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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Diogo G. C. Britto; Roberto Hsu Rocha; Paolo Pinotti; Breno Sampaio |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effect of having a child on parents’ criminal behavior using rich administrative data from Brazil. Fathers’ criminal activity sharply increases by up to 10% during the pregnancy period, and by up to 30% two years after birth, while mothers experience only a transitory decline in criminal activity around childbirth. The effect on fathers lasts for at least six years and can explain at least 5% of the overall male crime rate. Domestic violence within the family also increases after childbirth, reflecting both increases in actual violence and women’s propensity to report. The generalized increase in fathers’ crime stands in sharp contrast with previous evidence from developed countries, where childbirth is associated with significant and enduring declines in criminal behavior by both parents. Our findings can be explained by the costs of parenthood and the pervasiveness of poverty among newly formed Brazilian families. Consistent with this explanation, we provide novel evidence that access to maternity benefits largely offsets the increase in crime by fathers after childbirth. |
| Keywords: | crime, parenthood, maternity benefits |
| JEL: | D10 J13 K42 H55 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11083&r= |
| By: | Breuer, Matthias; Cai, Wei; Le, Anthony; Vetter, Felix |
| Abstract: | Recent proposals for a more inclusive capitalism call for labor and minority representation in corporate governance. We examine the joint promise of labor and minority representation in the context of German works councils. The councils are a powerful form of labor representation that grants elected delegates of shop-floor workers codetermination rights (e.g., over work conditions). Since 2001, a quota ensures that elected delegates include delegates of the minority gender in the workforce. Using detailed survey and administrative data, we find that required minority representation helps the representation of the minority gender on works councils, elevates the effort of works councils, and boosts job satisfaction and well-being of workers, irrespective of their gender. At the establishment level, we find that required minority representation reduces worker turnover and increases investment and productivity. Our findings suggest that laws ensuring labor and minority representation in corporate governance can work (i.e., benefit workers without necessarily hurting employers). The seemingly beneficial impact of the laws suggests that frictions hamper the representation of minorities and cooperation among workers and employers. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance, Labor Representation, Gender Quota, Job Satisfaction |
| JEL: | J15 J16 J28 J53 J54 J63 J71 J81 J82 J83 K22 K31 M12 M14 M50 M54 P16 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:294850&r= |
| By: | Zoltán Szücs |
| Abstract: | This article proposes to present the state of affairs of French municipal police forces, and to provide a review of the relevant scientific literature at the moment of the creation of the municipal police of Paris. This municipal police was born in a context of low levels of sense of insecurity, but high levels of different kinds of public nuisance, justifying the focus of its activities on the disturbances of public tranquillity. To keep this focus, one of the major issues is to maintain a clear and complementary share of competences with the forces of the national police. However, our article alerts on some difficulties to do so : according to our estimates on panel data, increasing municipal police force size are on average accompanied by a simultaneous drop in the national police force size on a local level in France, generating a substitution effect. In addition, a series of operational choices – in terms of recruitment, equipment, resource allocation – will impact if the new municipal police can efficiently address the issues of public tranquillity, which also depends on the level of trust and legitimacy recognized by the population. |
| Keywords: | policing ; municipal police ; public policies ; security ; public tranquillity |
| JEL: | H41 K40 K42 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-15&r= |
| By: | Elena Pisanelli |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of the 2014 Italian divorce law on help-seeking behavior of domestic violence victims and femicides. I find that contrary to expectations, the reform, which aimed to make divorce cheaper while requiring mutual consent, led to a decrease in help-seeking behavior among intimate partner violence (IPV) survivors and an increase in femicides perpetrated by husbands. These findings suggest that while reducing the cost of divorce may empower individuals to leave abusive relationships, the requirement for mutual consent may inadvertently escalate violence as husbands seek to assert control and prevent separation. The study underscores the importance of considering the unintended consequences of divorce legislation and prioritizing the safety of IPV survivors in family policy interventions. |
| JEL: | J12 J16 I10 I31 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1195&r= |
| By: | N. Edward Coulson (University of California, Irvine); Thao Le (Georgia State University); Victor Ortego-Marti (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside); Lily Shen (Clemson University) |
| Abstract: | We utilize state-level differences in the legal relationship between landlords and tenants to estimate their impact on rental housing affordability. We construct a Tenant Rights Index (TRI) spanning 1997 to 2016 to assess its effects on eviction rates and rental market outcomes. Increased TRI correlates with higher median rent, lower vacancy rates, and increased homelessness. To rationalize our findings, we develop a search and matching model of the rental market with free entry of both landlords and tenants, and an endogenous eviction mechanism. In our environment, more stringent eviction regulations reduce evictions and raise the relative demand for housing. However, stricter regulations also lead to higher rents and lower vacancy rates. We calibrate the model to the US rental market to quantitatively assess the mechanism in our model. An increase in eviction costs has a larger impact on the eviction rate and market tightness, with a relatively smaller effect on rents and vacancy rates. Our findings suggest that while stringent regulations may reduce evictions, they could lead to unintended consequences such as inflated house prices and heightened homelessness. Policymakers must carefully balance these potential drawbacks against the goal of tenant protection to avoid exacerbating existing housing affordability challenges. |
| Keywords: | Tenant Rights, Eviction, Rent Affordability, Landlord-Tenant Laws |
| JEL: | I38 K25 R13 R28 R31 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucr:wpaper:202404&r= |
| By: | Guichard, Lucas (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg); Machado, Joël (LISER) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the externalities arising from a bilateral asylum policy - the list of safe origin countries - relying on a tractable model. Using self-collected monthly data, we estimate that including one origin country on the safe list of a given destination decreases asylum applications from that origin to that destination by 29%. We use a counterfactual policy simulation to quantify the spillover effects occurring across origin and destination countries. Individuals from targeted origin countries move to alternative destinations. Individuals from untargeted origins divert from alternative destinations. The magnitude of the externalities depends on the size of the affected flows. |
| Keywords: | migration, asylum seekers, asylum policy, safe origin country, refugee |
| JEL: | F22 K37 J61 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16935&r= |
| By: | Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (University of Amsterdam); Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam); Francesco Parisi (University of Minnesota); Ram Singh (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | It is well known that sellers have a general obligation to disclose “negative” information about hidden defects of their products. In contrast, buyers usually do not have a binding obligation to disclose “positive” information about the hidden qualities of the products. The leading explanation for the asymmetric treatment of the two sides - buyers and sellers - is provided by appealing to incentives to invest in relevant information. It is argued that the imposition of disclosure duties on buyers would undermine their incentives to acquire socially useful but costly information ex-ante. This explanation is unsatisfactory. First, the failure to correct asymmetric information problems ex-post would cause, as we will show, an inverse adverse selection problem ex-ante. This would lead to the uninformed sellers’withdrawal from the market. Consequently, resources would not move to (informed)buyers with higher valuations. In this paper, we develop a model to balance the benefits of information acquisition, on the one hand, with the costs of asymmetric information, on the other hand. We use the framework to study the incentives created by different defaultdisclosure and non-disclosure - rules. We examine the optimum default rules by showing that the choice of alternative disclosure rules makes a difference when parties can contract around defaults at a moderate cost. Unlike disclosure rules, non-disclosure default rules yield partially separating equilibria that preserve the buyers’ incentives to acquire information and foster trade opportunities between expert and uninformed sellers. JEL Code: D44, D82, D86, K12 |
| Keywords: | asymmetric information, penalty default rules, inverse adverse selection |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cde:cdewps:346&r= |