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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Claudine Desrieux (CRED, University Paris Panthéon-Assas); Romain Espinosa (CIRED (CNRS) and CRED, University Paris Panthéon-Assas); Michael Visser (ENSAE-CREST and CRED, University Paris Panthéon-Assas) |
| Abstract: | Judges often handle multiple cases in a single court session, raising the question of whether their verdicts are interrelated. This paper examines if judicial outcomes are interrelated utilizing novel data from the Paris Labor Court, where judges concurrently determine the amounts employers must pay employees. Exploiting quasi-random assignment of cases and juries to sessions, we estimate simultaneous Tobit models following a recent method by Xu and Lee (2015) to account for the mass at zero of awarded amounts and the simultaneous nature of decisions. Controlling for characteristics of defendants and plaintiffs, case specifics, session features, and judge attributes, our analysis finds no evidence that compensation amounts awarded to plaintiffs are influenced by those awarded to others in the same session. These findings suggest that simultaneous decision-making may offer a more impartial approach to case handling compared to sequential processes, which prior literature suggests are prone to path dependency. |
| Keywords: | Concurrent outcome exposure; Labor dispute; Simultaneous judicial decisions |
| JEL: | J52 K31 |
| Date: | 2024–08–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crs:wpaper:2024-09 |
| By: | Stolowy, Nicole (HEC Paris); Stolowy, Hervé (HEC Paris) |
| Abstract: | Name and Shame practices consist of publicly identifying an individual or corporate entity that is breaking the law. These practices are also called whistleblowing in the legal vocabulary. Already known in Roman times, they have developed throughout the centuries and were formally recognized in the European Union Directive of 23 October 2019 on the ‘protection of persons who report breaches of Union law’. Although EU Member States were supposed to transpose this directive by 17 December 2021, the transposition process is very slow and so far very few countries have adopted a corresponding law. In this context, this article presents this important EU directive and a panorama of whistleblower laws in several sample countries, three covered by the EU Directive (Germany, Spain, France), and three outside its scope (the US, the UK, Japan). This article also offers some reflections on general key aspects of whistleblowing: the defense of the targeted entities, whether a criminal offence can be committed for the purpose of whistleblowing, the key features of a whistleblowing system, and the matters subject to whistleblowing. |
| Keywords: | whistleblower; whistleblowing; name and shame; compliance; EU Directive on whistleblower protection; Germany; Spain; France; US; UK; Japan |
| JEL: | K22 |
| Date: | 2023–02–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1471 |
| By: | Carl Hase; Johannes Kasinger |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that retailers increase prices in response to organized retail crime, revealing a substantial aspect of retail crime's social costs. We match detailed information on store-level crimes to administrative scanner data from the universe of transactions for cannabis retailers in Washington state. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation from the timing of store-level robberies and burglaries, we find that crimes cause a 1.8% increase in retail prices at victimized stores. Nearby rivals of victimized stores increase prices by a similar amount with a two-month lag. Retailers' price responses are not driven by demand effects, increased wholesale costs, or strategic price responses. Instead, they are consistent with precautionary security expenditures. We find the largest pass-through rates for independent stores and in less concentrated markets. We estimate that crime imposes a 1% "hidden" unit tax on affected stores, implying an annual negative welfare effect of approximately $30.6 million, with consumers bearing two-thirds of this burden. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.07201 |
| By: | Gelvez, Juan David (University of Maryland) |
| Abstract: | Governments across the Global South widely rely on tough-on-crime policies to control illicit drug production. Advocates argue these policies are necessary to control cartels; detractors claim they undermine human rights and ultimately yield minimal results in reducing drug production. How do these policies affect the government’s support? Who supports harsh crime policies? This paper addresses these puzzles by examining the political benefits of coca eradication in Colombia. I show that despite the electoral cost in coca-growing areas, politicians who rely on harsh eradication policies are more likely to benefit electorally, as their core supporters perceive aerial spraying as an effective strategy to combat drug production. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences design and a nationally representative survey, I show that right-wing politicians benefited politically from its aerial spraying eradication efforts, despite the punishment of voters living in coca-growing regions. |
| Date: | 2024–07–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:yn9rz |
| By: | Welker, Carl B. |
| Abstract: | Since the first bitcoins were mined in 2009, a large number of blockchains and a vast number of different tokens have been created on the basis of distributed ledger technologies (DLT). The Web3 ecotope, with its essential characteristics such as decentralized transactions and anonymity, is functioning and is preparing to attract billions of dollars in further demand and absorb investor funds. For companies that want to become active on the web3, there is also the question of a generally applicable and enforceable legal framework that covers the most diverse fields of application of the token economy, blockchains with their smart contracts, tokens as universally usable economic objects, token emissions and token trading. A DLT Act was enacted for the first time in the Principality of Liechtenstein in 2019: The "Token- und VTDienstleister-Gesetz" (TVTG, Token and DLT Service Provider Act). In 2023, the EU followed suit with Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 "Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, MiCAR" as a template for legislative amendments in all EEA countries. This discussion paper examines the aforementioned laws in terms of how they reflect new Web3 realities, whether they are suitable in terms of their objectives and approach to promote new digital markets and how tokens are understood as legal objects. |
| Keywords: | Web3, Distributed Ledger Technologies, Blockchain, Tokenization, Regulation |
| JEL: | G18 G20 K22 K23 K24 L26 M13 O32 O33 O35 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iubhbm:301160 |
| By: | Vuillemey, Guillaume (HEC Paris) |
| Abstract: | Limited liability is a key feature of corporate law. Using data on asset prices and capital flows in mid-19th century England, I argue that its liberalization was not decided to relax firms' financing constraints, but to satisfy investors' demand for "safe" stores of value. Limited liability eliminated adverse selection about the quality of other shareholders; stocks could be held to store wealth in diversified portfolios, without extended forms of responsibility. Prices of newly issued stocks are consistent with this hypothesis. Thus, the quest for "safe" stores of value explains not only features of debt markets, but also of equity markets. |
| Keywords: | Limited Liability; Safe Assets; Corporate Responsability; Contracts; Law |
| JEL: | G32 N23 |
| Date: | 2023–02–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1476 |
| By: | Deniz Kattwinkel; Alexander Winter |
| Abstract: | A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question by considering the Condorcet Jury Setting as a mechanism design problem. Applications include the optimal decision mechanisms for boards of directors, political committees, and trial juries. While we allow for any kind of mechanism, the optimal mechanism is a voting mechanism. In the terminology of the trial jury example: When jurors (agents) are more eager to convict than the lawmaker (principal), then the defendant should be convicted if and only if neither too many nor too few jurors vote to convict. This kind of mechanism accords with a judicial procedure from ancient Jewish law. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.07293 |