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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Jacopo Gambato; Bernhard Ganglmair; Julia K. Krämer |
| Abstract: | This chapter explores the interaction between the enforcement of and compliance with difficult-to-enforce rules in the context of data regulation. We focus on the effect of the introduction of the GDPR and its transparency principle on the readability of privacy policies for a large sample of German firms. Germany has a system of state-level data protection authorities. These data regulators enforce the same rules but face diverse funding situations, allowing for an ideal setting to study the role of a regulator's capacity in firms' compliance decisions. We find that while, on average, the GDPR lead to less readable policies, firms active in industries that have in the past received more regulatory scrutiny and those active in jurisdictions of better-funded data regulators exhibit a stronger compliance with the GDPR's readability requirement. These results exemplify a more general interaction between regulators' enforcement activity and firms' regulatory compliance. |
| JEL: | D22 K20 L51 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32913 |
| By: | Senlin Miao (NUAA - Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics [Nanjing]); Zhaobo Zhu (Audencia Business School); Xiaohua Deng (University of New South Wales [Kensington]); Fenghua Wen (Central South University [Changsha]) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the interplay between politics and law enforcement in China and its effects on firm financing decisions. By examining a sample of corporate lawsuits involving listed firms in China, we find that politically connected firms are less likely to be defendants, have higher win rates, and experience shorter litigation durations than non-connected firms. Additionally, we observe that firms with higher legal risk extend more accounts receivable and receive less accounts payable, but this relationship holds only for non-connected firms. Our findings support the financing advantage theory for politically connected firms and the legal risk compensation view for non-connected firms. Moreover, reforms in China's judicial system do not appear to mitigate the disadvantages faced by non-connected firms in terms of lawsuit outcomes and trade credit provision. Our findings suggest that well-functioned judicial independence might be still lacking in China, and that political connections continue to negatively impact law enforcement and corporate policies. |
| Keywords: | Lawsuits, Judicial reforms, Political connections, Trade credit |
| Date: | 2024–10–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04670162 |
| By: | Fletcher, Jason |
| Abstract: | A maturing literature across the social sciences suggests important impacts of the intergenerational transmission of crime as well as peer effects that determine youth criminal activities. This paper explores these channels by examining gender-specific effects of maternal and paternal incarceration from both own-parents and classmate-parents. This paper also adds to the literature by exploiting across-cohort, within school exposure to peer parent incarceration to enhance causal inference. While the intergenerational correlations of criminal activities are similar by gender (father-son/mother-son), the results suggest that peer parent incarceration transmits effects largely along gender lines, which is suggestive of specific learning mechanisms. Peer maternal incarceration increases adolescent female criminal activities and reduces male crime and the reverse is true for peer paternal incarceration. These effects are strongest for youth reports of selling drugs and engaging in physical violence. In contrast, the effects of peer parental incarceration on other outcomes, such as GPA, do not vary by gender. |
| Date: | 2024–09–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:35a8w |
| By: | Berlinski, Samuel; Gagete-Miranda, Jessica |
| Abstract: | This study examines labor law enforcement spillovers in Brazil's highly informal economy, focusing on disability quota enforcement for formal firms. New inspection procedures increased compliance through heightened inspections and fines, boosting disability hiring. We investigate spillover effects across various firm networks: neighborhood, ownership, and human resources specialists. Results show that spillovers can have up to twice the impact on disability employment compared to direct fines. These findings highlight the potential for targeted enforcement strategies to amplify policy effectiveness beyond directly affected firms even in developing economies characterized by low compliance with employment laws. |
| Keywords: | Enforcement spillovers;Networks;persons with disability;Brazil |
| JEL: | I38 J68 K31 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:13681 |
| By: | Sahana Simha; M. P. Ram Mohan |
| Abstract: | Trademark law is primarily viewed as a consumer protection law. Proprietary and consumer interests are not always balanced. This is especially evident in the doctrine of exhaustion of rights in trademarks, where the trademark owner loses control over the further distribution of their trademarked product once sold. Existing statutory exceptions to this doctrine allow the proprietor to take action against resellers only when the product has been impaired or changed. The exceptions do not account for harm or damage to the reputation and goodwill associated with a trademark as a ground to override exhaustion. This paper analyses legislative and judicial decisions regarding exceptions to exhaustion under Indian trademark law, with a comparative examination of rulings from the US and EU jurisdictions. We then highlight the theoretical differences between trademark and copyright law, exploring moral rights in copyright law and the anti-dilution theory of trademarks. In doing so, we examine the feasibility of expanding exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion to include proprietary concerns, in addition to consumer and market considerations. |
| Date: | 2024–09–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:14715 |
| By: | Pisarkiewicz, Anna Renata; Parcu, Pier Luigi |
| Abstract: | The digital economy, which keeps transforming how people and businesses interact and operate, has certain distinctive characteristics that pose unique challenges for regulators. It is highly dynamic and driven by innovation, which in comparison to the past, happens at a much faster pace and is more disruptive. It is technology-based and, more than before, data-driven, which means that it requires notable ICT and analytic capabilities and the ability to interpret and make decisions based on vast amounts of data. For example, to understand the economies of scale in search and the value of targeted advertising, the UK CMA requested and analysed over 4TB of data from Google and Bing during its market study on digital advertising (Hunt, 2022). Moreover, the digital economy with its corresponding digital regulations is increasingly complex and interconnected, making it difficult for regulators to understand and coherently regulate specific problems or components without examining entire digital and regulatory ecosystems. The digital economy also transcends traditional sectoral silos as well as territorial and jurisdictional limitations, thereby presenting challenges in terms of ensuring harmonized regulatory frameworks and effective compliance across different national authorities and different geographical realities. The German Facebook (Meta) case and the subsequent preliminary ruling from the EU perfectly illustrate both the increasingly blurred lines between data protection and competition law enforcement as well as a need for coordination and collaboration between the respective regulators. Finally, the global and interconnected nature of the digital economy creates important dependencies and vulnerabilities that regulators must understand and navigate, which exposes regulation to geopolitical tensions. The interplay between merger control and foreign direct investment (FDI) screening, for example, in cases involving semiconductors shows how regulatory frameworks must adapt to address these dependencies and vulnerabilities, ensuring that economic considerations are balanced with national security interests amidst rising geopolitical tensions. |
| Keywords: | Regulatory agility, digital markets, enforcement, VUCA framework, collaborative regulation, technological gap, technological proficiency, innovative policymaking, competences |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itsb24:302491 |
| By: | Jens-Uwe Franck; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | This paper explains the novelties for sector inquiries as a result of the 11th amendment to the German Competition Act. The Bundeskartellamt is now authorized to impose measures ranging from behavioural requirements to the unbundling of a company in order to remedy identified competition problems. The new regulatory instrument supplements antitrust law in an appropriate manner. |
| Keywords: | Competition law, sector inquiry, market investigation, New Competition Tool, Bundeskartellamt, divestiture |
| JEL: | K2 L41 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_598 |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | Interim measures are enforcement tools available to competition authorities to prevent harm to competition that may occur before a final decision on the existence of an infringement. Most often these decisions are related to an ongoing business practice that may potentially constitute an abuse of dominance infringement, when a dominant market player illegally engages in practices limiting competition. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries, most competition authorities dispose of interim measures in their legal frameworks and many have used them in past years (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Peru). This paper provides an overview of the state of play of interim measures in the region covering legal frameworks, recent enforcement experiences, as well as challenges and particularities of LAC countries. The paper highlights that interim measures represent a powerful tool for competition authorities and should be carefully used to mitigate enforcement errors and related reputation risks. |
| Date: | 2024–09–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:dafaac:312-en |
| By: | Garcia-Murillo, Martha; MacInnes, Ian |
| Abstract: | The rapid evolution of information technologies has led to a society with worldwide connectivity, efficiency, and convenience. Yet these technological innovations are not free of perils, as they can also negatively impact our economic, political, and social well-being. This paper analyzes the tradeoffs between technological progress and its potential harms, particularly in the United States. Recognizing the historical benefits of digital technologies while also being mindful of their negative consequences, we highlight the complex market dynamics, political influences, and societal forces that determine whether policymakers can pass legislation and regulatory measures to mitigate the potential harm caused by disruptive innovations. The research question driving this paper is: How do market dynamics, political influences, and societal forces interact to shape the prospects of introducing effective legislation and regulatory measures for digital technologies in the United States? In the absence of legal frameworks, what alternative entities are there to mitigate a technology's negative impacts? The research methodology entailed a comprehensive analysis of the scholarly literature and a review of secondary sources related to digital technologies. Synthesizing insights from academic works, reports, and studies, this paper analyzes the multifaceted forces influencing the introduction of legislation and regulatory frameworks for digital technologies in the United States. |
| Keywords: | Digital regulation, social media, digital markets, algorithms, artificial intelligence |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itsb24:302468 |
| By: | Ewan McGaughey |
| Abstract: | How has our economic constitutional order developed, and which laws make our economy democratic? Democracy in politics is familiar and starts with ‘one person, one vote’, but economic democracy is less familiar. In its ideal, it means ‘three stakeholders, one voice’. Workers, investors, and service-users make different contribution types in the economy, so rules to give them voice differ and are still evolving. This paper gives a brief history of how economic democracy developed, the evolving theories, and practices for democratic workplaces, capital, and public enterprise. It then unpacks the laws that make it. First, a board of directors will answer to an enterprise’s stakeholders, not simply appointing itself via so called ‘independent’ directors. Second, workers elect at least one-third or properly one-half of a board of directors, rather than shareholders monopolising all votes, and worker cooperatives are encouraged. Third, all capital fund directors, whether pensions or mutuals, are majority-elected by beneficiaries, and they set the shareholder voting policies, not allowing asset managers or banks to vote on other people’s money in what they deem to be the interests of the ultimate investor. Fourth, in public enterprises, where private competition fails and consumers cannot truly ‘vote with their feet’, service-users hold voting rights for representatives on the board, rather than appointments being monopolised by the state or board incumbents. These norms are spreading, and overcoming evidence-free theories that excuse illegitimate corporate power. |
| Keywords: | Economy, democracy, labour, capital, public services, enterprise, vote |
| JEL: | K0 K11 H40 K22 K23 K31 J01 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp539 |