criminal record. Using a large-scale dataset linking criminal justice and employer-employee wage records, we estimate two-way fixed effects models that decompose earnings into worker’s portable earnings potential and firm pay premia, both of which are allowed to shift after a worker acquires a record. We find that firm pay premia explain a small share of earnings gaps between workers with and without a record. There is little evidence of variable within-firm premia gaps either. Instead, components of workers’ earnings potential that persist across firms explain the bulk of gaps. Conditional on earnings potential, workers with a record are also substantially less likely to be employed. Difference-in-differences estimates comparing workers’ first conviction to workers charged but not convicted or charged later support these findings. The results suggest that criminal record penalties operate primarily by changing whether workers are employed and their earnings potential at every firm rather than increasing sorting into lower-paying jobs, although the bulk of gaps can be attributed to differences that existed prior to acquiring a record. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:25-39 |
| By: | Nogueira, Lauro; Rebouças de Souza, Nathanael Andray; Rodrigues, Fábio Lúcio; Gomes de Souza, Helson |
| Abstract: | This study investigated the impacts of water scarcity and/or periods of extreme drought on homicide rates in Brazilian municipalities, particularly rural ones. Using a survey of 769, 774 data points that combined climate information, socioeconomic data of victims, homicide rates, and municipal socioeconomic variables as controls, between 2002 and 2020. The study also outlined a profile of homicide victims in rural municipalities for a deeper understanding of the issue. The results show that water scarcity and/or periods of extreme drought increase firearm homicide rates in rural municipalities of Brazil, with higher homicide rates in the region leading to greater observed effects. In summary, there are indications of a phenomenon of crime interiorization, especially in predominantly rural municipalities. |
| Keywords: | Violence in Rural Areas. Homicide Rates. Crime Interiorization. Rural Municipalities. |
| JEL: | I3 J1 R1 |
| Date: | 2025–07–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:125310 |
| By: | Sindri Engilbertsson (University of Amsterdam); Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Leonard Treuren (KU Leuven) |
| Abstract: | Competition authorities impose substantial penalties on firms engaging in illegal price-fixing. We examine how basing cartel fines on either revenue, profit, or price overcharge influences cartel and market prices, as well as cartel incidence and stability. In an infinitely repeated Bertrand oligopoly game, we show that revenue-based fines incentivize firms to charge prices above the monopoly price, whereas only overcharge-based fines encourage prices below the monopoly price. Cartels are stable for a smaller range of discount factors when fines are based on overcharges rather than other bases. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where subjects can form cartels, which allows them to discuss pricing at the risk of being detected and fined. By equalizing expected fines across treatments, we isolate the effect of the fine's base. We find that market prices are lowest under overcharge-based fines and highest under revenue-based fines. Variation in market prices across treatments is fully driven by cartel prices. While these results align with the theoretical predictions, cartel incidence remains unchanged across regimes. Our results suggest competition authorities could improve enforcement by shifting from revenue-based fines to profit- or overcharge-based fines. |
| Date: | 2025–02–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250012 |
| By: | Matias Nunez; Danilo Coelho; Carlos Alós-Ferrera; Salvador Barberà |
| Abstract: | Arbitrators for high-stakes conflicts, as well as judges and other officials, are of- ten appointed through structured bargaining protocols. The theoretical literature models these protocols as extensive-form games with perfect information, evaluating them based on the merits of their subgame-perfect equilibria, such as efficiency. However, decision makers often fail to implement backward induction and exhibit other-regarding preferences. In a large experiment, we compare two prominent protocols and show that those concerns affect outcomes. Bargaining protocols whose equilibria are unfair (in a maximin sense) fare poorly compared to those favoring compromises. However, lengthy protocols face limitations because they elicit non-equilibrium behavior. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, fairness, backward induction, Appointment rules |
| JEL: | C78 C92 D63 D74 D82 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1490 |