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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Céline Launay (CLLE - Cognition, langues, langage, ergonomie - EPHE - École Pratique des Hautes Études - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - UBM - Université Bordeaux Montaigne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UT - Université de Toulouse); Stéphane Luchini (AMU - Aix Marseille Université, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Danica Mijovic-Prelec (MIT Sloan - Sloan School of Management - MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Drazen Prelec (MIT Sloan - Sloan School of Management - MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Jacques Py (CLLE - Cognition, langues, langage, ergonomie - EPHE - École Pratique des Hautes Études - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - UBM - Université Bordeaux Montaigne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UT - Université de Toulouse); Julie Rosaz (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)); Jason F. Shogren (UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Eyewitness testimony is the most powerful form of evidence in a court of law. Eyewitnesses affect both the odds of conviction and the severity of sentences of the guilty. But eyewitnesses also lie, and false testimony is the primarily cause of wrongful convictions. Most of the extant literature focuses on eyewitness reliability and credibility assessment, but very little is known about the efficiency of the main mechanism used in-field to foster eyewitness honesty: a solemn truth-telling oath-the most ancient and worldwide institution used in the solemn legal ceremony underpinning criminal cases. Herein we examine how the truth-telling oath actually affects the level of eyewitness deception. Using a controlled experimental test designed to address this question, we show that an eyewitness who is exogenously incentivized to lie and takes a solemn oath is significantly less likely to use deception. In contrast with the related literature focusing on the detection of lies, we show that an oath actually works to improve truth-telling. The oath is not just ceremonial, it plays a key role in improving efficiency within the court. |
| Keywords: | Eye-witness testimony, Truth-telling oath, Controlled experiment |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04855141 |
| By: | Elisabetta Iossa (CEIS & DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Chiara Latour (University of Stockholm) |
| Abstract: | Do firms with higher legality standards contribute to better procurement outcomes? We address this question in the context of Italian public works procurement, by combining contract-level data on procurement and firm-level data on legality scores, using the Legality Rating System managed by the Italian Antitrust Authority. We find that higher legality scores are positively associated with a significant and economically important improvement in procurement efficiency, measured by shorter time delays and lower extra costs. |
| Keywords: | Cartels, corruption, firm efficiency, legality, procurement |
| JEL: | H57 K40 L4 |
| Date: | 2025–02–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:592 |
| By: | Margherita Bove; Patricia Justino |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the state and evolution of the rule of law in Mozambique, focusing on key dimensions such as voice and political participation, judicial independence and accessibility, corruption, access to basic services, personal security, and property rights. Drawing on Afrobarometer surveys, voting data, and conflict records, the paper offer insights into the perceptions and experiences of Mozambican citizens. |
| Keywords: | Rule of law, Trust, Institutions, Mozambique |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2025-1 |
| By: | Nobumichi Teramura (Universiti Brunei Darussalam); Luke Nottage (The University of Sydney); Bruno Jetin (Universiti Brunei Darussalam, CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université Sorbonne Paris Nord) |
| Abstract: | This open access book explores Asian approaches towards investment arbitration—a transnational procedure to resolve disputes between a foreign investor and a host state—setting it in the wider political economy and within domestic law contexts. It considers the extent to which significant states in Asia are, or could become, "rule makers" rather than "rule takers" regarding corruption and serious illegality in investor-state arbitration. Corruption and illegality in international investment are widely condemned in any society, but there remains a lack of consensus on the consequences, especially in investment arbitration. A core issue addressed is whether a foreign investor violating a host state's law should be awarded protection of its investment, as per its contract with the host state and/or the applicable investment or trade agreement between the home state and the host state. Some suggest such protection would be unnecessary as the investor committed a crime in the host state, while others attempt to establish an equilibrium between the investor and the host state. Others claim to protect investment, invoking the sanctity of promises made. The book starts with a deep dive into economic and legal issues in corruption and investment arbitration and then explores the situation and issues in major countries in the region in detail. It is a useful reference point for lawyers, economists, investors, and government officials who are seeking comprehensive and up-to-date information on anti-bribery rules in Asian investment treaties. It is of particular interest to students and researchers in economics, finance, and law, who are undertaking new research relating to the multifaceted impacts of corruption. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Bribery, Arbitration, International commercial Law, Foreign Direct Investment, Helping hand, Grabbing hand, Asian Economics, Business Law, Dispute Resolution, Mediation, Political Economy/Economic Systems, Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics, Financial Economics, International Economic Law, Trade Law |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04553647 |
| By: | Carballa-Smichowski, Bruno; Lefouili, Yassine; Mantovani, Andrea; Reggiani, Carlo |
| Abstract: | Data combination and analytics can generate valuable insights for firms and society as a whole. Firms can seize these opportunities by joining platforms that either allow them to access the data contributed by other firms or provide the result of the analytics performed on such data, depending on whether the platform adopts ''data sharing'' or "analytics sharing" technologies. The former technology enables firms to exploit their data endowment together with the data contributed by others, whereas the latter offers advantages in terms of privacy and security by reducing data transmission. We present a model that allows us to study the economic and managerial incentives generated by these technologies for both firms and a platform. First, we find that the platform chooses analytics sharing only when the security advantage of this technology is sufficiently large. Second, we show that analytics sharing results in a higher total data contribution than data sharing under general and reasonable conditions. Third, we determine the optimal data-combination technology from the perspective of consumers and discuss potential misalignments between the platform's and consumers' preferred technology. Our findings carry relevant policy and managerial implications, offering a pathway to enhance both data provision and security. |
| Keywords: | Data sharing; analytics sharing; data platforms |
| JEL: | D43 K21 L11 L13 L41 L86 M21 M31 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130300 |